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PRELUDE TO A CHURCH-STATE: THE
SUPREMES SET THE STAGE FOR FAITH-BASED
INITIATIVES
Gary D. Allison*
"[Iln constitutional adjudication some steps, which when taken were
thought to approach 'the verge,' have become the platform for yet further
steps. A certain momentum develops in constitutional theory and it can
be a 'downhill thrust' easily set in motion but difficult to retard or stop."1
I. INTRODUCTION
Late in its 2000 Term, the United States Supreme Court decided an
important Free Speech case, Good News Club v. Milford Central School,2
which could play an important role in determining the constitutionality
of faith-based initiatives. In Good News, six Justices joined a majority
opinion to hold that a public school "violated the free speech rights" of a
religious club for elementary school-aged students by refusing to permit
the club to meet on its premises after regular school hours.3 Despite the
religious worship and proselytizing characteristics of the club's meetings,
and the fact that its meetings were directed by a minister and his wife, a
majority of five Justices found that the schoors denial of the club's re-
quest to meet on its premises could not be justified as necessary to avoid
"violating the Establishment Clause."
Upon a cursory examination, Good News appears to be not much
more than a logical extension of the Free Speech and Establishment
Clause principles the Court established in a twenty-one-year-old chain
* Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law. LL.M., Columbia University
School of Law (1976); J.D., The University of Tulsa College of Law (1972); B.S., The Univer-
sity of Tulsa (1968). The author wishes to thank his research assistant, Jake Woodward,
for exemplary help on the preparation of this article.
1. Chief Justice Burger, issuing a warning in his majority opinion in Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, 403 U.S. 602, 624 (1971), that permitting new or expanded state aid to church-
related educational institutions could lead to entanglements between government and
religion against which Religion Clauses were intended to protect. Id. at 624-25.
2. 121 S. Ct. 2093 (2001).
3. Id. at 2097, 2100-02 (opinion by Thomas, J., joined fully by Rehnquist, C.J., and
O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., and joined in part by Breyer, J.).
4. Id. at 2097, 2103-07 (opinion by Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ.).
1
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of cases involving public fora established by public educational institu-
tions. The chain includes:
Widmar v. Vincen (a public university engaged in unconsti-
tutional speech content discrimination under the First
Amendment by denying a student group dedicated to engag-
ing in religious worship and religious discussions access to a
general public forum, and the speech content discrimina-
tion could not be justified as a necessary action to avoid vio-
lating the Establishment Clause);
* Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens8
(a public high school violated the federal Equal Access Act by
denying a student-run Christian Club -formed so that students
could engage in Bible reading, Christian fellowship and
prayer-access to a limited public forum,9 and the Equal Access
Act did not violate the Establishment Clausel°);
* Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District"
(a public school district engaged in unconstitutional view-
point discrimination under the First Amendment by denying
a religious group permission to use its school buildings after
regular school hours to present a film series discussing child
rearing and family values from a religious perspective, 12 and
the discrimination could not be justified as a necessary ac-
tion to avoid violating the Establishment Clause3 );
* Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia'4 (a
public university engaged in unconstitutional viewpoint dis-
crimination under the First Amendment by denying an
evangelical Christian student group access to its program for
paying the printing costs of student publications because
the group's publication "primarily promotes or manifests a
particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate real-
5. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
6. Id. at 264 (opinion by Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, JJ.).
7. Id. at 270-76.
8. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
9. Id. 231-47 (plurality) (opinion by O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist. C.J., and White
and Blackmun, JJ., and joined in part by Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ.).
10. Id. at 247-53 (plurality) (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and White and
Blackmun, JJ.); id. at 259-62 (Kennedy, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); id. at 263-70 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., concurring
in the judgment).
11. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
12. Id. 386-94 (opinion by White, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Blackmun, Stevens,
O'Connor and Souter, JJ.); id. at 397 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 397-401 (Scalia, J.,
concurring, joined by Thomas, J.).
13. Id. at 394-95 (opinion by White, J.); Id. at 397 (Kennedy, J., concurring; id. at 398-
401 (Scalia, J., concurring).
14. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
[Vol. 37:111
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ity[,]"' 5 and the discrimination could not be justified as a
necessary action to avoid violating the Establishment
Clause16).
The extension is three-fold: (1) the forum at issue extends from an open
public forum1 7 to limited public fora;' 8 (2) the targeted audience of the
affected group extends from the general adult public,19 to college stu-
dents, to high school students, 2 1 to elementary school students;22 and
(3) the affected group's expression extends from religious-based com-
mentary on contemporary secular issues23 to various forms of religious
24
worship, instruction, and discussion.
15. Id. at 822-37 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor,
Scalia and Thomas, JJ.).
16. Id. at 837-46 (Kennedy, J.); id. at 846-52 (O'Connor, J. concurring and qualifying
her support of the majority opinion); id. at 852-63 (Thomas, J., concurring and specifically
rebutting the dissent's historical analysis of the Court's Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence).
17. Widrar, 454 U.S. at 267-69 (university practice of making its facilities generally
available for the activities of registered student groups characterized as an open public fo-
rum).
18. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2100 (Court assumed that the Milford School operated a
limited public forum "reservied] ... for [use by] certain groups or for the discussion of cer-
tain topics.") (citations and quotations omitted); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-30 (Court
treats university program for paying the costs of printing the publications of student-run
organizations as a limited public forum); Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 390-92 (Court treats
school district policy to limit the use of its facilities to two of ten purposes recognized as
valid uses of public school property by State Education Law as a limited public forum);
Mergens, 496 U.S. at 243-47 (Court finds that a high school's policies for recognizing non-
curricula related student groups constitutes a limited open forum within the meaning of
the Equal Access Act).
19. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 387-89 (targeted audience consisted of members of
the general public who would be interested in an adult-oriented film series presenting fam-
ily and child rearing issues from a Christian perspective).
20. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 823-25 (targeted audience consisted of university students
engaged in organizing and operating student-run organizations that created and distrib-
uted publications on campus); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265 (targeted audience consists of uni-
versity student readers of a religiously-oriented newspaper published by a student organi-
zation).
21. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 231-32 (targeted audience consists of high school students who
are members of student groups officially recognized by the public high school and other
students who are encouraged to join such groups).
22. Good News, 121 S.Ct. at 2098 (targeted audience consists of public school children
aged 6 to 12).
23. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 826 (describing the student group's publication, Wide
Awake, as a "journal [which] 'offers a Christian perspective on both personal and commu-
nity Issues, especially those relevant to college students at the University of Virginia.'"); see
Lamb's Chapel 508 U.S. at 387-88 (describing the petitioning church's desire to use
school facilities to show the public a six part film series "dealing with family and child-
rearing issues faced by parents today, through a discussion of Dr. James Dobson's views
on the undermining influences of media that could only be counterbalanced by returning
to traditional, Christian family values instilled at an early stage.").
24. The Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 202 F.3d 502, 504-06 (2d Cir. 2000)
(hereinafter Milford Circuit) (describing the typical Good News Club meeting as opening with
children having an opportunity to win prizes if they "remember[ed] 'the memory verse' from
the previous week's meeting," id. at 504, continuing with a prayer by a licensed minister
and adult leader of the club, id. at 504, followed by "a 'moral or value' lesson centered
around a [Bible] verse" that features game-playing designed to teach the children the
"memory verse" and "a Bible story that emphasizes the same moral value," id. at 505, and
20011
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On closer examination, Good News arguably represents a signifi-
cant change in church-state jurisprudence masked as a mere incre-
mental extension of long-existing Free Speech and Establishment Clause
principles. The extension bridges a huge factual gap by adapting Free
Speech and Establishment Clause principles originally applied to uni-
versity students seeking access to a university's open public forum in
order to engage in religious worship and discussion to a professional
clergyman's attempts to gain access to a school district's elementary
school in order to proselytize elementary school-aged children and en-
gage them in religious worship and instruction. More importantly, this
extension applies Free Speech rules developed in cases involving discus-
sions of secular issues from a religious perspective to speech that could
be fairly characterized as purely religious in nature, thereby blurring, as
to religious speech, the distinction between content discrimination and
viewpoint discrimination. Further, Good News makes it clear that the
United States Supreme Court will never accept an Establishment Clause
justification for excluding a religious speaker from a public forum, tradi-
tional, designated, or limited. In fact, the Good News Free Speech and
Establishment Clause issues are resolved in a manner that may estab-
lished the basis for the Court to uphold government giving religious or-
ganizations faith-initiatives grants to tackle secular problems with reli-
gious methods.
II. THE OPERATIVE FREE SPEECH PRINCIPLES
It is necessary to have a good grasp of key precedents from cases
involving public institutions imposing limitations on speech to under-
stand the significance of Good News. The relevant speech limitation
cases are those in which the Court established forum analysis as a criti-
cal factor in deciding whether speech limitations by a public entity vio-
lates the Free Speech Clause.
A. Forum Classification
In Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educator's Associa-
tion,25 the U.S. Supreme Court summarized its earlier holdings involving
the exercise of Free Speech rights on public property by asserting that
"[tihe existence of a right of access to public property and the standard
by which limitations upon such a right must be evaluated differ depend-
concluding with a challenge "to live by the value taught in the day's lesson through trust in
God and Jesus Christ," iL., and an invitation to the unsaved to accept Jesus as their sav-
ior, id. at 505-06); Mergens, 496 U.S. at 232 (describing the student group Mergens wished
to initiate as serving the purpose of "permit[ting] the students to read and discuss the Bi-
ble, to have fellowship, and to pray together."); Widrear, 454 U.S. at 265 n. 2 (describing
the "typical Cornerstone meeting [as] including prayer, hymns, Bible commentary, and dis-
cussion of religious views and experiences").
25. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
[Vol. 37:111
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ing on the character of the property at issue."26 The Court then made its
"first major effort to recognize and classify the types of public fo-
rums ... .27
First, the Court classified as traditional public fora those "places
which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to as-
sembly and debate. . . ."2 The Court cited streets and parks, "which
'have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public, and,
time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communi-
cating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions'" as
"quintessential" examples of the traditional public forum.2 9
Second, the Court classified as designated public fora "public prop-
erty which the State has opened for use by the public as a place for ex-
pressive activity."30 The Court cited as examples of such fora those the
State makes "generally open to the public" such as "university meeting
facilities[, school board meetings[,1 and municipal theaters .... ,31
Third, the Court classified as nonpublic fora "[p]ublic property
which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public communica-
tion .... ,32 This classification, said the Court, is based on the "rec-
ogni[tion] that the 'First Amendment does not guarantee access to prop-
erty simply because it is owned or controlled by the government. '- 3 It is
also premised on the proposition that the "State, no less than a private
owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control
for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated."34
Finally, in a footnote the Court appeared to recognize as a subcate-
gory of the designated public forum those public fora. "created for a lim-
26. Id. at 44.
27. John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law § 16.47, 1229 (6th ed.,
West 2000).
28. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. Note, however, that the Court did not use the label "tradi-
tional public forum" until the next paragraph, in which it distinguished this type of forum
from another type of forum it ultimately labeled as "[p]ublic property... by... designa-
tion .... " Id. at 46.
29. Id. at 45 (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
30. Id. Note, the Court did not in this case specifically use the label "designated public
forum" for this type of communicative public property. This label arose from a later para-
graph in the opinion in which the Court identified a third type of forum as being "[plublic
property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication .... "
Id. at 46 (emphasis added). The Court specifically referred to this type of forum as a desig-
nated public forum in IntL Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672,
678, (1992).
31. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (citing Wdmar, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)) ("university meeting facili-
ties"); City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist v. Wis. EmpL Relations Commit, 429 U.S. 167 (1976)
(school board business); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975)
("municipal theaters").
32. Id. The Court did not refer to this type of property as a nonpublic forum until, in a
later portion of its opinion, it stated that "[i]mplicit in the concept of the nonpublic forum is
the right to make distinctions in access on the basis of subject matter and speaker iden-
tity." Id. at 49.
33. Id. at 46 (quoting U.S. Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U.S.
114, 129 (1981)).
34. Id. at 46 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
20011 115
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ited purpose such as use by certain groups.., or for the discussion of
certain subjects."3 5 But, the Court made the status of the limited desig-
nated public forum quite confusing by stating that:
Implicit in the concept of the nonpublic forum is the right to make distinc-
tions in access on the basis of subject matter and speaker identity. These
distinctions may be impermissible in a public forum but are inherent and
inescapable in the process of limiting a nonpublic forum to activities com-
patible with the intended purpose of the property. The touchstone for
evaluating these distinctions is whether they are reasonable in light of the
purpose which the forum at issue serves.3
6
Thus, the Court created an ambiguity by identifying the reservation of a
forum for a limited use (by a specific group or for discussion of a specific
topic) as the hallmark characteristic of both nonpublic fora and limited
designated public fora.
This ambiguity was reinforced in Perry by the Court's holding that a
school system did not have to permit a labor union, which was not the
exclusive bargaining agent of its teachers, to use its internal mailing sys-
tem even though it had granted access to other "outside organizations[,]
such as the YMCA, Cub Scouts, and other civic and church organiza-
tions[, which had secured plermission to use the system. . . from the in-
dividual building principal.... ."7 The rationale for this holding was a
clear and simple ruling that "[tihis type of selective access does not
transform government property into a public forum. " 38 Unfortunately,
the Court proceeded to complicate matters by acknowledging that this
selective access might have "created a 'limited' public forum... [with a]
'constitutional right of access ... extend[ing] only to Girl Scouts, the lo-
cal boy's club and other organizations that engage in activities of interest
and educational relevance to students .... ,9 Such a forum, said the
Court, "might be... generally open for use by the [designated organiza-
tions]," but remain unavailable to unrelated organizations.4 °
The United States Supreme Court has attempted in subsequent
cases to clarify the distinction between limited designated public fora
and nonpublic fora, but its "clarifications" have been based on hotly dis-
puted rules that are not easily applied. In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal De-
fense and Education Fund, Inc.,4 a four-Justice majority observed that
"government does not create a public forum by inaction or by permitting
35. Id. at 45 n. 7, citing Widrar as authority for creating a public forum limited to the
use of certain groups (student groups), and Madison as authority for creating a public fo-
rum limited to the discussion of certain subjects (school board business).
36. Id. at 49.
37. Perry, 460 U.S. at 47-49.
38. Id. at 47.
39. See id. at 48.
40. Id.
41. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
[Vol. 37:111
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limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional fo-
rum for public discourse."42 The Court also announced that the deter-
mination of whether the requisite intent is present should be made
through examination of government policies and practices as well as "the
nature of the property and its compatibility with expressive activ-
ity ... "43 Most importantly, the Court stated that it "will not find that a
public forum has been created in the face of clear evidence of a contrary
intent, .... nor will [it]... infer that the government intended to create
a public forum when the nature of the property is inconsistent with ex-
pressive activity."44
In Cornelius, the Court applied the aforementioned principles to
hold that the lower federal courts erred in concluding that the federal
government violated the Free Speech rights of legal defense and political
advocacy groups by unreasonably excluding them "from participat[ing]
in the Combined Federal Campaign (CFC.. .), a charity drive aimed a
federal employees."45 Key to this holding was the Court's finding that the
CFC was a nonpublic forum because:
A. "The Government's consistent policy has been to limit participation in
the CFC to 'appropriate' voluntary agencies and to require agencies
seeking admission to obtain permission from federal and local Cam-
paign officials[;]"
4 6
B. "There [wa]s no evidence suggesting that the granting of the requisite
permission [wals merely ministerial[]" 47
C. "[Tihe Campaign was designed to minimize the disruption to the work-
place that had resulted from unlimited ad hoc solicitation activities by
lessening the amount of expressive activity occurring on federal prop-
erty[;]"48 and
D. The nature of the federal property involved-federal workplaces that
"exist[ I] to accomplish the business of the employer' 49 -conferred on
"Government... the right to exercise control over access [thereto]...
42. Id. at 802 (citation omitted). Note, only seven Justices participated in this case be-
cause Justices Marshall and Powell took no part in the decision of the case, id. at 813, and
three Justices, Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens, dissented. Id. at 813, 833. Thus, the
opinion of the Court, which was written by Justice O'Connor, id. at 790, was joined only by
Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist.
43. Id. at 802.
44. Id. at 803.
45. Id. at 790. The lower courts had entered summary judgment against the federal
government based exclusively on the reasonableness issue, so the issue of whether the ex-
clusions were also based on viewpoint discrimination had not been decided below or fully
briefed at the Supreme Court. Id. at 811-12. As a consequence, the Supreme Court left
the excluded groups free to pursue the viewpoint discrimination issue on remand of the
case back to the lower federal courts. Id. at 811-13.
46. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804 (einphasis added).
47. Id.
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in order to avoid interruptions to the performance of the duties of its
employees."5 0
In sum, the Court found that it was "neither [the federal govern-
ment's]... practice nor its policy... to designate the CFC as a public
forum open to all tax-exempt organizations,"5 ' for "[sluch selective ac-
cess, unsupported by evidence of a purposeful designation for public
use, does not create a public forum."
5 2
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Brennan, sharply dissented
from the distinction made by the Cornelius majority between limited
public fora and nonpublic fora.5 3 He defined nonpublic fora as simply
"property that is not compatible with general expressive activity."54 This
did not mean that Justice Blackmun required nonpublic fora be devoid
of expressive activity, for he recognized that "[siome 'outsiders' may be
participants 'in the forum's official business,'" while "[o]thers may be
provided access to the property ... because [the government] ... be-
lieves they will further the goals the government uses the property to
serve. " 5  Rather, it meant that Justice Blackmun believed the Court
should not have labeled the CFC as a nonpublic forum without first de-
termining whether the expressive activity of the excluded charitable or-
ganizations would have been incompatible with the purposes of the CFC
and federal workplaces.5 6
After asserting that the compatibility determination requires the
Court to "balanc[e] the First Amendment interests of the speaker and so-
ciety's interests in freedom of speech against the interests served by re-
serving the property to its normal use,"5 7 with some justification Justice
Blackmun accused the Court of "simply label[ing] the property and dis-
pens[ing] with the balancing."58 He also decried the Court's insistence
50. Id. at 806.
51. Id. at804.
52. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 805 (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 813-33 (Blackmun, J. dissenting, joined by Brennan, J.). Justice Stevens also
dissented, id. at 833-36, but he did so on grounds that the reasons proffered by the gov-
ernment to justify excluding legal defense and political advocacy groups from the CFC
"Iwe]re so plainly without merit that they actually lend support to an inference of bias." Id.
at 835-36.
54. Id. at 819.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 820-21.
57. Id. at 821.
58. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 821 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In this regard, Justice
Blackmun later charged that "ithe Court's analysis fors[ook] that balancing, and aban-
don[ed] the compatibility test that always has served as a threshold indicator of the proper
balance." Id. at 822.
These assertions are not precisely accurate, for as noted previously, the majority did exam-
ine the nature and purpose of federal workplaces in determining that the CFC was a non-
public forum. Id. at 805-06. But, the majority did not make this examination the thresh-
old test. Instead, the Court cited it as an incidental factor supporting its conclusion, based
on its analyses of CFC policies, practices and history, that the government never intended
for the CFC to be a limited public forum. Id. at 804-06. Moreover, it determining that it
[Vol. 37:111
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on attaching the label public forum only to government property which
by virtue of a long history of government acquiescence has been used by
the people for communicative purposes, or which has been expressly
designated by government as a place of public discourse, because he be-
lieved many government properties not meeting these requirements "are
natural sites for expressive activity.,
59
Finally, Justice Blackmun rejected the Court's holding that the gov-
ernment's express intention to make government property available for
the communicative activity of all similarly situated speakers is the key
factor distinguishing limited public fora from nonpublic fora. This dis-
tinction, he asserted, "ma[del it virtually impossible to prove that a fo-
rum restricted to a particular class of speakers is a limited public fo-
rum,"60 for "[if] the government does not create a limited public forum
unless it intends to provide an 'open forum' for expressive activity....
[t]he very fact that the Government denied access to the speaker indi-
cated that the government did not intend to provide... [such a] fo-
rum .... "61 As a consequence, Justice Blackmaun believed that the
Court's reasoning in Cornelius resolved the ambiguities of Perry by
"empt[yingl the limited-public-forum concept of meaning and collaps[ing]
the three categories of [traditional] public forum, [designated] limited
public forum, and non-public forum into two."
6 2
The dispute between the Cornelius majority and dissent essentially
was over whether the scope of speakers' access to government property
for the pursuit of their expressive activities should be determined by the
majority's rather formalistic forum classification principles or by the dis-
sent's more dynamic functional analysis of the suitability of government
property for hosting expressive activity. In International Society for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee,63 this dispute intensified as the Court
grappled with whether airport terminals were some sort of public fo-
was reasonable to exclude the legal defense and political advocacy groups from the CFC,
the Court opined that "[in] contrast to a public fonun, a finding of strict incompatibility be-
tween the nature of the speech or the identity of the speaker and the functioning of the
nonpublic forum is not mandated." Id. at 808.
59. Id. at 822. In this regard, Justice Blackmun noted that many government properties
ideally suited for expressive activity have no history of being used that way because they
are recent phenomena, or they have "only recently... become associated with the issue
that citizens wish to use the property to discuss," or they have been unjustifiably excluded
by government as places of expressive activity. Id.
60. Id. at 825.
61. Id.
62. Id. Justice Blackmun also believed that the Court's holding that the "CFC [wa]s not
a limited public forum because the Government permitted only 'limited discourse,'" was
inconsistent with prior cases where similar limitations caused the Court to treat the gov-
ernment property involved as limited public fora. Id. at 823. See Southeastern Promotions,
Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 549 n. 4 (1975) (a publicly owned and operated theater lim-
ited the use of its facility to "clean, healthful entertainment); Widmar, 454 U.S. 263 (a
public university limited the use of its meeting facilities for registered nonreligious student
groups).
63. 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
20011
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rum.64 By a narrow 5-4 margin, the formalistic classification approach
of the Cornelius majority prevailed so that the Court, per a majority opin-
ion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that airport terminals con-
stituted nonpublic fora.65 This conclusion was bitterly opposed by Jus-
tice Kennedy in an odd opinion that concurred in the judgment but
passionately disagreed with the majority's forum analysis. 66 Three dis-
senting Justices joined the forum analysis portion of Justice Kennedy's
concurrence.67
Taking a literal approach, the majority held that airport terminals
could not be regarded as traditional public fora, no matter how much
expressive activity they had hosted, because "the lateness with which
the modern air terminal has made its appearance.. . hardly qualifies [it]
for the description of having 'immemorially... time out of mind' been
held in the public trust and used for purposes of expressive activity."6
Moreover, noted the Court, "... only 'in recent years ... has [it] become
common practice for various religious and nonprofit organizations to use
commercial airports as a forum for the distribution of literature, the so-
licitation of funds, the proselytizing of new members, and other similar
activities.' 69 Alternatively, after citing Cornelius for the proposition that
'a traditional public forum is property that has as 'a principal purpose
the free exchange of ideas,'"70 the majority concluded that airport termi-
nals do not have such a principal purpose since "they are commercial
establishments funded by users fees and designed to make a regulated
profit, and... nearly all who visit [them] do so for some travel related
purpose.-7
The Krishna Consciousness majority also foreclosed the possibility
that airport terminals could be classified as designated public fora by
opining that "the frequent and continuing litigation evidencing the op-
erators' objections [to speech activity] belies any ... claim" that they
"have been intentionally opened by their operators to such activity."
7 2
The majority reinforced this conclusion by observing that "[airport
64. Krishna Consciousness arose from challenges by the International Society for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., to regulations adopted by the Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey, which prohibited the repetitive solicitation of money and the repetitive distri-
bution of literature within airport terminals. The Court resolved the challenge to the solici-
tation prohibition in Krishna Consciousness, but the literature distribution prohibition was
dealt with in Lee v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. 830
(1992) [hereinafter Lee].
65. Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 674-85 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White,
O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas, JJ.).
66. Id- at 693-709 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment, dissenting from the mode
of analysis).
67. Id. at 709-16 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun and Stevens, JJ.).
68. Id. at 680 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ.).
69. Id. (citation omitted).
70. Id. at 679 (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800).
71. Krishnu Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 682.
72. Id. at 680-81.
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builders and managers [have] focus[ed] their efforts on providing termi-
nals that will contribute to efficient air travel,"73 so "few [airports] have
included among their purposes the designation of a forum for solicitation
and distribution activities."7 4
Justice Kennedy asserted that the forum analysis of the Krishna
Consciousness majority was flawed because it made "the public forum
status of public property depend[ ] on the government's defined purpose
for the property, or on an explicit decision by the government to dedicate
the property to expressive activity."75 This led him to condemn "[as] a
most doubtful fiction" the majority's "notion that traditional public fo-
rums are properties that have public discourse as their principal pur-
pose."76 He supported this condemnation by observing that "streets and
sidewalks... [are created] to facilitate transportation... ,' and public
parks "[are created] ... as much for beauty and open space as for dis-
course."7 8 He also rejected the majority's definition of designated public
fora as property the government explicitly dedicates to facilitating public
discourse for being "so stringent that ... [it created un]certain[ty as to]
whether the category has any content left at all."-
9
Echoing Justice Blackmun's call in Cornelius for a dynamic func-
tional test for determining if government property is a public forum, Jus-
tice Kennedy proposed treating government property as a public forum
"[if] [its] objective, physical characteristics... and the actual public ac-
cess and uses that have been permitted by the government indicate that
expressive activity would be appropriate and compatible with those
uses .... . 80 He denoted three key factors for applying this test:
1. "whether the property shares physical similarities with more tradi-
tional public forums,"8t
2. "whether the government has permitted or acquiesced in broad public
access to the property, "82 and
3. "whether expressive activity would tend to interfere in a significant
way with the uses to which the government... has dedicated the
73. Ia at 682.
74. Id. at 683.
75. Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 695 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment,
and dissenting from the mode of analysis; joined in the analytical portion by Souter,
Blackmun, and Stevens JJ.).
76. Id. at 696.
77. Id. at 696-97.
78. Id. at 697.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 698.
81. Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 698-99 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judg-
ment, and dissenting from the mode of analysis; joined in the analytical portion by Souter,
Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.).
82. Id. at 699.
20011
11
Allison: Prelude to a Church-State: The Supremes Set the Stage for Faith-B
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2001
TULSA LAW REVIEW
property."8 3
Justice Kennedy readily concluded that airport terminals met his
public forum test. First, he found that airport terminals are similar
physically to traditional fora in that their "public spaces... are broad,
public thoroughfares full of people and lined with stores and other com-
mercial activities. "84 Second, he found that government had provided
the public with broad access to airport terminals because the relevant
areas of airport terminals have been "open to the public without restric-
tion" and visited by "a vast portion of the public."8 5 Third, he found that
expressive activity was "quite compatible with the uses of major airports"
since the airports involved in this case, as well as major airports around
the country, had in the past permitted a great deal of expressive activity
in their terminals and any problems of congestion that might arise could
be handled by adequate time, place and manner regulations., 6
B. Speech Regulation Standards
The fight over how to distinguish public fora from nonpublic fora
was not just a sterile academic exercise, for rights of speakers to engage
in expressive activity are much greater in public fora than they are in
nonpublic fora. The government's power to regulate speech in tradi-
tional public fora is severely limited:
A. "government may not prohibit all communicative activity;"
B. regulation of speech content must be "necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and ... [be] narrowly drawn to achieve that end;" and
C. time, place and manner regulations must be "content neutral .... nar-
rowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave
open ample alternative channels of communication."
8 7
"Although a State is not required to indefinitely retain the open character
of [a designated public forum], as long as it does so it is bound by the
83. Id.
84. Id. at 700.
85. Id. Justice Kennedy excluded the secured areas of airports from the relevant areas.
Id- He rejected the notion that airport terminals can be distinguished from traditional pub-
lic fora because most people who use them do so for travel purposes by pointing out that
most people also use streets and sidewalks for travel. Id. As to the extent of public's use
of airport terminals, he found that in 1986 the three airports involved in this case "served
over 78 million passengers." Id. Finally, he rejected the assertion that the "airport opera-
tors['] ... authority to restrict public access when necessary... bars the conclusion
that... airports are public forums" by noting that a government's power to "bulldoze a
park" would not strip the park of its public forum status as long as it remains open as a
park. Id at 700-0 1.
86. Id. at 701. In this regard, he cited several United States Court of Appeals cases sup-
porting his assertion that prior to Krishnu Consciousness "expressive activity ha[d]
been... commonplace... [in] major airports for many years, in part because of the wide
consensus among the Courts of Appeals... that the public spaces of airports are public
forums." Id. at 701-02 (case citations omitted).
87. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
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same [content, time, place and manner] standards as apply in a tradi-
tional public forum."88
By contrast with the strict scrutiny it applies to speech regulations
in public fora cases, and consistent with its definition of nonpublic fora
as government properties which have neither been traditionally appro-
priated by the public, nor expressly designated by government, as places
in which speakers can freely engage in expressive activity,8 9 the Supreme
Court has given the government great latitude in regulating speech in a
nonpublic forum. Not only may the State impose "time place and man-
ner regulations, . . [it] may [also] reserve the forum for its intended
purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on
speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely be-
cause public officials oppose the speaker's view."90 Moreover, having
noted that "distinctions [based on subject matter or speaker identity] ...
are inherent and inescapable in the process of limiting a nonpublic fo-
rum to activities compatible with [its] intended purpose... ,'91 the Court
has made it clear that it will judge the constitutionally of the govern-
ment's use of such distinctions by asking "whether they are reasonable
in light of the purpose which the forum at issue serves."9
C. Reasonableness Analysis v. Strict Scrutiny & Time, Place, and
Manner Analysis
A person's opportunity to engage in speech activity on government
property is severely reduced if the court decides that the government
property involved is a non-public forum, for the reasonableness criteria
applied in non-public forum cases has given the government much
greater discretion as to whether to admit a speaker than it would have if
the property were not a non-public forum. 93 First, the Court has indi-
cated that government may, without further justification, restrict use of
non-public fora exclusively to those who participate in the fora's official
business.9 4 Yet, the Court has left the government free to pick and
88. Id. at 46.
89. Id.
90. Id. (citing Greenburgh, 453 U.S. at 131 n. 7).
91. Id. at49.
92. Id.
93. Indeed, Justice Brennan, dissenting in United States v. Kokinda, complained that
"these public forum categories-originally conceived of as a way of preserving First
Amendment rights. . .- have been used in some of our recent decisions as a means of
upholding restrictions on speech." Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 741 (1990) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). Echoing this concern, Justice Kennedy stated in his Krishna Consciousness con-
currence that "Our public forum doctrine ought not to... convert what was once an
analysis protective of expression into one which grants the government authority to restrict
speech byflat" 505 U.S. at 693-94 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment, and dissent-
ing from the mode of analysis; joined in the analytical portion by Souter, Blackmun and
Stevens, JJ.).
94. Perry, 460 U.S. at 53, wherein the Court opined that "when government property is
not dedicated to open communication the government may-without further justifica-
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choose among speakers who do not participate in the official business of
its non-public fora by refusing to accept arguments that discrimination
among such speakers is unreasonable. Thus in Perry, the Court refused
to find that it was unreasonable for a School district to deny a labor un-
ion, which a was not the official bargaining representative of its teachers,
access to its internal mail systems even though it provided access to
other "outside organizations with no special duties to teachers."
9 5
Second, the Court has accepted as a reasonable justification for ex-
cluding speakers from non-public fora the government's assertions, even
when supported by little or no evidence, that their inclusion could dis-
rupt the official business of the fora. For example, in Perry the Court
accepted as reasonable the school district's assertion that denying the
outsider union access to the school district's internal mail system would
insure labor peace even though no evidence had been introduced show-
ing that the union's past access had produced a disturbance or indicat-
ing that a future disturbance was likely to occur.96 In doing so, the
Court expressly stated that "[wie have not required that such proof be
present to justify the denial of access to a nonpublic forum on grounds
that the proposed use may disrupt the property's intended function."
97
And, in Cornelius the Court found that the federal government's decision
to exclude controversial charitable organizations from its federal charity-
drive was reasonable in light of its fear that including these organiza-
tions would disrupt federal work places, by generating heated discus-
sions about the merits of certain charitable organizations, and diminish
the effectiveness of the charity-drive, by so angering potential contribu-
tors that they refuse to participate. 98 As in Perry, the Court in Cornelius
rejected the notion that the government must offer "conclusive proof of
an actual effect on the workplace,"99 for it announced that the
"[glovernment need not wait until havoc is wreaked to restrict access to a
nonpublic forum."100 Similarly, in United States v. Kokinda, 1 1 a plurality
tion-restrict use to those who participate in the forum's official business."
95. Id at 53 n. 13. Such organizations included "the YMCA, Cub Scouts and other civic
and church organizations." Id- at 47.
96. I& at 52 and n. 12.
97. Id. at 52 n. 12.
98. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 807, 809-11.
99. Id. at 810.
100. Id. In Cornelius, the evidence was conflicting as to whether inclusion of controversial
groups in the charity-drive would disrupt the workplace or reduce the total contributions
made. The Government submitted some letters from federal workers protesting the inclu-
sion of some ultimately excluded groups, logs of about 1,450 protest telephone calls, repre-
sentations from some charity-drive workers that they had to make extra efforts to get some
disgruntled workers to contribute, and showings that in some areas there had been a de-
cline in number of contributors or the total amount contributed. Id. However, in his dis-
sent, Justice Blackmun pointed out that contributions to the charity-drive increased each
year the subsequently excluded groups were included, and that the protest phone calls
and letters were a mere fraction of the 2.7 million person federal workforce that formed the
charity-drive's pool of potential contributors. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 830-31 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Moreover, he noted evidence indicating that many protestors continued to
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of the Court accepted as a reasonable justification for the U.S. postal
system denying all solicitors access to their sidewalks the government's
assertion that "solicitation is inherently disruptive.... '[slince the act of
soliciting... has the potentiality for evoking highly personal and subjec-
tive reactions.'"0 2 In dissent, Justice Brennan demonstrated that there
was no basis in fact to support the proffered justification since there was
no evidence that the persons charged with violating the solicitation ban
had "obstructed or impeded postal customers[, ... obstruct[ed] post of-
fice entrances, disturb[ed] postal employees in the performance of their
duties, or imped[ed] the public in the transaction of postal business."
0 3
Most importantly, Justice Brennan believed that a complete ban on so-
licitations, based "on speculation regarding the possibility of disruption,"
was inappropriate because 'governments [must] regulate based on actual
congestion, visual clutter, or violence rather... predictions that speech
with a certain content will induce these effects.' 3 4
Third, the Court will not accept as evidence of unreasonableness
the fact that government has admitted some speakers to its non-public
forum despite the fact that they present risks of subverting the function
of a non-public forum that are similar to those presented by the ex-
cluded speakers. In Cornelius, the Court upheld the reasonableness of
excluding political action and legal advocacy groups from the federal
charity-drive in part because "the President could reasonably conclude
that a dollar directly spent on providing food or shelter to the needy is
more beneficial than a dollar spent on litigation that might or might not
result in aid to the needy."0 5 When confronted with evidence that the
federal charity-drive included some "[o]rganizations that d[id] not provide
direct health and welfare services, such as the World Wildlife Fund, the
Wilderness Society, and the United States Olympic Comnittee,"10 6 the
Court declined to revisit its reasonableness holding and instead sug-
gested that this evidence might be relevant only to whether the excluded
contribute after they were assured that their specific contributions would not benefit of any
group they opposed. Id. at 831. More importantly, Justice Blackmun asserted forcefully
that since "[a] central purpose of the [charity-drive]... [was] to give federal employees the
opportunity to choose among charities that [met] legitimate eligibility criteria .... the free
exchange of ideas about which of those causes one should support [should] not.., be in-
fringed merely because a vocal minority does not with to devote their charitable dollars to a
particular charity." Id. at 830.
101. 497 U.S. 720 (1990) (plurality).
102. Id. at 732-33 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The plurality also condemned so-
licitation because it requires the person solicited to stop to receive the solicitor's message,
and then respond either by declining to contribute or exchanging money. Id. at 734. As a
consequence, the plurality concluded that "[t]his description of the disruption and delay
caused by solicitation rings of 'common sense'. . ., which is sufficient in this Court to up-
hold a regulation under reasonableness review." Id at 734-35 (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 753 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 758 (citation omitted).
105. Come/ius, 473 U.S. at 809.
106. Id. at 812.
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groups had been discriminated against on account of their viewpoints. 1 0 7
The Court expressed more directly its unwillingness to accept inequality
of treatment among speakers as evidence of unreasonableness in
Kokinda, wherein it expressly rejected the fact that the postal service
was "perniit[ting] other types of potentially disruptive speech on a case-
by-case basis" as evidence that it was unreasonable for the postal ser-
vice to impose a total ban on persons engaging in solicitation on its
sidewalks.10 8 In doing so, the Court stated that inequality claims are
"more properly addressed under the equal protection component of the
Fifth Amendment... [and] it is anomalous that the Service's allowance
of some avenues of speech would be relied on as evidence that it is
impermissibly suppressing other speech." 0 9
Fourth, the Court has made the availability of alternative channels
of communication a prime justification for denying any speaker access to
a non-public forum. In Perry, the Court found that the availability of al-
ternative methods for communicating with teachers, including bulletin
boards and meeting facilities, supported the reasonableness of the
school system denying a union access to its internal mail system.110
Similarly, in Cornelius the Court upheld the reasonableness of the fed-
eral government denying certain controversial charitable organizations
access to its federal charity-drive because they had access to alternative
channels by which to communicate with prospective donors, "including
direct mail and in-person solicitation outside the workplace."'
Fifth, the Court has accepted as a reasonableness justification the
government's mere assertion that it is necessary to exclude controversial
speakers because their inclusion will make it appear that the govern-
ment endorses their messages. This occurred in Cornelius, wherein the
Court opined that "avoiding the appearance of political favoritism is a
valid justification for limiting speech in a nonpublic forum."" 2
Almost none of the reasons found to be reasonable justifications for
government excluding speakers from non-public fora are available to
vindicate government's attempts to exclude speakers from public fora,
traditional or designated. As detailed in the Forum Classification sec-
tion, a key function of public fora is to provide speakers with places for
engaging in expressive activity. 113 Therefore, with the exception of desig-
107. See id. at 812-13.
108. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 733. In his dissent, Justice Brennan identified soapbox ora-
tory, pamphleteering, distributing literature for free, and flag burning as being among the
"many other types of speech presenting the same risk of disruption as solicitation." Id. at
759-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
109. Id.
110. Perry, 460 U.S. at 53-54.
111. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 809.
112. Id.
113. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
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nated public fora limited to the discussion of certain subjects,11 4 the is-
sue of whether a prospective speaker participates in the forum's official
business is moot since providing a place for expressive activity is a rec-
ognized function of public fora. 115
Public fora, especially traditional public fora, serve more functions
than providing the public with places in which to engage in expressive
activity. As Justice Brennan observed in his dissenting opinion in
Kokinda,
Public sidewalks, parks, and streets have been reserved for public use as
forums for speech even though government has not constructed them for
expressive purposes. Parks are usually constructed to beautify a city and
to provide opportunities for recreation, rather than to afford a forum for
soapbox orators or leafleteers; streets are built to facilitate transportation,
not to enable protesters to conduct marches; and sidewalks are created
with pedestrians in mind, not solicitors."
6
Needless to say, people engaged in expressive activities may disrupt the
non-expressive functions of public fora.
To insure that public fora can serve their non-expressive functions,
government may reasonably regulate the time, place and manner of ex-
pressive activities conducted within a public forum." 7 Such regulations
must be "content neutral .... narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of com-
munication.""'
The content-neutrality requirement of the time, place and manner
test makes it all but impossible for the government to deny speakers ac-
cess to public fora on grounds that the content of their expression could
disrupt non-expressive functions of the public fora. Government may
114. See id. at 46 n. 7 (citing Madison, 429 U.S. at 169 (for the proposition that some des-
ignated public fora can be limited for the discussion of certain subjects)). Madison dealt
with the question of whether a state could by statute prohibit school teachers, who were
not union negotiators, from speaking at public school board meetings on the topic of col-
lective bargaining negotiations when those negotiations had been the subject of an open
school board meeting and the school board had made time for the public to comment on
the business of the meeting. Madison, 429 U.S. at 169. Its designation as authority for
the ability to limit the subject matter of a designated public forum apparently arose from
the fact that the school board opened a portion of its public meetings for citizens to com-
ment on the subjects discussed during the meeting and from footnote 8 of the majority
opinion, which simply stated that "[p]lainly, public bodies may confine their meetings to
specified subject matter...." Id. at 175 n. 8.
115. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46 (contrasting the function of public fora with nonpublic
fora).
116. Kokinda. 497 U.S. at 744.
117. For example, in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984),
the Court upheld the application of a National Park Service regulation banning sleeping in
Lafayette Park except in certain designated areas to the symbolic speech demonstration of
the Community for Creative Non-Violence in part because it "narrowly focuse[d] on the
Government's substantial interest in maintaining the parks in the heart of our Capital in
an attractive and intact condition, readily available to the millions of people who wish to
see and enjoy them by their presence." Id. at 296.
118. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
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not deny a speaker access to a public forum out of fear that a distur-
bance could arise from the controversial nature of the speaker's mes-
sage, for such a content-based restriction would constitute an unconsti-
tutional prior restraint on speech. 9 The controversial speaker can
neither be removed from a public forum, nor otherwise punished, on ac-
count of the disturbing effects of her speech content, unless eliminating
or preventing those disturbing effects serves a compelling government
interest.12 Government must find from "careful consideration of the ac-
tual circumstances surrounding [the] expression" that the disturbing ef-
fects it fears will come from the content of speech in a public forum is
likely to occur. 12 1 These requirements produce outcomes contrary to
those in cases where the government seeks to deny a speaker access to a
non-public forum because the content of his speech could disrupt the
non-public forum's official business, for in such cases the government's
speech restrictions need to be only reasonably related to protecting the
functions of the non-public forum. This was amply illustrated by Come-
lius, wherein the Court found, on the basis of very little support evidence
in the record, that it was reasonable for the federal government to deny
charitable organizations access to a federal charity-drive in part because
their controversial expressive activities could have created disruptive de-
bates about their merits in the federal workplace or caused a reduction
in contributions. 1
22
Given that the time, place and manner test applies equally to pub-
lic-fora and non-public fora with respect to regulating the non-expressive
aspects of speech, 123 it would seem that the government's power to regu-
late non-expressive aspects of speech capable of disrupting the function
of a forum is the same whether the forum is public or non-public. How-
ever, in Kokinda, the plurality eschewed using the time, place and man-
ner test in favor of the reasonableness test to determine whether the
119. A prior restraint occurs when government denies a person the opportunity to engage
in an expressive activity on the basis of the content of the prospective expression rather
than "rel[ieslon law enforcement authorities to prosecute [after the expression takes place]
for anything illegal that occur[s]." Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546,
553-57 (1975). In Conrad, the Court found that a municipal board's refusal to permit a
production company to stage the musical, Hair, at a public auditorium, because its con-
tent would not be "clean and healthful and culturally uplifting," and its nudity and sexual
themes might constitute obscenity, was an unconstitutional prior restraint. Id. at 554, 57
n. 7.
120. See Tex. v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 407-10 (1989), wherein the Court overturned
Johnson's conviction for burning an American Flag in part because it determined that
Texas, by trying to punish Johnson out of concern that his flag burning would cause a
hostile audience to turn violent, violated his First Amendment rights to offend his audience
and be free from being punished for the violent reaction of the his audience unless he in-
cited it to imminent lawlessness or directed fighting words to one of its members.
121. See id. at 409.
122. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 810-11. Note especially that in Cornelius the Court recognized
that "the avoidance of controversy is not a valid ground for restricting speech in a public
forum." Id. at 811.
123. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
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Postal Service could constitutionally ban all solicitations from post office
sidewalks. 124  It is not absolutely clear from the plurality opinion in
Kokinda why the plurality thought the reasonableness test was more ap-
propriate to use than the time, place and manner test, but the plurality's
express refusal to entertain arguments that less restrictive alternatives
than a total ban on solicitation were available for protecting post office
functions seemed to be motivated by a desire to avoid the narrow tailor-
ing requirement of the time, place and manner test. 125 For in adopting
this position, the plurality opined that "[e]ven if more narrowly tailored
regulations could be promulgated .... the Postal Service is only required
to adopt reasonable regulations, not 'the most reasonable or the only
reasonable regulation possible.'' 126 Indeed, in Kokinda, five Justices ap-
plied the time, place and manner test, and four of them concluded that
the Postal Service's total ban on solicitation was "not 'narrowly tai-
lored'.., to the Government's interest in avoiding disruption."
127
Relying heavily on Cornelius, in Arkansas Educational Television
Commission v. Forbes,128 the Court stated that the key distinction be-
tween public fora and non-public fora is whether government makes "its
facilities generally available to a certain class of speakers... [or merely]
reserve[s] eligibility for access to the forum to a particular class of
speakers, whose members must then, as individuals, 'obtain permis-
sion'.., to use it." 129 This distinction dictates that all persons within a
common class of speakers must be granted access to a public forum but
it also leaves the government free to discriminate, based on their indi-
vidual characteristics and the individualized nature of their speech,
among members of a class of speakers with respect to granting persons
access to non-public fora. 130 Thus, it is only with respect to granting ac-
cess to non-public fora that the government may discriminate among
speakers within a common class who present similar risks of disturbing
a forum's official business.131
Unlike cases involving speaker access to non-public fora,13 2 the
124. 497 U.S. at 730.
125. See id. at 735-36.
126. Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
127. Id. at 755-56 (Brennan J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, Stevens and Blackmun,
JJ.). Compare Justice Brennan's dissent with Justice Kennedy, who concurred in the
judgment on grounds that the Postal Service's regulation met all the requirements of the
time, place and manner test, including the narrow tailoring requirement. Id. at 737-39
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
128. 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
129. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 679.
130. The Court drove this point home in Forbes by noting that "the Federal Government
did not create a designated public forum in Cornelius when it reserved eligibility for par-
ticipation in the... [federal charity-]drive to charitable agencies, and then made individ-
ual, non-ministerial judgments as to which of the eligible agencies would participate." Id.
at 679-80.
131. See suprann. 103-107 and accompanying text.
132. See supra nn. 108-109 and accompanying text.
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presence of alternative channels of communication are relevant in cases
concerning the regulation of speech in public fora only when the regula-
tion concerns the non-expressive aspects of speech under the time, place
and manner test. Accordingly, in Southeastern Promotions, LtcL v. Con-
rad,3 3 the Court rejected the assertion that a municipality could deny a
production company permission to stage the musical Hair at its public
theater on account of its controversial content if a suitable privately
owned theater was available. 134 In justifying this rejection, the Court
quoted a prior precedent for the proposition that "'[o]ne is not to have the
exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the
plea that it may be exercised in some other place.'"'135 In contrast, in
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,136 the Court accepted the
presence of alternative channels of communication as sufficient evidence
that the National Park Service had met the time, place, and manner test
when it applied its rule that people can sleep in public parks only within
designated areas to reduce significantly the disruptive potential, and
therefore the communicative power, of a symbolic speech protest dem-
onstration in Lafayette Park.1
3 7
Government may not deny a speaker access to a public forum out
of concern that doing so will cause others to believe it has endorsed the
speaker's message. The sole expressive function of public fora is to pro-
vide places in which speakers can deliver their messages. These pri-
vate messages do not become those of the government simply because
they are delivered through the use of government property, the access to
which the government may not deny speakers on the basis of the con-
tent of their expressions.139 As a consequence, no one can reasonably
conclude that a message delivered in a public forum by a private speaker
has been endorsed by the government simply because the government
provided the public forum.14
0
D. Content Regulation v. Viewpoint Regulation
In any case where a speaker's access to a government-owned forum
has been limited, it is important to determine whether the limitation was
based on the viewpoint or content of the speaker's message. If the limi-
tation was based on the speaker's viewpoint, it must be justified under
the strict scrutiny standard even if a non-public forum is involved.'
4
'
133. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
134. I& at 556.
135. Id. (quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939)).
136. 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
137. See id. at 294-98.
138. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
139. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833-35.
140. See id.
141. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46, wherein the Court stated that "the State may reserve the fo-
130 [Vol. 37: 111
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Speech content may be the basis of excluding speakers from non-public
fora if the exclusion is otherwise a reasonable means of preserving gov-
ernment property for its intended purpose, 142 but it cannot be the basis
of excluding speakers from public fora unless it meets the strict scrutiny
test. 143 Time, place and manner regulations must be content-neutral.144
Similarly, under United States v. O'Brien,145 government may regulate or
prohibit conduct, such as burning draft cards, that arguably expresses
an idea of the person engaged in it if the government's regulatory "inter-
est is unrelated to the suppression of free expression ... and the inci-
dental restriction on... [expression] is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest."
146
These rules beg the question of what constitutes content and view-
point regulation. In his dissenting opinion in Perry, Justice Brennan
succinctly defined the two concepts through the following comparison:
Generally, the concept of content neutrality prohibits the government from
choosing the subjects that are appropriate for public discussion. The con-
tentneutrality cases frequently refer to the prohibition against viewpoint
discrimination and both concepts have their roots in the First Amend-
ment's bar against censorship. But unlike the viewpoint discrimination
concept, which is used to strike down government restrictions on speech
by particular speakers, the content neutrality principle is invoked when
the government has imposed restrictions on speech related to an entire
subject area."
Despite the seeming clarity of the distinction between content and view-
point regulation, sharp differences have often arisen among the U.S. Su-
preme Court Justices as to whether specific speech limitations consti-
tuted one or the other or neither.
In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,14 six Justices joined an
opinion finding that an ordinance "prohibit[ing] any 'adult motion pic-
ture theater from locating within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, sin-
gle- or multiple-family dwelling, church or park, and within one mile of
rum for its intended purposes... as long as the regulation on speech is... not an effort
to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speakers' view." See
Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394-95, indicating that viewpoint discrimination would be
deemed justified as meeting a compelling state interest if it were necessary to keep the
State from violating the Establishment Clause.
142. Perry, 460 U.S. at 49, where the Court noted that access to non-public fora can be.
limited by subject-matter.
143. Id. at 45-46.
144. Id. at 45. See Kokinda, where Justice Brennan, in dissent, complains that Justice
Kennedy was wrong to base his concurring opinion on time, place and manner regulation
because the regulation banning solicitations was content based. 497 U.S. at 753 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
145. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
146. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
147. Perry, 460 U.S. at 59.
148. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
2001]
21
Allison: Prelude to a Church-State: The Supremes Set the Stage for Faith-B
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2001
TULSA LAW REVIEW
any school"149 was content-neutral.' 5 0 Although this ordinance treated
theaters showing a specific genre of films differently than all other types
of theaters, 151 the majority found that the ordinance was predominantly
aimed at non-speech secondary effects, such as crime, and reductions in
property values, retail sales, and "quality of urban life," that are typically
stimulated by adult movie theaters. 12 Thus, the Court concluded that
the ordinance was content-neutral, and did not discriminate on the ba-
sis of viewpoint, 5 3 because it reflected "merely a decision by the city to
treat certain movie theaters differently because they have markedly dif-
ferent effects on their surroundings."'- 4 Moreover, the Court opined that
'[ilf [the city] had been concerned with restricting the message purveyed
by adult theaters, it would have tried to close them or restrict their
number rather than circumscribe their choice as to location.'" i 5
Dissenting for himself and Justice Marshall, Justice Brennan made
a strong case that the Renton ordinance imposed severe burdens on
adult motion picture theaters on the basis of the content of adult films
and the common viewpoint expressed in such fims. First, he asserted
that the fact that adult movies produce undesirable non-speech effects
did not make the ordinance content-neutral and should have been more
properly considered in determining whether government had a compel-
ling interest in regulating adult movie theaters. 5 6 Second, he argued
that the city's failure to control the secondary effects of other adult en-
tertainment, "such as bars, massage parlors, and adult book stores, "'57
was "cogent evidence that [the ordinance] was aimed at the content
of... [adult] films . ,lS.158 Third, noting that the ordinance targeted
adult movie theaters on the basis of the content of the fims they exhib-
ited, 5 9 Justice Brennan contended that it should have been upheld only
if an examination of the city's actions evidenced a plan to "'seriously and
comprehensively address[ I' secondary land-use effects associated with
adult movie theaters."160 Fourth, he demonstrated that the city failed to
develop evidence showing how adult movie theaters negatively affected
the values it sought to protect and instead simply relied on the experi-
ence of other cities, which had adopted similar ordinances without ex-
149. Id. at 44.
150. Id. at 48.
151. Id. at 47.
152. Id. at48-49.
153. Renton, 475 U.S. at 48-49 (The majority observed that the ordinance did not treat
speakers differently because of their views.).
154. Id. at 49.
155. Id. at 48 (quoting Young v. Am. Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 82 n.4 (1976)).
156. Id. at 56 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.).
157. Id. at 57.
158. Renton, 475 U.S. at 58 (emphasis in original).
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amining whether their problems were relevant to those faced by Ren-
ton.161 In a footnote, Justice Brennan suggested that the ordinance was
also concerned with viewpoint because the "'speech suppressed...
carr[ied] an implicit, if not explicit, message in favor of more relaxed sex-
,162
ual mores.
Two years after Renton, in Boos v. Barry,'6 five Justices found that
a city code provision that "prohibit[ed] the display of any sign within 500
feet of a foreign embassy if that sign tend[ed] to bring that foreign gov-
ernment into 'public odium'"'" regulated speech on the basis of its con-
tent.1 65 The Justices supported this finding by noting that under this
provision "whether individuals may picket in front of a foreign embassy
depend[ed] entirely upon whether their picket signs [welre critical of the
foreign government .... ,166 As a consequence, "[o]ne category of
speech... [was] completely prohibited within 500 feet of embassies...
[while o]ther categories.... such as favorable speech about a foreign
government.... [weire permitted."1 67 Strangely, even though the provi-
sion discriminated among speakers delivering messages about the merits
of foreign governments, excluding speakers with critical messages while
including speakers with favorable messages, the Justices concluded that
it did not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint because it "determine[d]
which viewpoint [wals acceptable in a neutral fashion by looking to the
policies of foreign governments. "168
These same five Justices combined, for differing reasons, to reject
an argument that the outcome of Boos should have been controlled by
the secondary effects holding of Rentor Proponents of the provision ar-
gued that its "real concern [wals a secondary effect, namely our interna-
tional law obligation to shield diplomats from speech that offends their
dignity." 169 Justice O'Connor, writing for herself and Justices Stevens
161. Id. at 61-62.
162. Id. at 56 n. 1 (quoting Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of Its Content. The Pecu-
liar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 111-12 (1978)).
163. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
164. Id. at 315.
165. Two Justices, Stevens and Scalia, joined that portion of Justice O'Connor's opinion
which dealt with the content restrictions of the provision, id. at 318-21 (partial plurality)
(O'Connor, J., joined by Stevens and Scalia, JJ., in Part I-A), and Justice Marshall joined
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion which agreed with every aspect of Justice O'Connor's
Part II-A except its discussion of the possible relevance of Renton to a case involving regu-
lation of political speech. Id. at 334-38 (Brennan, J., concurring in part as to Part II-A,
joined by Marshall, J.).
166. Id. at 318-19.
167. Id. at 319.
168. Id. Proponents of the provision argued that it "[wa]s not content-based because the
government [wa]s not itself selecting between viewpoints ..... Id. The Justices rejected
this argument by reaffirming prior holdings that regulations which "'do[ I not favor either
side of a political controversy' [are] nonetheless impermissible because the 'First Amend-
ment's hostility to content-based regulation extends... to prohibition of public discussion
of an entire topic.'" Id. (citations omitted).
169. Boos, 485 U.S. at 320 (O'Connor, J., joined by Stevens and Scalia, JJ., as to Part II-
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and Scalia, found that the effects of the Boos' provision were not secon-
dary but rather "focus[ed] on the direct impact of the speech on its audi-
ence .... "17o She then flatly proclaimed that "[l]istners' reactions to
speech are not the type of 'secondary effects'. . . referred to in Ren-
ton," 7 and that "the emotive impact of speech on its audience is not a
'secondary effect.'' 7 2 Nevertheless, she ominously suggested that Renton
could have controlled the outcome of Boos if the proponents of the provi-
sion had "point[ed] to. .. 'secondary effects' of picket signs in front of
embassies... [such as] congestion .... interference with ingress or
egress .... visual clutter, or... the need to protect the security of em-
bassies." 1 73
Writing for himself and Justice Marshall, Justice Brennan agreed
that "[whatever 'secondary effects' means .... it cannot include listners'
reactions to speech." 7 4 But, he bitterly objected to Justice O'Connor's
"assumption that the Renton analysis applies.., even to political
speech." 17 5 He did so out of fear that secondary effects arguments could
be raised that would single out certain political speech for suppression
on grounds
that the political gatherings of some parties are more likely than others to
attract large crowds causing congestion, that picketing for certain causes
is more likely than other picketing to cause visual clutter, or that speakers
delivering a particular message are more likely than others to attract an
unruly audience.1
7 6
Therefore, Justice Brennan extolled the virtues of a "traditional approach
[that] sets forth a bright-line rule: any restriction on speech, the applica-
tion of which turns on the content of the speech, is a content-based re-
striction regardless of the motivation that lies behind it." 177
Justice Brennan's desire to preserve a bright-line test for when a
speech regulation is content-based has not been fulfilled. In Kokinda,
the Court produced a 5-4 division over whether a regulation banning all
solicitations on post office sidewalks was a content-based regulation of
speech. Using an analysis similar to the secondary effects principle of
Renton, a plurality of four justices found that the ban on solicitations
was not a content-based regulation of speech because
[it is the inherent nature of solicitation itself, a content-neutral ground,
that the Service justifiably relies upon when it concludes that solicitation
A).




174. Id. at 334 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Marshall, J.).
175. Boos, 485 U.S. at 335-38.
176. Id. at 335.
177. Id. at 335-36.
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is disruptive of its business. The regulation is premised on the Service's
long experience, on the fact that solicitation is inherently more disruptive
than the other speech activities it permits, and on the Service's empirically
based conclusion that a case-by-case approach to regulation of solicitation
Is unworkable.
178
Dissenting for himself and three others, Justice Brennan found the
plurality's reasoning to be flawed. First, he used the common language
of solicitation to show that the regulation was content-based by noting
that: "[if a person on postal premises says to members of the public,
'Please support my political advocacy group,' he cannot be punished. If
he says 'Please contribute $10,' he is subject to criminal prosecution.
His punishment depends entirely on what he says. "179 Second, citing
two controversial flag-burning cases in which the Court, relying heavily
on Boos, had held that prohibitions against desecrating flags are con-
tent-based regulations of speech, 180 Justice Brennan proclaimed that "it
is axiomatic that a listener's reaction to speech is not a content-neutral
basis for regulation."' 8 ' Applying this axiom, he then found that the ban
on solicitations was content-based because it was enacted out of fear
that "solicitors might annoy postal customers and discourage them from
patronizing post offices. " 182 Justice Brennan drove this point home by
observing that
solicitors do not purportedly irk customers by speaking unusually loudly
or uncomfortably close to their subjects. Rather, the fear is that solicita-
tion is bothersome because of its content The post office is concerned that
being asked for money may be embarrassing or annoying to some people,
particularly when the speaker is a member of a disfavored or unpopular
political advocacy group.
t 3
As the outcome of the viewpoint issue in Boos revealed,1 4 identify-
ing viewpoint regulation separate and distinct from content regulation is
often an exercise in tortured logic and confusing semantics. This was
illustrated well in the odd "hate crime" case of R.A.V. v. City of St. PauL18 5
In RAY, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously found that a St.
Paul, Minnesota, ordinance, which criminally punished persons who
placed on public or private property objects or words they knew or
should have known would "arouse anger or resentment in others on the
178. Koknda, 497 U.S. at 736 (plurality) (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
White and Scalia, JJ.).
179. Id. at 753 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, as
to Part I).
180. Id. at 754 (citing U.S. v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Tem v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989) (each concerns flag burning)).
181. Id. at 754.
182. Id. at 754.
183. Id.
184. See supra nn. 166-69 and accompanying text.
185. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
20011 135
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basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender," 86 violated the Free Speech
Clause. 8 7 Writing for a majority of five Justices, Justice Scalia accepted
the Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation that the ordinance
reached only fighting words, and announced that even though the ordi-
nance applied only to proscribable fighting words, it was nonetheless fa-
cially unconstitutional because it "prohibit[ed] otherwise permitted
speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech address[ed]."' 8s He
concluded that the ordinance discriminated on the basis of content be-
cause it "applie[d] only to 'fighting words' that insult, or provoke vio-
lence, 'on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender,'18 9 thereby
leaving unpunished "[displays containing abusive invective, no matter
how vicious or severe .... unless they [welre addressed to one of the
specific disfavored topics."' 9°  For example, he noted that "[tihose
who... use[d] 'fighting words'... to express hostility... on the basis of
political affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality... [weire not
186. St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordin. (Minn.) § 292.02 (1990), which states:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, char-
acterization, or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi
swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger,
alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gen-
der commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordin. § 292.02.
187. RAV, 505 U.S. at 381 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy, Souter,
and Thomas, JJ.) (quoting St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordin. § 292.02) ); id. at 397
(White, J., concurring, joined by Blackmun and O'Connor, JJ., and by Stevens, J., except
as to Part I-A); idA at 415-16 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 416-17 Stevens, J., concur-
ring as to Part I, joined by White and Blackmun, JJ.). In order to save the ordinance from
being unconstitutionally overbroad, the Minnesota Supreme Court had narrowed its scope
so that it only covered speech that could be characterized as fighting words. In re Welfare
of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Minn. 1991). The majority accepted the Minnesota Su-
preme Court's narrowing interpretation, RAV, 505 U.S. at 381, but went on to find that the
ordinance discriminated on the basis of content and viewpoint. Id. at 381, 391-94. Reject-
ing Minnesota's attempt to save the ordinance, id. at 411-14 (White, J., concurring), iAL at
416 (Blackmun, J., concurring), idA at 417 (Stevens, J., concurring), and the majority's ap-
plication of content and viewpoint analyses to speech arguably proscribable for being fight-
ing words, iA. at 399-411 (White, J., concurring, joined by Blackmun and O'Connor, JJ.,
and joined except as to Part I-A by Stevens, J.), id. at 415-16 (Blackmun, J., concurring),
id. at 416-26 (Stevens, J., concurring, joined as to Part I by White and Blackmun, JJ.), the
concurring Justices found the ordinance to be unconstitutionally overbroad. Id. at 411-14
(White, J., concurring); id. at 416 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 417 (Stevens, J., con-
curring).
188. RAV, 505 U.S. at 381. Noting that several categories of speech had been designated
by the United States Supreme Court as being so low-valued or harmful that they could be
restricted or prohibited. Id. at 382-83 (identifying the proscribable speech categories as
obscenity, defamation, and fighting words). The full list of proscribable speech categories
include: fighting words, Chaplinsky v. N.H., 315 U.S. 568 (1942); defamation, Beauhamais
v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); obscenity, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); in-
citements to imminent lawlessness, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); and child
pornography, N.Y. v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). Justice Scalia proclaimed that these
categories of speech are "not [so]... entirely invisible to the Constitution... that they
may be made the vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to their distinctly proscrib-
able content." RAV, 505 U.S. at 383-84. Justice Scalia continued his defense of this
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covered [by the ordinance]." 19 ' Justice Scalia bolstered his content dis-
crimination finding by offering St. Paul's Juvenile Court argument-
"that 'Itihe burning of a cross does express a message and it is, in fact,
the content of that message which the St. Paul Ordinance attempts to
legislate" 92-as proof that "[w]hat makes the anger, fear, sense of dis-
honor, etc., produced by violation of th[e] ordinance distinct from the
anger, fear, sense of dishonor, etc., produced by other fighting words is
nothing other than the fact that it is caused by a distinctive idea, con-
veyed by a distinctive message.
" 193
Justice Stevens strongly disagreed with Justice Scalia's content
analysis, arguing instead that the ordinance "regulates speech not on
the basis of its subject matter or the viewpoint expressed, but rather on
the basis of the harm the speech causes."1 94 This is so, he suggested,
because "the ordinance regulates only a subcategory of expression that
causes injuries based on 'race, color, creed, religion, or gender,' not a
subcategory that involves discussions that concern those characteris-
tics."1 9 5 He supported his harm-based theory by noting sadly that "social
unrest in the Nation's cities [shows] ... that race-based threats may
cause more harm to society and individuals than other threats."196
Notwithstanding Justice Stevens' critique, Justice Scalia also found
that St. Paul's ordinance discriminated on the basis of viewpoint. He did
so by contending through a convoluted piece of imaginative logic that
"'fighting words' that do not themselves invoke race, 'color, creed, relig-
ion, or gender... would seemingly be usable ad ibitum in the placards
of those arguing in favor of racial, color, etc., tolerance and equality, but
could not be used by those speakers' opponents. " 197 To illustrate how
the ordinance discriminated on the basis of viewpoint, he applied his
viewpoint analysis to two speakers casting aspersions upon another per-
son's mother, one of whom was an anti-Catholic bigot and the other an
opponent of anti-Catholic bigots. 198 He then asserted that a person who
put up a sign stating that "all 'anti-Catholic bigots' are misbegotten,"
would not have violated the ordinance, but a bigot who put up a sign
stating that "all 'papists' are [misbegotten]" would have violated the ordi-
nance by "insult[ing] and provok[ing] violence 'on the basis of relig-
ion.'"1 99 This result, he said, would "license one side of a debate to fight
freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry
191. Id.
192. Id. at 393.
193. Id. at 392-93.
194. RA, 505 U.S. at 433 (Stevens, J., concuning) (emphasis in original).
195. Id. (emphasis in original).
196. Id. at 434 n. 9.
197. Id. at 391 (Scalia, J., writing for the Court) (emphasis in original).
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rules..20 0
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens condemned Justice
Scalia's viewpoint analysis for being "asymmetrical."20 1 First he con-
tended that battles between religious bigots and advocates for religious
tolerance would not be "'based on religion' but rather one's beliefs about
tolerance."20 2 Thus, he argued that the ordinance would not reach signs
by either side casting aspersions on the birth circumstances of the
other.20 3 Second, he proclaimed that signs by two persons of different
religions that cast aspersions on the birth circumstances of those be-
longing to specific religions would be covered by the ordinance, since
their attacks would be based on religion. 204 From these observations,
Justice Stevens concluded that:
The St. Paul ordinance is evenhanded. In a battle between advocates of
tolerance and advocates of intolerance, the ordinance does not prevent ei-
ther side from hurling fighting words at the other on the basis of their con-
flicting ideas, but it does bar both sides from hurling such words on the
basis of the target's 'race, color, creed, religion or gender.' To extend the
Court's pugilistic metaphor, the St. Paul ordinance simply bans punches
'below the belt'-by either party. It does not, therefore, favor either side of
the debate.20 5
E. Summation
It is clear from the non-religious speech cases examined thus far
that, unless a traditional public forum is involved, a majority of U.S. Su-
preme Court Justices can easily manipulate the Court's forum classifica-
tion principles to enable governments to exclude any private speaker or
any type of private expressive activity from government property. All the
majority needs to do is find some minimal evidence demonstrating that
the government property involved is a non-public forum, for this fiding
enables the government to justify its exclusion of private speakers or cer-
tain types of private speech under the reasonableness standard.0 6 The
critical evidence can be a showing that the government entity never
overfly allowed private expressive activity to occur on the government
207property, ° or did so only through a process that is selective in some
manner.
2 08
200. RAV, 505 U.S. at 392.
201. Id. at 435 (Stevens, J., concurring).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. Justice Stevens' asserted this claim by hypothesizing that the ordinance would
prohibit equally a sign by a Muslim casting aspersions on Catholics and a sign by a Catho-
lic casting aspersions on Muslims.
205. Id.
206. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
207. See Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 680-81.
208. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804-05.
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The reasonableness standard gives government nearly unrestricted
discretion in determining what private expressive activity, if any, it will
allow on non-public fora so in most cases a finding that property in-
volved is a non-public forum is in essence a holding that the government
was justified in excluding the private expressive activity at issue. This
broad discretion arises from the Court accepting as justifications for ex-
cluding specific private expressive activities:
" Proof that the private expressive activities at issue did not involve
speakers who participate in the official business generally con-
ducted on the government property involved;
20 9
" The mere assertion that the expressive activity of the excluded
speaker could have disrupted the official business generally con-
ducted on the government property involved;210
" A showing that the excluded speaker could reach its intended
audience by some means other than engaging in expressive activ-
ity on government property involved;21' or
" The mere assertion that the excluded speaker is controversial
and that permitting it to engage in expressive activity on the gov-
ernment property involved will create a perception that govern-
ment endorses its controversial messages. 2
Moreover, under the reasonableness standard, government need not
treat speakers equally even if their expressive activities will produce
similar impacts on the ability of government to conduct its official busi-
ness.
2 13
On the other hand, if a majority of Justices is determined to require
govermment to permit specific private expressive activities to take place
on government property, it need only find that the government's regula-
tion of the expressive activities at issue constitutes viewpoint discrinina-
tion. The standards the Court has traditionally used to determine if gov-
ernment restrictions on speech were content or viewpoint based are
quite amorphous, so they can be easily manipulated by five Justices in-
tent on finding viewpoint regulation. 4
209. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 53.
210. See id. at 52 and n. 12.
211. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 809.
212. Id.
213. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 679-80; Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 733.
214. The amorphousness of these standards has been amply demonstrated by the cases
analyzed above in which Justices have differed sharply as to whether a speech restriction
was viewpoint-based. Compare Renton, 475 U.S. at 48-49 (majority opinion finding no
content or viewpoint based regulation of speech) with Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion
suggesting the ordinance in question imposed viewpoint regulation on adult theatres, id. at
56 n. 1 (Brennan, J., dissenting); compare RAV, 505 U.S. at 391-92 (majority opinion find-
ing the ordinance in question imposed viewpoint discrimination on persons using fighting
words to commit hate crimes) with Justice Stevens' concurring opinion asserting strongly
that the ordinance in question did not impose any viewpoint restrictions on speech. Id. at
435 (Stevens, J., concurring). See Boos, 485 U.S. at 319, where the majority of the Court
held that an ordinance was not viewpoint based even though it applied only to pickets who
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III. THE OPERATIVE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE PRINCIPLES
Good News involves the attempts of a religious organization to en-
gage in religious worship and proselytizing activities in a public elemen-
tary school, so it cannot be fully understood unless one has a good grasp
of the U.S. Supreme Court's evolving Establishment Clause principles.
This is because when government helps speakers communicate religious
messages relationships are formed that may violate the Establishment
Clause's prohibition against laws "respecting an establishment of relig-
ion."
2 15
Over the last twenty years, the Justices have applied three major
tests for determining whether it violates the Establishment Clause for
government to admit religious speakers to government-created fora. In
evolving order of importance, the tests are the three-prong Lemon Test,"'
various formulations of an endorsement test,2 17  and a non-
coercive/historical understandings neutrality test.21 8  No matter which
test was used, the outcome was the same in each case -the Court found
that the government did not violate the Establishment Clause by admit-
were critical of foreign governments.
215. U.S. Const. amend. I. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 837-46: Lamb's Chapel, 508
U.S. at 394-97; Mergens, 496 U.S. at 247-53; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270-76.
216. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The Lemon Test dominated the Estab-
lishment Clause analyses of Widmar and Mergens. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271-75 (Powell, J.,
joined by Burger, C.J., and Brennan, Marshall, Blackman, Rehnquist and O'Connor, JJ.);
Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248-53 (plurality) (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White
and Blackmun, JJ.). But, the Lamb's Chapel majority paid only lip service to the Lemon
Test by concluding, without elaborate analysis, that admitting a religious speaker to the
forum in question "would not have been an establishment of religion under the ... [Lemon]
test...." 508 U.S. at 395 (White, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Blackmun, Stevens,
O'Connor, and Souter, JJ.). The Lemon Test was not used at all in Rosenberger. 515 U.S.
at 837-46 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas, JJ.);
icL at 846-52 ( O'Connor, concurring); id. at 852-63 (Thomas, J. concurring); id. at 864-92
(Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ.).
217. Until Rosenberger, endorsement analysis was an increasingly important factor in ap-
plying the Lemon Test to cases where the government facilitated religious speakers com-
municating religious messages. In Widmar, the majority used brief endorsement analyses
to find that a university would not violate the purpose and effects prongs of the Lemon
Test. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 272 and n. 10 (purpose); ic. at 273-74 (effect). Endorsement
analysis was much more important in Mergens, where it was the major focus of the plural-
ity's Lemon "effects" analyses. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250-52 (plurality) (O'Connor, J., joined
by Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Blackmun, JJ.). Eventually, endorsement analysis
nearly displaced the full Lemon Test: in Mergens, two concurring Justices relied on it al-
most exclusively in making their Establishment Clause determinations, id. at 264-70 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring, joined by Brennan, J.), and in Lamb's Chapel it dominated the ma-
jority's attenuated Establishment Clause analysis. Lamb's Chapel 508 U.S. at 395.
However, endorsement analysis was an insignificant factor in Rosenberger, where it was
used only as an indicia of government neutrality toward religion by the Majority, Rosenber-
ger, 515 U.S. at 841-42 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor, Scalia, and
Thomas, JJ.), and was relied on as a determinative Establishment Clause factor by only
one concurring Justice. Id. at 515 U.S. at 846-52 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasizing
that the government program at issue did not amount to government endorsement of reli-
gious messages even though she had joined a majority opinion based on neutrality analy-
sis).
218. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 838-46 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas, JJ.).
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ting religious speakers to a government-created forum.219
A. The Lemon Test
First announced and applied in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 220 the Lemon
test holds that a law or government practice does not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause if it (1) has a "secular purpose,"221 (2) produces a "pri-
mary effect [that] ... neither advances nor inhibits religion,"222 and (3)
does "not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.'
223
It was applied in full measure in Widmar and Mergens.
Widmar involved the issue of whether a public university would vio-
late the Establishment Clause by admitting to a public forum, which
provides all approved student groups access to university meeting
rooms, religiously-oriented student groups seeking meeting rooms in
which to conduct religious worship and discussion. 4 After noting that
universities promote a secular purpose by creating public fora in which
students may exchange ideas, the Court found that the secular aim of
such fora would not be undermined if religious speakers were admitted
to them since "by creating a forum the University does not... endorse
or promote any of the particular ideas aired there."225 Admitting that "[uit
is possible -perhaps even foreseeable-that religious groups will benefit
from access to University facilities,"226 the Court went on to find that
those benefits are merely incidental,227 and therefore the primary effect
of admitting religious speakers to a public forum is not the advancement
of religion.228 The benefits are incidental, said the Court, for two main
reasons:
(1) an open forum in a public university does not confer any imprimatur
of state approval on religious sects and practices[,] . . . [since] such a pol-
icy 'vould no more commit the University... to religious goals' that it is
'now committed to the goals of the Students for a Democratic Society, the
Young Socialist Alliance' or any other group eligible to use its facili-
ties .... 229
(2) the forum is available to a broad class of nonreligious as well as reli-
219. Id. at 837-46; Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395 (White, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.,
and Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor and Souter, JJ.), Mergens, 496 U.S. at 247-53 (plural-
ity) ( O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Blackmun, JJ.); id. at 260-62
(Kennedy, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id.
at 262-70 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment.).
220. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13, (1971).
221. Id. at 612.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 613 (citing Walz v. Tax Comma., 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
224. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 264-65.
225. Id. at271 and n. 10.
226. Id. at 273.
227. Id. at 273-75.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 274 (citation omitted).
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gious speakers... [- over 100 recognized student groups [- and t]he
provision of benefits to so broad a spectrum of groups is an important in-
dex of secular effect .... [alt least in absence of empirical evidence that re-
ligious groups will dominate ... [the] forum. 230
The Court found that universities may avoid excessive entanglement
with religion by admitting religious speakers to their public fora, since to
exclude religious speakers universities "would need to [monitor group
meetings continuously, and] determine which words and activities fall
within 'religious worship and religious teaching,' [a task which] could
prove [to be] '... . impossible... in an age where many and varied beliefs
meet the constitutional definition of religion.'"
231
In Mergens, the plurality relied heavily on Widmar's Lemon Test
analysis to reject Establishment Clause attacks on a federal law which
prohibits high schools that have created a limited open forum from "dis-
criminating against students who wish to conduct a meeting within that
forum on the basis of the 'religious, political, philosophical, or other con-
tent of the speech at such meetings.' 232 First, the plurality found that
"Congress" avowed purpose-to prevent discrimination against religious
and other types of speech-is undeniably secular. "2 3 Second, the plu-
rality found that the primary effects of the Act on high school students
generally, and on the students of the specific high school involved, would
not be the advancement of religion because:
(1) "[Slecondary school students are mature enough and are likely to un-
derstand that a school does not endorse or support student speech that it
merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis.
"234
(2) The ability of high schools to disclaim any endorsement of the views of
religious groups they admit to their fora, the act's restrictions on school
officials' participation in the activities of religious groups, and the re-
quirement that religious groups meet only during non-instructional time,
reduce or eliminate the "risk of official state endorsement or coercion" even
if students face peer pressure to attend the religious groups' activities.
235
(3) The possibility that students perceive that the high school endorses re-
ligion by admitting religious groups to its limited open forum is counter-
acted by "the broad spectrum of officially recognized student groups at...
230. Widmar, 454 U.S. 274-75 (citation omitted).
231. Id. at 272 and n. 11.
232. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 235, 247-53 (plurality) (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J., and White and Blackmun, JJ.).
233. Id. at 248-49.
234. Id. at 250. The plurality also noted that the difference between the ages of the high
school students in Mergens and the college students in Widnar was just a few years, d.,
and that Congress was owed deference to its judgment that "high school students are Inot]
likely to confuse an equal access policy with state sponsorship of religion." I&. at 250-51.
235. Id. at 251. In this regard, the plurality specifically found that the Act's requirements
.avoid[ ] the problems of 'the students' emulation of teachers as role models' and 'manda-
tory attendance requirements'...." Id. (citation omitted).
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[the high school], and the fact that... students are free to initiate and or-
ganize additional student clubs," for "students should perceive no message
of government endorsement of religion" "to the extent that a religious club
is merely one of many different student-initiated voluntary clubs."
23 6
Finally, the plurality found that facially and as applied, the Act would
not excessively entangle government with religion, because:
(1) School employees are permitted to attend the meetings of religious
student groups only in a custodial role to "ensure order and good behav-
ior,
-237
(2) high schools are forbidden from sponsoring religious meetings, 238 and
(3) "denial of equal access to religious speech might well create greater en-
tanglement problems in the form of invasive monitoring to prevent reli-
gious speech at meetings at which speech might occur."2 3 9
B. The Endorsement Test
Although concern that government practices may "halve] the pur-
pose or effect of 'endorsing' religion.., has long had a place in [the
Court's] Establishment Clause jurisprudence, 240 a formal endorsement
test did not really emerge until Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in
the 1984 case of Lynch v. Donnelly.24 1 In her Lynch concurrence, Justice
O'Connor contended that the core concern of the Establishment Clause
is whether "government ... mak[es] adherence to religion relevant in
any way to a person's standing in the political community." 242 She then
opined that government endorsement or disapproval of religion directly
implicates this core concern because "[e]ndorsement sends a message to
non-adherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are
insiders, favored members of the political community[; and d]isapproval
sends the opposite message [sic]." 243 As a consequence, she suggested
that the Lemon test be modified to emphasize a particularized endorse-
236. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 252.
237. Id. at 253.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. County ofAllegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989).
241. 465 U.S. 668 (1984); id. at 687-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See Allegheny, 492
U.S. at 592-94 ( Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, Stevens and O'Connor, JJ.).
In Allegheny, Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White and
Scalia, bitterly protested that the majority's use of the endorsement test, formulated in
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lynch, complaining that "[ilt has never been my
understanding that a concurring opinion 'suggest[ing] a clarification of our... doc-
trine'... could take precedence over an opinion joined in its entirety by five Members of
the Court." Id. at 668 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in
part, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Scalia, JJ.).
242. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-88.
243. Id. at 688.
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244
ment analysis. Observing that "[tihe meaning of a statement to its
audience depends both on the intention of the speaker and on the 'objec-
tive' meaning of the statement in the community[,]" 2 4 5 she asserted that
"[the proper inquiry under the purpose prong of Lemon... is whether
the government intends to convey a message of endorsement or disap-
proval of religion[,]"246 and that the proper inquiry under the effects
prong of Lemon is "whether, irrespective of government's actual purpose,
the practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or
disapproval."247 In applying her test, Justice O'Connor judges whether
government's action is perceived objectively by members of the commu-
nity as an endorsement of religion through the perspective of the rea-
sonable observer.2 4 8 As detailed above, endorsement analysis was in-
volved in the pre-Lynch, Widmar case and dominated the plurality's
effects determinations in the post-Lynch, Mergens case. More impor-
tantly, it was relied on almost exclusively by Justice Marshall in his
Mergens concurrence and by the majority in Lamb's Chape 2 49
Justice Marshall used his concurring opinion in Mergens to warn
that a policy of requiring schools to give all student groups equal access
to any fora they create may be "nominally 'neutral' [in] character" yet
produce unequal effects that cause students to perceive that their
schools are "conferring the imprimatur of the State on religious doctrine
or practice. "2 5 Noting that the forum created by the high school in-
volved in Mergens is "dedicated to promoting fundamental values and
citizenship as defined by the school[,]" 25 1 he asserted that the high
school could be perceived as endorsing religion if it admitted student re-
ligious groups to such a forum without taking steps to effectively "disso-
ciate [the school] from ... religious speech and avoid appearing to spon-
sor or endorse the [religious groups'] goals."252 He suggested that the
requisite dissociation could be accomplished by the high school "entirely
discontinu[ing] encouraging student participation in clubs and clar-
ify[ing] that the clubs are not instrumentally related to the school's over-
all mission."
253
Marshall was particularly insistent that dissociation needed to be
overt in Mergens, because the high school involved had not yet admitted
244. Id. at 687-94.
245. Id. at 690.
246. Id. at 690-91.
247. Id. at 690.
248. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 630-31 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
249. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 262-70 (Marshall, J., concurring, joined by Brennan, J.);
Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395.
250. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 264.
251. Id. at 263-64.
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any other "student club that advocate[d] a controversial viewpoint. " 25
As a consequence, he contended that "the school's failure to dissociate
itself from the religious activity will reasonably be understood as an en-
dorsement of that activity" if "the religion club is the sole advocacy-
oriented group in the forum, or one of a very limited number, and the
school continues to promote its student club program as instrumental to
citizenship. "255 "Moreover, [he feared that] in the absence of a truly ro-
bust forum[,]... the presence of a religious club could provide a fertile
ground for peer pressure, especially if the club commanded support from
a substantial portion of the student body."25 6 "Indeed, [he observed], it is
precisely in a school without such a forum that intolerance for different
religious and other views would be most dangerous and that a student
who does not share the religious beliefs of his classmates would perceive
'that religion or a particular belief is favored or preferred.'"25 7 Thus, Jus-
tice Marshall concluded that if the "State has structured an environment
in which students holding mainstream views may be able to coerce ad-
herents of minority religions to attend club meetings or to adhere to club
beliefs[.... it] cannot disclaim its responsibilities for those resulting
pressures."
25 8
In Lamb's Chapel, the Court relied almost exclusively on a brief en-
dorsement analysis to find that a school board would not violate the Es-
tablishment Clause by permitting a church to use school facilities after
school hours to show a film series presenting a distinctly Christian view
about "family and child-rearing issues faced by parents today."259 The
Court found that "the showing of the films series would not have been
during school hours, would not have been sponsored by the school, and
would have been open to the public, not just to church members."260 It
further found that the "District property had repeatedly been used by a
wide variety of private organizations."261 "Under these circumstances,
[the Court concluded] ... there would have been no realistic danger that
the community would think that the District was endorsing religion or
any particular creed, and any benefit to religion or to the Church would
have been no more than incidental."
26 2
Justices Kennedy and Scalia have consistently opposed the en-
dorsement test.2 63 In Allegheny, a case concerned with government
254. Id.
255. Id. at 266.
256. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 268.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 269.
259. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 387-88, 389 n. 3, 395 (White, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J., and Blacknun, Stevens, O'Connor and Souter, JJ.).
260. Id. at 395.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 668-77 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part,
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Christmas holiday displays,2 4 Justice Kennedy argued that the en-
dorsement test was flawed and unworkable in a concurring opinion
joined by Justice Scalia and two other Justices. 265  From his under-
standing that under the endorsement test a government practice is un-
constitutional if it makes "nonadherents... feel like 'outsiders'.. .266
he asserted that the faithful application of such a test would require the
Court to declare unconstitutional many of the nation's traditional prac-
tices of recognizing and accommodating religion, for each practice could
make non-religious persons feel like outsiders.26 7 So, Justice Kennedy
believes the endorsement test is terribly flawed because:
Either the endorsement test must invalidate scores of traditional practices
recognizing the place religion holds in our culture, or it must be twisted
and stretched to avoid inconsistency with practices we know to have been
permitted in the past, while condemning similar practices with no greater
endorsement effect simply by reason of their lack of historical antecedent.
Neither result is acceptable.26 s
Justice Kennedy supported his contention that the endorsement
test is unworkable by mockingly describing how the Allegheny majority
divined what message the community derived from the holiday displays
through analyses of what items they included, the size of each item,
where each items was located in relation to the others, and what each
item historically symbolized.2 s9 From this description, he concluded that
and dissenting in part, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and white and Scalia, JJ.); Mergens, 496
U.S. at 261-62 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, joined by
Scalia, J.); Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 397 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment); id. at 398, 400-01 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by
Thomas, J.).
264. Allegheny concerned the constitutionality of a creche displayed alone in a county
court house and an outdoor holiday display comprised of a Christmas Tree and a Menorah.
492 U.S. at 578.
265. Id. at 668-77 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in
part, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and white and Scalia, JJ.)
266. I. at 670.
267. These practices include Thanksgiving Proclamations, invocations at presidential in-
augurations, prayers at the opening of Supreme Court sessions, prayers at the opening of
legislative sessions, federal statutes containing religious references, the national motto "In
God We Trust," non-secular Christmas caroling on public property. Id. at 671-74 and nn.
9-10.
268. I. at 674.
269. Id. at 674-78. For example, Justice Kennedy claimed that "Justice Blacklmun em-
braces a jurisprudence of minutiae [which requires] a reviewing court [to]... consider
whether the city has included Santas, talking wishing wells, reindeer, or other secular
symbols as 'a center of attention separate from the creche.'" I&. at 674. After determining
whether these centers of attention are sufficiently 'separate' that each 'had their specific
visual story to tell,' the court must then measure their proximity to the crache. A commu-
nity that wishes to construct a constitutional display must also take care to avoid floral
frames or other devices that might insulate the creche from the sanitizing effect of the
secular portions of the display. The majority also notes the presence of evergreens near
the creche that are identical to two small evergreens placed near official county signs. Af-
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the endorsement test "trivialize[s] constitutional adjudication[,]" 270 and,
at least with respect to cases involving government use of religious sym-
bols, can provide lower courts with workable guidance "only after this
Court has decided a long series of cases, using little more than intuition
and a tape measure."
271
Most importantly, Justice Kennedy proclaimed that the "[endorse-
ment test] approach adopted by the [Allegheny] majority contradicts im-
portant values embodied in the [Establishment] Clause."2 72  He sup-
ported this proclamation by essentially accusing the Allegheny majority
of engaging in "[o]bsessive, implacable resistance to all but the most
carefully scripted and secularized forms of accommodation... ,"273 This
approach, he contended, "requires the Court to act as a censor, issuing
national decrees as to what is orthodox ... 274 Worse yet from his per-
spective, Justice Kennedy concluded that "[w]hat is orthodox, in this
context, means what is secular; the only Christmas the State can ac-
knowledge is one in which references to religion have been held to a
minimum." 2vs Moreover, he noted that the endorsement test approach of
the Allegheny majority caused the Court to "assume[ ] the difficult and
inappropriate task of saying what every religious symbol means[J,]" 276 a
task he believed was probably unwise and unconstitutional since the
"Court is ill equipped to sit as a national theology board."
277
Given this scathing critique of the endorsement test, it was not sur-
prising that Justices Kennedy and Scalia refused to join the Establish-
ment Clause portion of the majority opinion in Mergens,78 and filed
separate concurring opinions in Lamb's Chapel279 Nor was it surprising
that Justice Kennedy all but ignored endorsement as an issue in his ma-
jority opinion in Rosenberger.Y
Mergens was not a religious symbols case, but Justices Kennedy
and Scalia nevertheless found the use of the endorsement test to be an
inappropriate way to determine the Establishment Clause issues pre-
270. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 674.
271. Id- at 675.
272. Id. at 677.
273. Ic at 677-78.
274. I& at 678.
275. Id.
276. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 678.
277. Id.
278. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 261-62 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment, joined by Scalia, J.).
279. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 397 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the Judgment); id. at 397-401. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Thomas,
J.).
280. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 837-46 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ.). What is surprising is that Justice O'Connor joined
the majority opinion in Rosenberger even though it gave short shrift to endorsement analy-
sis. However, she also authored a concurring opinion that emphasized the importance of
endorsement analysis to the outcome of the case. Id. at 846-52.
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sented therein. In his concurring opinion, joined by Justice Scalia, Jus-
tice Kennedy declared that "[tihe word endorsement has insufficient con-
tent to be dispositive[, and... its literal application may result in neu-
trality in name but hostility in fact when the question is the
government's proper relation to those who express some religious prefer-
ence."28' Applying this critique to the problem raised in Mergens, Justice
Kennedy "th[ought it to be] inevitable that a public high school 'endorses'
a religious club, in a common-sense use of the term, if the club happens
to be one of many activities that the schools permit students to choose
in order to further the development of their intellect and character in an
extracurricular setting., 2 8 2 Indeed, as discussed above, this was the pre-
cise concern of Justices Marshall and Brennan, who warned that the
high school involved in Mergens would violate the Establishment Clause
by admitting religious clubs to its forum without first taking steps to
dissociate itself from the religious views of those clubs.2 3 Justices Ken-
nedy and Scalia strongly disagreed with Justices Marshall and Brennan,
for they asserted that "no constitutional violation occurs if the school's
action is based upon a recognition of the fact that membership in a reli-
gious club is one of many permissible ways for a student to further his
or her own personal enrichment.2 4
In Lamb's Chapel, Justice Kennedy's rejection of the majority's use
of the endorsement test was brief-"the Court's use of the phrase 'en-
dorsing religion. . cannot suffice as a rule of decision consistent with
our precedents and our traditions in this part of jurisprudence."28 5 Jus-
tices Scalia and Thomas also bitterly rejected the majority's view that
"the proposed use of... [a public] school's facilities [by a religious group
to show a film series presenting a Christian view about family and child-
rearing issues] is constitutional because ... it would not signal en-
dorsement of religion in general."28 6 They found it to be "a strange no-
tion.., that a constitution which itself gives 'religion in general' prefer-
ential treatment ... [through] the Free Exercise Clause ... forbids
endorsement of religion in general."28 7 They also attacked New York's at-
torney general flor arguing that "'[r]eligious advocacy.., serves the
community only in the eyes of its adherents and yields a benefit only to
those who already believe[;]"' claiming that this view was not shared by
"those who adopted our Constitution, [since they] believed that the pub-
281. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 261 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment, joined by Scalia, J.).
282. Id.
283. Id. at 266, 270 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Brennan, J.).
284. Id. at 261 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, joined by
Scalia, J.).
285. Lanb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 397 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
286. Id. at 400 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Thomas, J.).
287. Id. (emphasis in original).
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lic virtues inculcated by religion are a public good."28 Noting that the
Northwest Ordinance enacted by the Confederation Congress encour-
aged "schools and the means of education" because "[rieligion, morality,
and knowledge [are] necessary to good government and the happiness of
mankind," they insisted that "indifference to 'religion in general' is not
what our cases, both old and recent, demand."
289
C. The Non-Coercive Accommodation / Historical Understandings
Neutrality Test
Those who oppose the ideas of others for resolving issues have an
affirmative obligation to offer alternative approaches. Justice Kennedy
met this obligation in his Allegheny concurring opinion by proposing a
neutrality test for determining what government practices violate the Es-
tablishment Clause.
290
Justice Kennedy's neutrality test gives the government great lati-
tude in accommodating, recognizing or aiding religion,291 because he re-
jected a form of neutrality that "would require a relentless extirpation of
all contact between government and religion."292 His rejection of a strict
separation between church and state was based partly on his belief that
"[glovemment policies of accommodation, acknowledgment and support
of religion are an accepted part of our political and cultural heritage,"293
and partly on his concern that
Any approach less sensitive to our heritage would border on latent hostil-
ity toward religion, as it would require government in all its multifaceted
roles to acknowledge only the secular, to the exclusion and so to the det-
riment of the religious. A categorical approach would install federal courts
as jealous guardians of an absolute 'wall of separation,' sending a clear
message of disapproval. In this century, as the modem administrative
state expands to touch the lives of its citizens in such diverse ways and
redirects their financial choices through programs of its own, it is difficult
to maintain the fiction that requiring government to avoid all assistance to
religion can in fairness be viewed as serving the goal of neutrality.294
Under Justice Kennedy's neutrality test, government actions that
accommodate, recognize or aid religion are permissibly neutral if they do
"not coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion or its exer-
cise... [or] give direct benefits to religion in such a degree that [they] in
288. Id.
289. Id. (emphases in original) (citations omitted).
290. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 657-63 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part in the judgment, and
dissenting in part, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and white and Scalia, JJ.).
291. Id at 657.
292. Id. at 657.
293. Id. at 657.
294. Id. at 657-58.
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fact 'establish[ I a [state] religion or religious faith, or tend[ I to do so."295
According to Justice Kennedy, government actions that would violate his
coercion test include:
" "compelling or coercing participation or attendance at a religious
activity,"
296
" "requiring religious oaths to obtain government office or bene-
fits,
297
" "delegating government power to religious groups,"298 or
" any action that "would place the government's weight behind an
obvious effort to proselytize on behalf of a particular religion."
299
His neutrality test requires the Court to determine whether government
action establishes a religion, or tends to do so, by comparing it to "other
types of church-state contacts that have existed unchallenged through-
out our history, or that have been found permissible in our case law."'30
Church-state contacts Justice Kennedy would use for comparative pur-
poses include "governmental support for religious education, legislative
chaplains, 'recognition of the origins of the [Christmas] Holiday itself as
Christ's Mass,'... [and providing religious organizations with] school
transportation, beneficial grants for higher education, or tax exemp-
tions .... "301 Given its dual aspects, Justice Kennedy's neutrality test
can be labeled the non-coercive accommodation/historical understand-
ings test. Justice Kennedy summarized it by proclaiming that
"[n]oncoercive government action within the realm of flexible accommo-
dation or passive acknowledgment of existing symbols does not violate
the Establishment Clause unless it benefits religion in a way more direct
and more substantial than practices that are accepted in our national
heritage. 302
In his Mergens concurrence, Justice Kennedy used an abbreviated
application of his non-coercive accommodation/historical understand-
ings test to find that it would not violate the Establishment Clause for a
public high school to admit religious clubs to its "limited open forum" in
compliance with the Equal Access Act. 03 With respect to the non-
coercion requirement, Justice Kennedy found that "[niothing on the face
of the Act or in the facts of the case. . . demonstrates that enforcement
of the statute will result in the coercion of any student to participate in a
295. Id. at 659.
296. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 659.
297. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 660.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 661.
300. Id. at 662.
301. Id. at 662.
302. Id. at 662-63.
303. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 260-62 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment, joined by Scalia, J.).
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religious activity."3°4 He supported this finding by noting that "[tihe Act
does not authorize school authorities to require, or even encourage, stu-
dents to become members of a religious club or to attend a club's meet-
ings .... the meetings take place while school is not in session .... and
the Act does not compel any school employee to participate in, or to at-
tend, a clubs' meeting or activities ... ."305 Unaccompanied by suppor-
tive findings, Justice Kennedy simply proclaimed that "[any incidental
benefits that accompany official recognition [by a public high school] of a
religious club... do not lead to an establishment of religion . ...306
Justice Kennedy used more in-depth neutrality analyses to resolve
the Establishment Clause issues involved in Rosenberger.°7 The Rosen-
berger Establishment Clause issues arose from a public university deny-
ing an evangelical Christian student organization, Wide Awake Produc-
tions ("WAP"), access to a program that encourages the development of
student publications by paying the printing costs of approved student
groups from funds generated by a Student Activity Fee ("SAF").3 °8
University policies forbade the use of SAF support to help student
groups engage in religious activities, which the university defined as "ac-
tivit[ies] that 'primarily promote[ ] or manifest[ I a particular belief in or
about a deity or an ultimate reality.'"30 9 The university's policies also ex-
cluded religious organizations, which it defined as those "'whose purpose
is to practice a devotion to an acknowledged ultimate reality or deity.'-
3 10
WAP was denied access to the university's program because it
sought to publish a paper, entitled Wide Awake, that was so religious in
character that the university deemed its publication to be a precluded
religious activity. 311 The university deemed the publication of Wide
Awake to be a religious activity because:
" "WAP was established 'to publish a magazine of philosophical and
religious expression,' 'to facilitate discussion which fosters an
atmosphere of sensitivity to and tolerance of Christian view-
points,' and 'to provide a unifying focus for Christians of multi-
cultural backgrounds[,"' 3
12
" The editors of Wide Awake proclaimed it to be a journal that "of-
fers a Christian perspective on both personal and community is-
sues, especially those relevant to college students at the Univer-
sity of Virginia,"... [and]... has a two-fold mission: "to
304. I& at 261.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 260.
307. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839-46 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas, JJ.).
308. Id. at 822-25, 837-46.
309. Id. at 825, 827.
310. Id. at826, 840.
311. Id. at825, 827.
312. Id. at 825-26.
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challenge Christians to live, in word and deed, according to the
faith they proclaim and to encourage students to consider what a
personal relationship with Jesus Christ means[,]" 3 13 and
* Each Wide Awake issue featured articles giving a Christian per-
spective about various topics of general current interest, reviews
of Christian music, and advertisements by Christian organiza-
tions.3 14
Curiously, despite WAP's distinctive religious orientation, the university
did not classify WAP as a religious organization. Nevertheless, the uni-
versity defended its refusal to pay WAP's printing costs by asserting that
to do so would violate the Establishment Clause.
3 15
Relying heavily on cases involving government providing benefits to
religion, Justice Kennedy derived what he called "[a] central lesson of...
[the Court's Establishment Clause] decisions ... [-1 that a significant
factor in upholding governmental programs in the face of Establishment
Clause attack is their neutrality towards religion."3 16 His reliance on
government benefits cases to support his neutrality approach is not sur-
prising, since the Rosenberger "forum" consisted of the university mak-
ing financial payments to vendors who provided services to approved
student groups rather than providing speakers with places in which to
317engage in expressive activities. However, he relied mainly on cases in-
volving religious speakers seeking admission to government created fora
to support his neutrality approach to resolving the Rosenberger Estab-
lishment Clause issues, with his neutrality approach, 3 18 and, as will be
discussed below, he did so in a manner that appears to give government
greater latitude to pay for services used by groups for sectarian purposes
than it enjoyed under the holdings of prior government benefits cases.31 9
Indeed, the Court split five to four over the lessons to be drawn from
government benefits cases and the relevance of religious speakers' rights
cases, with the four dissenting Justices insisting that paying WAP's
printing costs violated the Establishment Clause's classical prohibition
against government directly financing religious activity. 2 °
Justice Kennedy's conclusion that the university's program for pay-
ing the printing costs of student news, information, opinion, entertain-
313. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 826.
314. Id
315. Id at 837.
316. Id at 839.
317. In fact, Justice Kennedy characterized the forum involved in this case as "a forum
more in a metaphysical sense than in a spatial or geographic sense .... " Id. at 830.
318. He relied mainly on Widmar, Mergens, and Lamb's Chapel to support his application
of the neutrality test. Id. at 841-45.
319. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 844-45.
320. Compare the Establishment Clause portion of Justice Kennedy's majority opinion, id.
at 837-46 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas, JJ.),
with the Establishment Clause portion of Justice Souter's dissenting opinion. Id. at 963-
82 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ.).
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ment, or academic communications media groups was neutral toward
religion rested on three distinct findings. First, Justice Kennedy found
that the purpose of the program was not to advance religion but rather
was "to open a forum for speech and to support various student enter-
prises, including the publication of newspapers, in recognition of the di-
versity and creativity of student life."32' He supported this finding by
noting that "[tihe University's SAF Guidelines have a separate classifica-
tion for, and do not make third-party payments on behalf of, 'religious
organizations.'"32 s
Second, Justice Kennedy used some dextrous logic to distinguish a
public university program that creates a fund by imposing a mandatory
fee on each student and uses it to pay vendors for rendering services
that facilitate the expressive activities of approved student groups from
"general public assessments designed and effected to provide financial
support for a church."323 The distinction was based on a clever historical
understandings analysis that set up a straw man that could easily be
toppled to eliminate Establishment Clause prohibitions against publicly
funded benefits for religion. Justice Kennedy began his historical un-
derstandings analysis by setting up the straw man with his claim that
"[tihe apprehensions of our predecessors involved the levying of taxes
upon the public for the sole and exclusive purpose of establishing and
supporting specific sects."324 He then characterized the university's pro-
gram as a means of promoting the university's educational mission by
financing "the whole spectrum of [student] speech, whether it manifests
a religious view, an antireligious view, or neither."325 Based on his com-
parison of the university's program with his straw man, Justice Kennedy
concluded that "[the university's program] is a far cry from a general
public assessment designed and effected to provide financial support for
a church."326 He bolstered this conclusion by making the curious claim
that paying vendors from the student activity fee fund for rendering ser-
vices to approved student groups could not be considered "an expendi-
ture from a general tax fund."327 He based this claim on his belief that
the student activity fee was "not a general tax designed to raise revenue
for the University... [because it could not] be used for unlimited pur-
poses... [since it went into] a special fund from which any [approved
student group] ... [could] draw for purposes consistent with the Univer-
sity's educational mission 328
321. Id. at 840.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 840-41.
324. Id. at 840 (emphasis added).
325. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 840-41.
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Third, Justice Kennedy found that "It]he program respects the criti-
cal difference 'between government speech endorsing religion, which the
Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion,
which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect.'"329 This find-
ing was based on a disclaimer contained in every "standard agreement
signed between each... [approved student group] and the Univer-
sity."33 0 The disclaimer stated "that the benefits and opportunities af-
forded to... [approved student groups] 'should not be misinterpreted as
meaning that those organizations are part of or controlled by the Univer-
sity, that the University is responsible for the organizations' contracts or
other acts or omissions, or that the University approves of the organiza-
tions' goal or activities.' 3 3' 1 To Justice Kennedy, the existence of the dis-
claimer meant that any "concern that Wide Awake's religious orientation
would be attributed to the University is not a plausible fear, and there is
no real likelihood that the speech in question is being either endorsed or
coerced by the State."
33 2
Responding to the dissenters' insistence that the Court's past
government benefits cases preclude the university paying the printing
bills of such a religiously oriented publication as Wide Awake,3 33 Justice
Kennedy set up yet another straw man that was easy to knock down.
This time, he claimed that the Court's government benefits cases "recog-
nized special Establishment Clause dangers where the government
makes direct money payments to sectarian institutions."3 34 He then dis-
tinguished Rosenberger from the straw man by declaring that it was not
.a case where, even under a neutral program that includes nonsectarian
recipients, the government is making direct money payments to an insti-
tution or group that is engaged in a religious activity. "33 Justice Ken-
nedy based this distinction mainly on the fact that the university sent
money to vendors so that "no public funds flow[ed] directly to WAP's cof-
fers."3 3 6 But, he also asserted that Wide Awake is "not a religious insti-
tution, at least in the usual sense of that term as used in our case
law."3 37 He supported this assertion by noting that WAP was not deemed
by the university to be a religious organization" and Wide Awake "is...
a publication involved in a pure forum for the expression of ideas, ideas
329. Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Capital Square and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S.
753, 765-66 (1995)) (plurality) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy and
Thomas, JJ.).
330. Id. at 824.
331. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 824.
332. Id. at 841-42.
333. See id. at 863-92 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer,
JJ.).
334. Id. at 842.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 844.
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that would be both incomplete and chilled were the Constitution to be
interpreted to require that state officials and courts scan the publication
to ferret out views that principally manifest a belief in a divine being."338
Thus, he distinguished Rosenberger from the type of case even he would
admit violated the Establishment Clause-where a "State[ I pays a
church's bills .... "339
Justice Kennedy also attacked the dissenters' position that paying
Wide Awake's printing costs constituted impermissible government fi-
nancing of religious proselytizing on the policy ground that if it became
law, "it would require the University, in order to avoid a constitutional
violation, to scrutinize the content of student speech, lest the expression
in question-speech otherwise protected by the Constitution-contain
too great a religious content."30 He objected to such an outcome be-
cause to achieve it the Court would have to "distinguish[ ] between
'works characterized by the evangelism of Wide Awake and writing that
merely happens to express views that a given religion might approve. ' "3 l
This was not a task he believed was appropriate constitutionally for the
Court to undertake, because:
" it "raises the specter of governmental censorship.., to ensure
that all student writings and publications meet some baseline
standard of secular orthodoxy[,]"
342
" it is not possible for the Court to distinguish on a principled ba-
sis "[between] 'religious' speech and speech 'about' relig-
ion . . .[,]"343 and
" it would impermissibly entangle the government with religion by
"requir[ing] the university-and ultimately the courts-to in-
quire into the significance of words and practices to different reli-
gious faiths, and in varying circumstances, by the same faith.","
Most importantly, for purposes of examining future cases of gov-
ernment financing religiously oriented expression or activities, Justice
Kennedy intimated that it does not violate the Establishment Clause for
the government to "pay for a service that is, pursuant to a religion-
neutral program, used by a group for sectarian purposes.. .. "345 He






343. Rosenberger, 515, U.S. at 845. In this regard, Justice Kennedy, quoting Widmar,
declared that "It]here is no indication when 'singing hymns, reading scripture, and teach-
ing biblical principles' cease to be 'singing, teaching, and reading' -all apparently forms of
'speech,' despite their religious subject matter-and become unprotected 'worship.'" Id. at
845 (quoting W/dmar, 454 U.S. at 269 n. 6).
344. Id. at 845.
345. Id. at 843.
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Lamb's Chapel to support this idea. 346 It was logical for him to do so,
because these cases stand for the propositions that the government pur-
sues secular aims by creating fora in which private persons can engage
in expressive activity,347 and government must admit religious speakers
to the fora it creates on the same basis it admits non-religious speak-
ers. 34  From his observation that "le]ven the provision of a meeting
room... involve[s] governmental expenditure, if only in the form of elec-
tricity and heating or cooling costs[,]" 349 Justice Kennedy concluded that
"Widmar, Mergens, and Lamb's Chapel would have to be overruled [ilf the
expenditure of governmental funds is prohibited whenever those funds
pay for a service that is, pursuant to a religion-neutral program, used by
a group for sectarian purposes. . . .350 For Justice Kennedy, this con-
clusion lead to the further proposition that it does not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause when an organization uses government resources to fa-
cilitate a religious expression or activity as long as it obtained them from
the government on a religiously neutral basis.351 Taking this proposition
one step further, Justice Kennedy asserted that "[there is no difference
in logic or principle, and no difference of constitutional significance, be-
tween a school using its funds to operate a facility to which students
have access, and a school paying a third-party contractor to operate the
facility on its behalf."
352
Even though she joined the majority opinion, Justice O'Connor
wrote a concurring opinion that recognized how the majority's reasoning
could reduce significantly the Establishment Clause's limitation on gov-
ernment aid to religion. She did so by characterizing Rosenberger as a
"case [that] lies at the intersection of the principle of government neu-
trality and the prohibition on state funding of religious activities."353 To
her, this type of case presented a dilemma for it involved "two bedrock
principles ... [in such] conflict... [that] neither can provide the defimi-
346. Id. at 842-44.
347. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395; Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248-49 (plurality)
(O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Blackmun, JJ.): id at 263 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Brennan, J.); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 272 and
n. 10.
348. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 844-45; Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 392-94 (applying
the traditional Free Speech rule that expressive activity cannot be excluded from a non-
public forum on the basis of the speaker's viewpoint to the exclusion of religious speech
from an arguably nonpublic forum); Mergens, 496 U.S. at 247 (finding that a high school
violated the Equal Access Act because it did not treat religious speakers the same way it
treated nonreligious speakers with respect to admitting speakers to a limited open forum);
Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267-70 (applying the traditional Free Speech rule requiring strict
scrutiny for the exclusion of expressive activity from a public forum on the basis of the
content of the speaker's message to the exclusion of religious speech from a public forum).
349. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 843.
350. Id.
351. See id. at 843-44.
352. Id. at 843.
353. Id. at 847 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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tive answer."3  She approached the dilemma by proclaiming that
Rosenberger's "nature... does not admit of categorical answers, nor
should any be inferred from the Court's decision today.... .. 35 This led
her to fall back on endorsement analysis of "certain considerations spe-
cific to the [university's] program .... 356 From this analysis, she "con-
clude[d] that by providing the same assistance to Wide Awake that it
does to other publications, the University would not be endorsing the
magazine's religious perspective."
357
Justice O'Connor used four major findings to support her conclu-
sion. "First, the student organizations, at the University's insistence,
remain strictly independent of the University. " 358 "Second, financial as-
sistance is distributed in a manner that ensures its use only for permis-
sible purposes. " 35 9 "Third, assistance is provided to the religious publi-
cation in a context that makes improbable any perception of government
endorsement of the religious message."36 Finally, "[tihe Student Activi-
ties Fund... represents not government resources, whether derived
from tax revenue, sales of assets, or otherwise, but a fund that simply
belongs to the students."361
Having used endorsement analysis to conclude that the university's
program would not violate the Establishment Clause, she joined the ma-
jority opinion "[slubject to these comments" included in her concur-
354. I& at 847.
355. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 849.
356. Id.
357. I.
358. Id. "The University's agreement with the Contracted Independent Organizations
("CIO")-Le., student groups-provides: T£he University is a Virginia public corporation
and the CIO is not part of that corporation, but rather exists and operates independently of
the University .... The parties understand and agree that this Agreement is the only
source of any control the University may have over the CIO or its activities .... And the
agreement requires that student organizations include in every letter, contract, publica-
tion, or other written materials... [a] disclaimer... [clarifying that the University] is not
responsible for the organization's contracts, acts, or omissions.'" Id.
359. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 850 ("A student organization seeking assistance must
submit disbursement requests; if approved, the funds are paid directly to the third-party
vendor and do not pass through the organization's coffers. This safeguard accompanying
the University's financial assistance, when provided to a publication with a religious view-
point such as Wide Awake, ensures that the funds are used only to further the University's
purpose in maintaining a free and robust marketplace of ideas, from whatever perspec-
tive.").
360. Id. "Wide Awake does not exist in a vacuum. It competes with 15 other magazines
and newspapers for advertising and readership. The widely divergent viewpoints of these
many purveyors of opinion, all supported on an equal basis by the University, significantly
diminishes the danger that the message of any one publication is perceived as endorsed by
the University." Id.
361. Id. at 851-52. This finding was based on Justice O'Connor's conclusion that
"[ulnlike moneys dispensed from state or federal treasuries, the Student Activities Fund is
collected from students who themselves administer the fund and select qualifying recipi-
ents only from among those who originally paid the fee. The government neither pays into
nor draws from this common pool, and a fee of this sort appears conducive to granting in-
dividual students proportional refunds." Id. at 851.
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rence. 362 Most significantly, she opined hopefully that "[the Court's de-
cision today... neither trumpets the supremacy of the neutrality prin-
ciple nor signals the demise of the funding prohibition in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence."36 3
Justice Souter obviously did not share Justice O'Connor's optimism
about the survival of the funding prohibition, for in writing a dissenting
opinion for himself and three others, he complained that:
[t]he Court's principal reliance... is on an argument that providing relig-
ion with economically valuable services is permissible on the theory that
services are economically indistinguishable from religious access to gov-
ernmental speech forums, which sometimes is permissible. But this rea-
soning would commit the Court to approving direct religious aid beyond
anything justifiable for the sake of access to speaking forums.364
He supported this complaint with arguments designed to show that
" the university directly subsidized religious evangelism by paying
the printing costs of Wide Awake from a fund generated by im-
posing a student activity fee on every student;
365
" the Court has always prohibited the government from directly
funding religious activities;9
66
* neutrality is a necessary but not sufficient factor that may be
used to justify government providing any financial aid that ulti-
mately facilitates a sectarian function, but it never justifies gov-
ernment providing direct aid to religion; 367 and
" the justifications other than neutrality offered by the majority to
bolster its Establishment Clause holding violate prior precedent
and key Establishment Clause principles.3a
Justice Souter's contention that the university subsidized religious
evangelism by paying the printing costs of Wide Awake was based on an
in-depth analysis of Wide Awake's contents. He found and quoted pas-
sages from several Wide Awake articles that exhorted readers to become
true Christians.369 Moreover, he found that "[elven featured essays on
362. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 852 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
363. Id.
364. Id. at 864 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ.).
365. Id. at 865-74.
366. Id. at 873-76.
367. Id& at 877-85.
368. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 886-91.
369. Id. at 865-68. In this regard, Justice Souter noted that "Itihe masthead of every is-
sue bears St. Paul's exhortation, that '[tlhe hour has come for you to awake from your
slumber, because our salvation is nearer now than when we first believed. Romans 13:11."
Id. at 865. Among the several examples he quotes of evangelical exhortations contained in
Wide Awake articles was this particularly colorful passage:
When you get to the final gate, the Lord will be handing out boarding passes, and
He will examine your ticket. If, in your lifetime, you did not request a seat on His
Friendly Skies Flyer by trusting Him and asking Him to be your pilot, then you
will not be on His list of reserved seats (and the Lord will know you not). You will
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facially secular topics bec[alme platforms from which to call readers to
fulfill the tenets of Christianity in their lives."3 z° For example, he noted
that "an article on eating disorders ... beg[an] with descriptions of ano-
rexia and bulimia and end[ed] with this religious message:"
As thinking people who profess a belief in God, we must grasp firmly the
truth, the reality of who we are because of Christ. Christ is the Bread of
Life (John 6:35). Through Him, we are full. He alone can provide the ulti-
mate source of spiritual fulfillment which permeates the emotional, psy-
chological, and physical dimensions of our lives.37 '
Not surprisingly, from his analysis of Wide Awake's contents, Jus-
tice Souter found that "[tihis writing is.. . straightforward exhortation to
enter into a relationship with God as revealed in Jesus Christ, and to
satisfy a series of moral obligations derived from the teachings of Jesus
Christ."372 This finding led him to conclude that Wide Awake's "subject
is not the discourse of the scholar's study or the seminar room, but of
the evangelist's mission station and the pulpit. It is nothing other than
the preaching of the word, which (along with the sacraments) is what
most branches of Christianity offer those called to the religious life."
373
Given that the printing costs of this preaching were paid for by a fee the
university compelled each student to pay through the exercise of State
power, Justice Souter contended that "[tihe principle against direct fund-
ing [of preaching or other religious activity] with public money is patently
violated by the contested use of today's student activity fee."374
Justice Souter supported his argument that the Court has always
prohibited the government from directly funding religious activities, in-
cluding those involving proselytizing, by citing a long string of cases
where the Court struck down attempts by the government to provide fi-
nancial and other aid directly to sectarian schools under conditions that
gave rise to a risk that the school's sectarian missions would be benefit-
ted.3 7 5 He also cited cases involving aid to institutions engaged in both
not be able to buy a ticket then; no amount of money or desire will do the trick.
You will be met by your chosen pilot and flown straight to Hell on an express jet
(without air conditioning or toilets, of course).
Id. at 865-66 (quoting Ace, The Plane Trlth, Wide Awake 3 (Nov./Dec. 1990)).
370. Id. at 866.
371. Id. at 867 (quoting Ferguson & Lassiter, From Calorie to Calvary, Wide Awake 14
(Sept./Oct. 1991)).
372. Id.
373. Id. at 868.
374. Id. at 868, 873-74.
375. Id. at 874-75. Among the examples of the Court striking down attempts by the gov-
ernment to aid religion were a state program providing nonpublic schools with aid in giving
state-mandated services including tests that lacked monitoring or other measures needed
to insure that the state aid would not be used for religious indoctrination, see Levitt v.
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 480 (1973); and a portion of a
federal program for financing the construction of educational facilities that would have al-
lowed a building to be constructed for a religious university that could have been used for
sectarian purposes after twenty years. Titon v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 683 (1971) (plu-
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secular and sectarian missions to demonstrate that the Court "has al-
ways made a searching enquiry to ensure that the institution kept the
secular activities separate from its sectarian ones, with any direct aid
flowing only to the former and never the latter."3 76 From these cases,
Justice Souter found a "common principle [which] has never been ques-
tioned or repudiated: '[Tihe [Establishment] Clause... absolutely pro-
hibit[s] government-financed... indoctrination into the beliefs of a par-
ticular religious faith."
3 7 7
The majority's assertions that Rosenberger was not a case con-
cerned with the government attempting to aid directly persons engaged
in religious activity,3 78 and that the university's financial aid to Wide
Awake satisfied Establishment Clause requirements because it was dis-
pensed pursuant to neutral eligibility criteria,3 7 9 compelled Justice
Souter to argue that the Court requires more than neutral criteria to jus-
tify government providing any affirmative aid that ultimately benefits re-
ligion, s° and that neutral criteria can never justify government providing
direct aid to religion.3 8 1 First, he asserted that neutrality had become
important only in the context of cases not involving direct government
aid to religion, where the direct funding prohibition is irrelevant to
whether the indirect government aid involved violated the Establishment
Clause.8 2 Second, he supported his argument that neutrality was insuf-
ficient to justify even indirect government aid to religion by citing three
important Establishment Clause cases wherein the Court upheld gov-
ernment programs that distributed aid through religiously neutral crite-
ria to private individuals, who then used it to support religious institu-
tions, only because the aid ultimately reached the religious institutions
through the private choices of the aid recipients. 38 Third, he supported
rality) (Burger, C.J., joined by Harlan, Stewart and Blackmun, JJ.) (cited in Rosenberger,
515 U.S. at 875).
376. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 875-76. These cases included Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S.
589 (1988), in which the Court permitted religious organizations to compete for federal
grants to provide various services to adolescents aimed at preventing them from engaging
in premarital sexual relations or from conceiving a child out of wedlock as long as the reli-
gious grantees in no way engaged in religious speech while fulfilling their grant obligations.
Bowen, 487 U.S. at 594, 614-15 (cited in Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 875-76).
377. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 876 (citation omitted).
378. See id- at 842, 844 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor, Scalia
and Thomas, JJ.).
379. See id. at 840-42.
380. See id. at 877-81.
381. See id. at 882-85.
382. See id. at 878-79. He cited as examples cases concerned with such questions as
whether "it [would] be wrong to put out fires in burning churches .... to pay the bus fares
of students on the way to parochial schools.... to allow a grantee of special education
funds to spend them at a religious college?" Id.
383. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 879-81. The three indirect benefits cases were Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills School Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (It did not violate the Establishment
Clause for a deaf high school student to attend a parochial high school with an interpreter
provided by State aid.); Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481
(1986) (It did not violate the Establishment Clause for a blind student to use State voca-
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his assertion that neutral criteria never justifies direct aid to religion by
citing primarily to three important direct benefits cases in which the
Court invalidated government programs that provided, or could have
provided, direct aid to religion, even though the programs distributed aid
on the basis of religiously-neutral criteria.
3 84
The majority had offered three Establishment Clause justifications
other than neutrality-the printers were paid directly, the printing ser-
vice is functionally equivalent to admitting speakers to a public forum,
and the student activity fee is not a tax. 8 5 Justice Souter argued that
these justifications either do not reflect reality or are inconsistent with
important Establishment Clause precedents and principles.
He attacked the direct payment to the printer justification on func-
tionality and policy grounds. WAP's chosen printer did not receive
money from the university to subsidize its choice of what to print, for it
would get paid only for printing Wide Awake.3 8 6 As a consequence, Jus-
tice Souter contended that the payment to the printer did not bring the
university's program in line with the Court's important indirect benefits
cases because it did not provide a "third party standing between the gov-
ernment and the ultimate religious beneficiary to break the circuit by its
independent discretion to put state money to religious use."3 8 7 Further,
he asserted that "[t]he formalism of distinguishing between payment to
Wide Awake so it can pay an approved bill and payment of the approved
bill itself cannot be the basis of a decision of constitutional law[, other-
wise,... the Constitution would permit a State to pay all the bills of
"388
any religious institution ....
The majority essentially claimed that since the Establishment
tional aid to prepare for the ministry by attending a private Christian college.); Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (It did not violate the Establishment Clause for a state to pro-
vide tax deductions for educational expenses incurred by parents of both public school
students and private school students.) (cited in Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 579-81).
384. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 882-85. The three direct benefits cases were Bowen, 487
U.S. at 602-18 (upholding facially the constitutionality of a federal program permitting reli-
gious organizations compete for grants to help adolescents avoid premarital sex because,
among other reasons, it contained safeguards to insure that the religious grantees would
not use religious methods to fulfill their grant obligations); Tilton, 403 U.S. at 682-84
(striking down a portion of a program that distributed construction grants to educational
institutions on a religiously neutral basis because it could help sectarian colleges build fa-
cilities they could use for religious purposes); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 252-55
(1977) (striking down state funding for helping both public and private schools conduct
field trips because the field trips taken by private religious schools could foster religion).
385. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 840-41 (student activity fee is not a tax justification), id. at
842 (direct payment to printer justification), id. 842-45 (providing printing service is func-
tionally equivalent to admitting a speaker to a public forum justification).
386. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 886 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Gins-
burg and Breyer, JJ.).
387. Id. (noting that Zobrest, Witters, and Mueller "turned on the fact that the choice to
benefit religion was made by a nonreligious third party standing between the government
and a religious institution.").
388. Id. at 886-87. In this regard, he noted that even the majority had stated that "if the
State pays a church's bills, it is subsidizing it, and we must guard against this abuse." Id.
at 887 n. 10.
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Clause is not violated when the government provides religious speakers
equal access to public fora it has incurred costs to create and maintain,
it will not be violated if government provides religious organizations any
other good or service that it provides nonreligious organizations. 389 Jus-
tice Souter attacked this claim on grounds that it was based on a faulty
analogy. He noted that the public fora cases were concerned with "the
preservation of free speech on the model of the street corner[,]" and
"drew ultimately on unexceptional Speech Clause doctrine treating [all
speakers equally] in a public forum. " 39° Thus, he insisted that the ma-
jority's "analogy breaks down entirely" when applied to printing services,
since "[tihere is no traditional street corner printing provided by the gov-
ernment on equal terms to all comers, and the forum cases cannot be
lifted to a higher plane of generalization without admitting that new eco-
nomic benefits are being extended directly to religion in clear violation of
the principle barring direct aid."39'
Finally, the majority basically asserted that the student activity fee
was not a tax, and therefore the university's program was exempt from
the Establishment Clause's prohibition against government taxing to
provide direct benefits to religion.3 92 Given its mandatory nature, Justice
Souter found it ludicrous to treat the student activity fee as anything
other than tax.393 More importantly, he rejected "[tihe novelty of the [ma-
jority's] assumption that the direct aid bar only extends to aid derived
from taxation ... To that end, he quoted dicta from a few of the
Court's important direct aid cases to support his proposition that the
"Court has never held that government resources obtained without taxa-
tion could be used for direct religious support, and.., cases on direct
government aid have frequently spoken in terms no way limited to tax
revenues."395 Observing that one of the Establishment Clause's "dual
objectives... was... to protect religion from a corrupting dependence
on support from the Government[,]" 396 he argued that permitting gov-
ernment to provide direct aid to religion from nontax sources would sub-
vert that objective because "the corrupting effect of government support
does not turn on whether the Government's own money comes from
taxation or gift or the sale of public lands ....
389. See id. at 842-45.
390. Id. at 888 (Souter, J, dissenting, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ.).
391. Id. at 889.
392. See id. at 840-41 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor, Scalia and
Thomas, JJ.).
393. See id. at 873-74, 890 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ.).
394. Id- at 890.
395. Id. For example, he noted that in Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Ny-
quist, 413 U.S. 756, 780 (1973), the Court stated that "it is clear from our cases that direct
aid in whatever form is invalid." Id.
396. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 891 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg
and Breyer, JJ.).
397. Id.
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D. Summation
Over the years, Supreme Court Justices have applied a number of
Establishment Clause tests to determine whether it violates the Estab-
lishment Clause for the government to admit religious speakers to fora it
has created. So far, regardless of the test used, the Court has resolved
this issue in favor of religious speakers. Keys to this outcome have been
the Court's beliefs that:
* any benefits a religious organization receives from being admitted
to a government created forum are merely incidental;
398
* the monitoring mechanisms government would have to imple-
ment to keep religious expression out of government created fora
could impermissibly entangle government with religion or pro-
duce oppressive acts of censorship; 399
" requiring or permitting the government to exclude religious ex-
pression from government created fora would enmesh govern-
ment in the nearly impossible task of distinguishing between
purely religious speech, religious commentary on secular topics
and secular commentary about religion;400 and
" government does not endorse religion by admitting religious
speakers to government created fora, because all messages ex-
pressed therein, secular or religion, are those of private speak-
ers. 
401
And yet, the Court left open the possibility that it might not univer-
sally approve the admission of religious speakers to every forum created
by public schools and universities. In both Widmar and Mergens, the
maturity level of the students was an important factor in the Court find-
ing that the students would not perceive the views of the religious or-
ganizations admitted to the schools' fora to be those of the school.
40 2
398. Lamb's Chapel. 508 U.S. at 395; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274-75.
399. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 844-45; Mergens, 496 U.S. at 253; Widmar, 454 U.S. at
272 and n. 11.
400. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 272 n. 11.
401. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395; Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250-52; Widmar, 454 U.S. at
271 and n. 10, 273-74. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 841-42, where Justice Kennedy re-
lies on a disclaimer to find that a public university program for paying the printing costs of
a religiously oriented student organization "respects the critical difference 'between gov-
emnment speech endorsing religion... and private speech endorsing religion ....'" Id
(quoting Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250). But cf. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 261 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment, joined by Scalia, J.) where Justice Kennedy
asserted "that a public high school 'endorses' a religious club... if the club happens to be
one of many activities that the school permits students to choose in order to further the
development of their intellect and character in an extracurricular setting." See Mergens,
496 U.S. at 266, 270 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Brennan, J.)
where Justice Marshall warned that the high school would violate the Establishment
Clause by admitting religious clubs to its forum without first taking steps to dissociate it-
self from the religious views of those clubs.
402. In Widmar, the Court especially noted that "University students are... young
adults[, so tihey are less impressionable than younger students and should be able to ap-
preciate that the University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion." Id. at 274 n. 14.
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Presumably, these findings left open the possibility that cases involving
middle school and elementary school children might be decided differ-
ently.
The Court's finding that the forum at issue was comprised of
enough student groups of varying interests to keep religious groups from
dominating it was very important to the Court's determinations in Wid-
mar and Mergens that admitting religious groups to the forum would not
violate the Establishment Clause.4 °3 This finding appeared to have left
open the possibility that the Court would come to a different result in
cases involving less robust fora.
Factually, the student organizations involved in Widmar and Mer-
gens were student initiated and did not involve any substantive partici-
404pation by non-student adults. In Lamb's Chapel, the forum was es-
sentially comprised of adult-led community organizations and the target
audience was the general public, not students. 40 5 These factual differ-
ences seemed to have left open the possibility that the Court would rule
differently in cases where the religious organization was comprised of
adult leaders and student members.
Conversely, the neutrality principles announced and applied in
Rosenberger appeared to have made it easier for religious organizations
to be admitted into classical "speaking" fora. The Court's emphatic re-
fusal in Rosenberger to recognize the blatantly Christian proselytizing
nature of the student journal at issue seemed to be inconsistent with
Justice's Kennedy's prior view that any action that "would place the gov-
ernment's weight behind an obvious effort to proselytize on behalf of a
particular religion" violates his neutrality test.4 ° 6 Indeed, in Rosenberger
the majority found that it would be inappropriate for government to ana-
In Mergens, the Court found the maturity level of high school students, or at least Con-
gress' finding that high school students were mature enough, to be an important factor in
determining that students would not perceive the high school as endorsing the views of a
religious club by admitting it to its limited open forum. See il. at 250-51.
403. See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 252; Widmear, 454 U.S. at 274-75. But see Justice Mar-
shall's concurring opinion in Mergens, wherein he worries that the forum did not contain
enough issue-oriented student groups to keep students from believing that the school en-
dorsed the views of religious organizations absent the school disclaiming any association
with student groups. 496 U.S. at 265-69 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment, joined
by Brennan, J.).
404. The forum in Widmar was limited to registered student groups, which turned out to
be a broad class of over 100 organizations. W/dmar, 454 U.S. at 264-65, 274. In Mergens.
the forum involved school recognized student-initiated clubs and organizations, 496 U.S.
at 231-32, 252-53, and the substantive participation of school employees was expressly
forbidden by federal law. Id at 251, 253.
405. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 386, 395.
406. Compare Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 661, where Justice Kennedy cites as an example of
government behavior that would violate the coercion element of his neutrality test any ac-
tion that "would place the government's weight behind an obvious effort to proselytize on
behalf of a particular religion" with Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 844, where the Court charac-
terized the publication at issue as merely "a publication involved in pure forum" instead of
"a religious institution.., in the usual sense of that term... ."
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lyze speech to see if it was in reality religious proselytizing.
40 7
Finally, the neutrality test applied in Rosenberger appeared to have
supplied a theory for enabling government to provide direct benefits to
religion, at least where the goods or services supplied help facilitate ex-
pression. The connection between printing services and expression
caused the Court to characterize the university's program for paying the
printing costs of approved student publications as a "metaphysical" fo-
rum. 40 As a consequence, the basic equal access requirement applica-
ble in cases where the government provides private speakers with places
in which to engage in expressive activities was extended to cases where
the government supplies speakers with the means for expressing them-
selves. °" This appeared to have opened the door for the government to
provide religious organizations with anything it supplies non-religious
organizations. In addition, Justice Kennedy's use of historical under-
standings analysis to find that only government benefits financed by
general tax revenues are subject to the prohibition against the govern-
ment providing benefits directly to religion seemed to have opened the
door to enabling the government to supply religion with anything that is
not paid for by tax-generated funds.410
IV. RELIGIOUS SPEAKERS IN GOvERNMENT-CREATED FORA
Widmar, Mergens, Lamb's Chapel, and Rosenberger presented Es-
tablishment Clause issues because in each a government entity asserted
that it had to exclude religious speakers from its forum in a manner that
violated either the Free Speech Clause or statutorily-created free speech
rights in order to avoid violating the Establishment Clause.411 Although
facially the Court's speech rights holdings seemed to be consistent with
the operative Free Speech principles previously discussed, an examina-
tion of the specific facts of each case is necessary to determine if the
407. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 844-45, where the Court declared that permitting the
government to analyze speech to see if it is too religious would constitute impermissible
censorship, require courts to undertake the impossible task of distinguishing "[between
'religious' speech and speech 'about' religion[,1" and "to inquire into the [religious] signifi-
cance of words and practices[,]" a task it believed was beyond judicial competency. Id. at
845 (quoting Walz v. Tax Commn. of Cty of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664 (1970)).
408. Id. at 830, 842-44.
409. See icl. at 842-44.
410. See idl. at 840-41.
411. Free Speech Clause-see Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 837; Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at
394; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270-71. Statutory free speech rights-see Mergens, 496 U.S. at
247. In Widmar, the Court held that a public university had used content-based discrimi-
nation to deny religious speakers access to a forum generally open for use by student
groups. 454 U.S. at 267-70. In Mergens, the Court held that a public high school had vio-
lated the federal Equal Access Act by denying religious speakers equal access to a statuto-
rily defined limited open forum. 496 U.S. at 243-47. But the nature of the government-
created forum was irrelevant in Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger, because the Court held in
each case that a government entity used viewpoint discrimination to deny religious speak-
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Court departed from its usual standards for classifying fora and identify-
ing viewpoint discrimination so as to give religious speakers preferential
access to government-created fora.
A. Forum Classification and the Religious Speaker
The Court characterized the forum in Widmar as being "generally
open .... " 412 This characterization was based on findings that the uni-
versity had created the forum by routinely making meeting facilities
available to registered student organizations and had admitted over 100
student groups to it. 413 Given that the university routinely granted regis-
tered status to student groups, the Court was clearly justified in charac-
terizing the forum as being generally open,4 14 for the university's "grant-
ing of the requisite permission [seemed to be] ministerial."415 In fact, in
Perry, the Court cited Widmar's forum as an example of the designated
public forum.4 16 Therefore, the forum classification in Widmar was con-
sistent with those made in cases involving non-religious speakers.
The Mergens forum was classified as a limited open forum, a forum
classification different than any used by the U.S. Supreme Court in its
Free Speech cases,4 17 because it was created conceptually by Congress
418in the Equal Access Act. As defined by Congress, a limited open fo-
rum is created in fact whenever a public high school permits even one
"noncurriculum related student group[ I to meet on school premises dur-
ing noninstructional time. " 419  Congress neglected to define the term
"noncurriculum related student group," but the Court interpreted it to
mean "any student group that does not directly relate to the body of
courses offered by the school."420 The Court further held that:
a student group directly relates to a school's curriculum if the subject
matter of the group is actually taught, or will soon be taught, in a regu-
larly offered course; if the subject matter of the group concerns the body of
courses as a whole; if participation in the group is required for a particular
412. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267.
413. Id. at 265.
414. Id
415. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804 (citation omitted), where the Court identified the min-
isterial nature of the forum access granting process as a key distinction between a limited
designated public forum and a nonpublic forum. See id.
416. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
417. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 241-42, where the Court rejected the assertion that the limited
open forum was in essence a limited public forum of the type identified in Widmar and that
the Act reflected Congressional intent to "'track [the Court's] Free Speech Clause Jurispru-
dence.'" The Court did so because "Congress' deliberate choice to use a different term
[from those the Court used in conducting forum analysis] -and to define that term-can
only mean that it intended to establish a standard different from the one established by
our free speech cases." Id.
418. Id. at 235-36 (citing 20 U.S.C.A. § 4071(b) (West 2001)).
419. Id. at 235 (quoting 20 U.S.C.A. § 4071(b) (West 2001)).
420. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 239 (emphasis in original).
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course; or if participation in the group results in academic credit.42 '
In interpreting these key terms, the Court was influenced by its be-
lief that Congress' broad legislative purpose in enacting the Equal Access
Act was "to address perceived widespread discrimination against reli-
gious speech in public schools .... 4 2 2 Consistent with its view of the
Act's purpose, the Court rejected the high school's contention that all of
its student groups were curriculum related because their subjects bore
some relation to its educational goals.42 3 The Court explained this rejec-
tion by adopting the following explanation for it given by the Court of
Appeals:
Allowing such a broad interpretation of 'curriculum-related' would make
the [Act] meaningless. A school's administration could simply declare that
it maintains a closed forum and chooses which student clubs it wanted to
allow by tying the purposes of those student clubs to some broadly defmed
educational goal. At the same time the administration could arbitrarily
deny access to school facilities to any unfavored student club on the basis
of its speech content. This is exactly the result... Congress sought to
prohibit by enacting the [Act]. 424
Given that the government's use of content-based discrimination to ex-
clude speakers from government-created fora escapes strict scrutiny
only if a nonpublic forum is involved,4 25 it is clear that the closed forum
addressed in this explanation is a nonpublic forum. As will be demon-
strated below, the ease with which religious speakers could be excluded
from public high schools' nonpublic fora under the Court's nonpublic
fora holdings makes it equally clear that the Equal Access Act was de-
signed to prevent public high schools from being able to use nonpublic
fora justifications for engaging in content-based exclusions of religious
groups.
In Perry and Cornelius, the Court specifically identified selective ac-
cess as a key characteristic separating nonpublic fora from limited des-
ignated public fora.426 In Perry, the Court indicated that government
agencies are to be given great flexibility in defining their nonpublic fora
by approving a school system's selective exclusion of a non-bargaining
agent union from its mail system even though it admitted other "speak-
ers" whose messages were only broadly related to school's educational
427functions. These precedents enable a high school to adopt a much
broader definition of its educational mission than it is permitted to do
under the Court's interpretation of the Equal Access Act for purposes of
421. Id. at 239-40.
422. Id. at 239.
423. See id. at 243-45.
424. Id. at 244-45 (citation omitted).
425. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46, 49.
426. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804-06; Perry, 460 U.S. at 49.
427. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 47-48.
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creating a nonpublic forum limited to student organizations concerned
with subjects related to its educational mission. And, as discussed in
detail in Section II.C. above, the Court has been quite liberal in permit-
ting the government to exclude speakers from nonpublic fora, for it has
* freely permitted government entities, without further justifica-
tion, to restrict the use of their nonpublic fora to those who par-
ticipate in the fora's official business, even when they have ad-
mitted some non-business related speakers while excluding
others;
428
* accepted as a reasonable justification for excluding speakers the
assertion that their inclusion could disrupt the official business
of a nonpublic forum, even when the assertion was supported by
little or no evidence, 429 and some speakers had been admitted
who presented risks of disruption equal to those who were ex-
cluded;43 0 and
* accepted as a reasonable justification for excluding controversial
speakers the mere assertion that the community could regard
their inclusion as government favoritism toward, or entanglement
with, their messages. 431
As a consequence, if the Court applies its nonpublic forum precedents
consistently, it will have to uphold most exclusions of religiously-
oriented student groups from nonpublic fora created by public high
schools to complement their educational missions.
First, it is quite likely that religiously-oriented student groups can
be excluded from such nonpublic fora on grounds that they do not par-
ticipate in the nonpublic fora's official business, for the religious pur-
poses of these student groups often will not be very closely related to the
schools' educational missions no matter how broadly the missions are
defined. 432 Moreover, under the Court's holding in Perry, the religious-
oriented groups would not be able to gain admission to these nonpublic
fora simply because non-religious student groups which were unrelated
to the schools' educational missions were admitted.433
Second, religious activity in the public school setting has always
been controversial because of its potential for subjecting school children
to coercive pressures to participate in religious activities and creating di-
428. See icL at 47, 53 and n. 13.
429. See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 732-33; Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 807, 809-11; Perry, 460
U.S. at 52 and n. 12.
430. See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 733; Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 809, 812-13.
431. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 807, 809.
432. See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 238, where the Court noted that the "[t]he logic of the
[Equal Access] Act... [is] that a curriculum-related student group is one that has more
than just a tangential or attenuated relationship to courses offered by the school... land
that] a religious.., club is itself likely to be a noncurriculum-related group."
433. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 47, 53 and n. 13.
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visiveness among the students along religious lines .434 'So, schools could
be deemed justified in fearing that their educational environments could
be disrupted by admitting religious student organizations to their non-
public fora.435
Third, nonpublic fora are neither openly available to a broad spec-
trum of speakers nor "dedicated to general debate or the free exchange of
ideas[,]" 436 since by definition they are reserved for speakers deliberately
selected for admission because their expressive activities will be com-
patible with the fora's official business.437 Therefore, a public high
school's selective admission of a religiously-oriented student organiza-
tion to a nonpublic forum it created to complement its educational mis-
sion could easily be perceived as an endorsement of the organization's
religious messages."
The Court finessed the forum classification issue in Lamb's Chapel
and Rosenberger by holding in each case that the government used
viewpoint discrimination as the basis of excluding religious speakers
from the forum it created. 439 However, the forum involved in each case
was arguably a nonpublic forum,440 so the Court's viewpoint discrimina-
tion findings obviated the need for it to consider carefully whether reli-
gious speakers should be treated differently than non-religious speakers
with respect to access to non-public fora. Examination of the Court's
handling of content discrimination and viewpoint discrimination in cases
where religious speakers are involved suggests that it intends to be more
protective of religious speakers than non-religious speakers.
B. Content and Viewpoint Regulation of Religious Speakers
Widmar involved a public forum,441 so the Court needed only to find
that the university's exclusion of religious speakers was content-based
434. See Santa Fe Independent SchL Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 311-12 (2000); Mergens,
496 U.S. at 268-69 (Marshall, J., concurring, joined by Brennan, J.).
435. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 810-11.
436. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 811.
437. See id. at 802-05; Perry, 460 U.S. at 45, 49.
438. See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 261-62 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment, joined by Scalia, J.); id. at 263-64, 270 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judg-
ment, joined by Brennan, J.); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 809. Note, this circumstance is very
different from the open admissions of self-selecting private speakers in public fora, since
under those circumstances the Court has held that government does not endorse
messages of speakers in a public forum simply because it created the public forum. See
Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395; Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250-52; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271
and n. 10, 274.
439. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-35; Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 392-94.
440. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 391. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 823-25, describing
an elaborate process by which the university selectively provided student groups access to
its program for paying vendors for their costs in providing services to approved student
groups. In particular, the only student groups eligible for this program were those engaged
in activities "'related to the educational purpose of the University.'" Id. at 824 (citation
omitted).
441. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267, 268 n. 5.
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in order to apply the strict scrutiny rule.4 4 2 Having found that a public
university "discriminated against student groups and speakers based on
their desire to use a generally open forum to engage in religious worship
and discussion[,I" 44 3 there was little doubt that these speakers were ex-
cluded from the forum because of the religious content of their speech.
So, the Court's application of the strict scrutiny rule to the exclusion
was consistent with its public forum cases involving non-public speak-
ers.
Nevertheless, in rejecting Justice White's dissenting assertion that
religious worship is not a form of expression protected by the Free
Speech Clause,444 the Court articulated its belief that the task of drawing
a principled line between religious worship and other speech involving
religion is beyond judicial competence. 44 5 This reply to Justice White's
dissent in Widmar was used by the Rosenberger majority as a partial
justification of its Establishment Clause holding, which was stated in
language that seemed to signal the Court's intent to treat any attempt by
the government to distinguish between religious speech and other types
of speech as impermissible censorship." 6 If this view of censorship were
to become law, it would preclude government from excluding religious
speakers from nonpublic fora on a non-viewpoint basis, since such ex-
clusions would require government to distinguish religious speech from
other types of speech.
Mergens involved a forum defined statutorily by the Equal Access
Act so that it did not meet any of the forum definitions made by the U.S.
Supreme Court for purposes of conducting Free Speech analysis." 7
And, the Equal Access Act is violated if a religious organization is ex-
cluded from the statutorily created forum merely on the basis of speech
442. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
443. Widniar, 454 U.S. at 269-70.
444. Id. at 282-86, relying heavily on school prayer cases, a case prohibiting the state re-
quiring the Ten Commandments to be posted on the walls of school rooms, and a case
striking down a state requirement that a person believe in God to obtain state employment.
445. Id. at 269-70 n. 6, wherein the Court pointed out that the distinction would have to
be between religious worship, speech about religion, descriptions of religious experience,
and religious appeals to non-believers. The Court believed the distinction would not have
any intelligible content, because "[there is no indication when 'singing hyms, reading
scripture, and teaching biblical principles[,]'... cease to be 'singing, teaching, and read-
ing'-all apparently forms of 'speech,'... and become unprotected 'worship.'" Id. More-
over, the Court complained that "Im]erely to draw the distinction... requirels]... in-
quir[y] into the significance of words and practices to different religious faiths, and in
varying circumstances by the same faith." Id.
446. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 844-45, wherein the Court stated that permitting the gov-
ernment to distinguish between "works characterized by... evangelism... and writing
that merely happens to express views that a given religion might approve[,]'... raises the
specter of governmental censorship... to ensure that all student writings and publica-
tions meet some baseline standard of secular orthodoxy. To impose that standard on stu-
dent speech at a university is to imperil the very sources of free speech and expression."
Id.
447. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 241-42.
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content. 448 As a consequence, even though the statutorily defined forum
was in reality a nonpublic forum,449 the Court did not need to determine
if the high school denied religious organizations access to its forum on a
viewpoint basis since the religious organizations were identified for ex-
clusion by the religious content of their speech. 5 ° This result was at
variance with the Court's nonpublic forum jurisprudence.
In Lamb's Chapel, the Court found that a school used viewpoint
discrimination to exclude religious speakers from a forum limited to
speakers engaged in social, civic, or recreational uses or in certain politi-
cal uses. 451 It also found "that a lecture or film about child rearing and
family values would... be a use for social or civic purposes."452 So, the
forum was available generally for presentations concerning the subjects
of child-rearing and family values except those having a religious per-
spective. 4, 3 Thus, the Court's holding-that a public school engaged in
viewpoint discrimination by excluding from its forum a film-series about
child-rearing and family values because it was presented from a Chris-
tian perspective5--was consistent with its earlier precedents dealing
with viewpoint discrimination.455
It is much more debatable as to whether the Court's viewpoint dis-
crimination holding in Rosenberger was consistent with the Court's prior
distinctions between viewpoint and content discrimination. The univer-
sity prohibited student activity fee funds from being used to reimburse
the expenses of student groups engaged in "any activity that 'primarily
promotes or manifests a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ulti-
mate reality.'"456 It invoked this prohibition as justification for refusing
to pay the printing costs of Wide Awake, a Christian-oriented newspaper
published by a Christian student group,457 because of the pervasively re-
448. 20 U.S.C.A. § 4071(a), (b) (West 2001).
449. A high school creates a nonpublic forum if it deliberately limits the use of its facili-
ties during non-instructional hours to student organizations concerned with subjects
broadly related to its educational mission. After all, as discussed in detail in Section II.A.
above, the Court has made selective access, whereby a speaker gains admission to a gov-
ernment-created forum only after successfully undergoing a permission-granting process
designed to limit access to speakers whose messages and identities are compatible with the
forum's official business, as the key characteristic separating nonpublic fora from limited
designated public fora. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804-06; Perry, 460U.S. at 49.
450. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 247.
451. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 387, 392-94.
452. Id. at 393.
453. Id. at 393-94.
454. Id.
455. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806, wherein the Court stated that "[aIthough a speaker
may be excluded from a nonpublic forum if he wishes to address a topic not encompassed
within the purpose of the forum .... the government violates the First Amendment when it
denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he espouses on an other-
wise includible subject." See Perry, 460 U.S. at 49, wherein the Court indicated that gov-
ernment operators of nonpublic fora could exclude speakers based on their identity or ex-
clude entire subjects but could not exclude viewpoints about an admitted subject.
456. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 825.
457. Id. at 827
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458ligious nature of its contents.
In court, the university defended its refusal to pay Wide Awake's
printing costs on grounds that its exclusion of Wide Awake was based
on content rather than viewpoint discrimination. 4 5 9 The Court rejected
the university's position, finding instead that Wide Awake was the victim
of viewpoint discrimination.4 6 °
Each issue of Wide Awake contained articles about subjects of cur-
rent interest, such as racism, crisis pregnancy, stress, music, homo-
sexuality, and eating disorders.4 6 ' The Court concluded that these non-
religious subjects "were ... within the approved category of publica-
tions., 4 62 After declaring that "[rleligion may be a vast area of inquiry
[that] ... also provides.., a specific premise, a perspective, a stand-
point from which a variety of subjects may be discussed and consid-
ered[,]"463 the Court found that Wide Awake had been excluded from the
university's printing cost subsidy program not because it discussed the
general subject of religion, but rather because it discussed a variety ap-
proved subjects from a religious perspective.
In dissent, Justice Souter argued that the university's prohibition
against funding activities "which primarily promotes or manifests a par-
ticular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality" did not discrimi-
nate against religious viewpoints because it excluded "the entire subject
matter of religious apologetics."465 Although the term religious apologet-
ics could be limited to discourse in defense of the existence of a deity,4 66
Justice Souter interpreted it broadly to include all perspectives about a
deity or ultimate reality so that it covers the viewpoints of all specific re-
ligions, the perspectives of deists and theists, and the perspectives of
agnostics and atheists.4 67 Thus, he viewed the university's prohibition
as "a categorical exclusion of both sides of the religious debate ....
Having found from an examination of its contents that Wide
Awake's subject "is nothing other than the preaching of the word,"469
Justice Souter concluded that Wide Awake "'primarily promote[d] or
458. Id. at 826-27.
459. Id. at 830.
460. Id. at 828-32.
461. Id. at 826.
462. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831.
463. Id.
464. Id.
465. Id. at 895-96 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ.).
466. See Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 53 (1979), where the term apologetics is de-
fined broadly as "systematic argumentative discourse in defense (as of a doctrine)" and
more narrowly as "a branch of theology devoted to the defense of the divine origin and au-
thority of Christianity."
467. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 895-97 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg
and Breyer, JJ.).
468. Id. at 898.
469. Id. at 868.
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manifest[d] a particular beliefi I in or about a deity.. .[ ]' in the very spe-
cific sense that its manifest function is to call students to repentance, to
commitment to Jesus Christ, and to particular moral action .... " 47 0 As
a consequence, he regarded Wide Awake's exclusion from the univer-
sity's printing cost subsidy program as a content-based exclusion con-
sistent with the university's policy against subsidizing any expression
within the subject matter of religious apologetics."
Clearly, the majority and dissent had radically different views about
the nature of Wide Awake's contents: The majority believed they con-
sisted of religious perspectives about secular subjects;4 7 2 the dissent be-
lieved they constituted nothing more than a call to Christianity.4 7 3 If the
majority and dissent had come to their opposing positions about view-
point discrimination solely because of their different factual interpreta-
tions of Wide Awake's contents, they would not have been in disagree-
ment as to what legal principles controlled the viewpoint discrimination
issue. After all, even Justice Souter agreed that it constitutes viewpoint
discrimination for the government to exclude a person from a nonpublic
forum because his speech gives a religious perspective about a secular
subject.474 Viewed this way, Rosenberger's viewpoint discrimination
holding would have been consistent with the Court's prior viewpoint dis-
crimination precedents. 475
But, in response to Justice Souter's assertion that the university
had not engaged in viewpoint discrimination, Justice Kennedy character-
ized Justice Souter's position as being that "no viewpoint discrimination
occurs [if government]... discriminate[s] against an entire class of
viewpoints...,6 He rejected this position by opining that "[tihe dis-
sent's declaration that debate is not skewed so long as multiple voices
are silenced is simply wrong; the debate is skewed in multiple ways."
47 7
To illustrate his point, Justice Kennedy hypothesized a debate about ra-
cism and asserted that the "exclusion of several views on that problem is
just as offensive to the First Amendment as exclusion of only one." 478 To
drive this point home, he further contended that "[i]t is as objectionable
to exclude both a theistic and an atheistic perspective on the debate as it
is to exclude one, the other, or yet another political, economic, or social
470. Id. at 895.
471. Id. at 895-98.
472. Id at 831 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor, Scalia and Tho-
mas, JJ.).
473. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 865-68, 895-96 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens,
Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ.).
474. Id. at 897-98.
475. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806; Perry, 460 U.S. at 49.
476. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor,
Scalia and Thomas, JJ.).
477. Id. at 831-32.
478. Id. at 831.
2001]
63
Allison: Prelude to a Church-State: The Supremes Set the Stage for Faith-B
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2001
TULSA LAW REVIEW
viewpoint. 479
Of course, all viewpoints about a subject are excluded if the entire
subject is excluded from a government-created forum. In that sense,
when government excludes a subject from a forum, it excludes an entire
class of viewpoints. So, if Justice Kennedy intended for his response to
Justice Souter's dissent to be read as equating viewpoint discrimination
with the elimination of all viewpoints about a subject from a govern-
ment-created forum, which is the way Justice Souter read it, 480 then
surely Justice Souter was correct in proclaiming that "the Court has all
but eviscerated the line between viewpoint and content. "4 s 1 On the other
hand, Justice Kennedy's response to Justice Souter's dissent is still con-
sistent with the Court's prior viewpoint discrimination precedents if all
he meant to say was that it constitutes viewpoint discrimination to ex-
clude from a government-created forum some, but not all, viewpoints
about a subject even if the viewpoints excluded are the polar opposites of
482religious and anti-religious perspectives.
C. Summation
Under the Court's prior forum analysis precedents, it would be rela-
tively easy for a government entity to exclude religious speakers from its
nonpublic forum unless the Court deemed the exclusion to be viewpoint
rather than content based. So far, the Court has not squarely faced this
type of case. In Mergens, Congress statutorily prohibited the application
of nonpublic forum rules. In Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger, the Court
found that religious speakers were excluded from government-created
fora on the basis of their religious viewpoints.48 3
479. Id.
480. In this regard, Justice Souter declared that:
The Court's decision equating a categorical exclusion of both sides of the religious
debate with viewpoint discrimination suggests the Court has concluded that pri-
marily religious and antireligious speech, grouped together, always provides an
opposing [and not merely a related] viewpoint to any speech about any secular
topic. Thus, the Court's reasoning requires a university that funds private publi-
cations about any primarily nonreligious topic also to fund publications primarily
espousing adherence to or rejection of religion. But, a university's decision to
fund a magazine about racism, and not to fund publications aimed at urging re-
pentance before God does not skew the debate either about racism or the desir-
ability of religious conversion.
Id. at 898-99 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ.).
481. Id. at 898-99.
482. This would not be an unreasonable interpretation of Justice Kennedy's response to
Justice Souter's dissent, since his racism example did not specifically exclude all perspec-
tives about racism but rather appeared to hypothesize the exclusion of many, but not all.
perspectives. Rosenberger, 515, U.S. at 831 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas, JJ.). Given that viewpoint discrimination has been defined
as the exclusion from a forum of a viewpoint about a subject the forum includes, this in-
terpretation would be consistent with the Court's past viewpoint discrimination prece-
dents. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806; Perry, 460 U.S. at 49.
483. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393-94; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828-37.
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Although the Court's viewpoint discrimination holding in Mergens
was unremarkable, the debate between the majority and dissent in
Rosenberger elicited from the majority a theory of viewpoint discrimina-
tion that could be interpreted as treating the exclusion of the entire sub-
ject of religion from nonpublic fora as impermissible viewpoint discrimi-
nation. Such a rule would eviscerate the distinction between content
and viewpoint discrimination with respect to religious speech, thereby
giving religious speakers greater access to nonpublic fora than the
Court's traditional forum analysis has accorded nonreligious speakers.
However, the meaning of the Court's viewpoint discrimination holding in
Rosenberger is debatable. Thus, as the 2000-2001 U.S. Supreme Court
term commenced, it was far from clear that the Rosenberger viewpoint
discrimination holding made it impossible for government to exclude the
subject of religion from nonpublic fora.
V. THE GOOD NEWS EXTENSIONS
Good News arose from the refusal of the Milford School District
(Milford) to permit the Good News Club (The Club) to meet immediately
at the end of the regular school day on the premises of a school that
educated children in grades K-12. 4 m The Club is a local chapter of the
"Child Evangelism Fellowship ... , a Christian missionary organiza-
tion .... "45 "[its stated purpose is to instruct [school] children [aged 6-
12] in family values and morals from a Christian perspective."48 6
In Milford, The Club was organized and is run by a Christian minis-
ter and his wife. 87 The Club meetings consist of opening and closing
prayers, 488 games that involve learning Bible verses,489 and a formal les-
son based on a "'devotional booklet' [designed] ... to provide daily 'spiri-
tual nourishment' to the children."490 "During the lesson, the teacher
'challenges' the 'saved' children, those who already believe in the Lord
Jesus as their Savior, to '[sItop and ask God for the strength and the
want'... to obey Him." 49 1 The teacher then "'invites' the [unsaved]
child[ren] 'to trust the Lord Jesus to be your Savior from sin' and 're-
484. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2098, 2103 n. 5, 2106.




488. Id. at 154.
489. Id.
490. Milford District, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 155 n. 6.
491. Id. at 156. The children are then instructed
[If you know Jesus as your Savior, you need to place God first in your life. And if
you don't know Jesus as Savior and if you would like to, then we will-we will
pray with you separately, individually... And the challenge would be, those of
you who know Jesus as Savior, you can rely on God's strength to obey Him.
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ceive[ I [him] as your Savior from sin 4 9 2
Milford's refusal to allow The Club to meet at the Milford Central
School was based on its belief that The Club would use the school's
meeting room for religious purposes, a belief that was forcefully articu-
lated by Milford's superintendent in a letter of October 3, 1996:
Your group's request to use the school facilities indicated such use would
be for the purpose of 'hearing a bible lesson and memorizing scripture.' I
understand such proposed use to be the equivalent of religious worship,
which is prohibited under [Milford Central School District] policy, rather
than the expression of religious views or values on a secular subject mat-
ter. To my knowledge, our facilities have not been used in the past by any
organization for the purpose of religious worship.4 93
The policy referred to in the superintendent's letter was Milford's "com-
munity use policy, which prohibits use 'by any individual or organization
for religious purposes'[ I] ... .9 Milford adopted this religious purposes
exclusion in the belief that New York's Education Law prohibited public
school property from being used for religious activity.4 95
Milford's community use policy also adopted several of the Educa-
tion Law's approved after-school uses of public school property, which
most notably made Milford's property available "for [holding] social, civic
and recreational meetings and entertainment events, and other uses per-
taining to the welfare of the community[ ] .... M496 ilford stated that un-
der this policy it would permit "any group that 'promote[s] the moral and
character development of children'. . . to use the school building."
497
The Club noted that Milford had indeed allowed several youth or-
ganizations dedicated to the moral development of young people to meet
at the Milford Central school, including the Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, and
the 4-H Club. 498 This led The Club to argue that Milford had "created a
492. Id. "The children are then instructed[:]"
If you believe what God's Word says about your sin and how Jesus died and rose
again for you, you can have His forever life today. Please bow your heads and
close your eyes. If you have never believed on the Lord Jesus as your Savior and
would like to do that, please show me by raising your hand. If you raised your
hand to show me you want to believe on the Lord Jesus, please meet me so I can
show you from God's Word how you can receive His everlasting life.
Id.
493. Id. at 149 n. 3, 152.
494. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2098.
495. The accuracy of this belief is unclear. New York's Education Law did not expressly
state a religious activity prohibition, but religious activities were not among the listed per-
mitted activities for which public schools could be used. New York's Court of Appeals ap-
parently had interpreted the absence of religious activities on the approved activities list as
a prohibition against public school property being used for religious purposes. See Good
News, 121 S. Ct. at 2100 n. 2 (citing Trietley v. Bd. of Educ. of Buffalo, 65 A.2d 1 (M.Y.A.D.
4 Dept. 1978)).
496. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2098 (emphasis added).
497. Id. at 2101.
498. Milford District, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 154.
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Each of the lower federal courts found that Milford had established
a limited public forum. The District Court did so on the basis that Mil-
ford's access policies implemented the policies of New York's Education
Law, which it interpreted to have "evi[nced an]... intent of the legisla-
ture to create a limited public forum in its public schools by permitting
use of public school buildings by the general public for specific pur-
poses."5 0 9 It also noted that the parties' agreed that the forum was a lim-
ited public forum.5 10 The U.S. Court of Appeals found that Milford had
created a limited public forum by citing its prior holdings that New
York's Education Law "and policies promulgated thereunder create lim-
ited public forum[][,]" the parties agreement that Milford created a lim-
ited public forum, and the District Court's forum conclusions.5 '
The Supreme Court expressly declined to find that Milford had cre-
ated a limited public forum.5 1 2 Instead, after noting that it had previ-
ously refused to decide what type of forum is created when "a school dis-
trict[ I open[s]... its facilities pursuant to [New York's Education
Law],"5 l3 the Court merely presumed that Milford had created a limited
public forum in reliance on the parties' agreement that it had.514 This
was significant, because the Court indicated that had it been forced to
decide the issue its choice would have been between a limited and a tra-
ditional public forum.515 If the Court had decided that Milford's forum
was a traditional public forum, The Club would have prevailed simply by
showing that it had been denied access to the Milford Central School be-
cause of the religious content of its speech.5 16
B. The Free Speech Extensions
Even though all of the courts determined that Milford had estab-
lished a limited public forum, they each applied the free speech stan-
dards applicable to nonpublic fora to decide if Milford's exclusion of The
Club from its forum violated the Free Speech Clause. Under these stan-
dards, the speech "restriction must be 'reasonable in light of the purpose
served by the forum,' 5 17 and must not "discriminate against speech on
the basis of viewpoint[ ]. . 5...518
509. Milford District, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 152.
510. Id. at 153.
511. Milford Circuit, 202 F.3d at 508-09.




516. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
517. Good News, 121 S. CL at 2100 (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806). See Milford Cir-
cuit, 202 F.3d at 509; Milford District, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 154.
518. Good News, 121 S. CL at 2100. See Milford Circuit, 202 F.3d at 509; MilfordDistrict
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limited public forum open to a genre of speech that addresses 'the moral
development of young people.' 499 The Club further argued that "its use
falls within the same genre as the other clubs[,]" differing only in that
"its message [is conveyed] 'from a Christian perspective by using Bible
stories, games, scripture, and religious songs.'"5 0 0 In short, The Club as-
serted that it had been denied permission to meet at the Milford Central
School on the basis of viewpoint discrimination. 5 1 In reply, Milford con-
tended that "[T]he Club's activities are more appropriately classified as
religious instruction and worship and are therefore outside the permitted
use of the forum."
50 2
Given the nature of the disagreement between Milford and The
Club, this case presented the federal judiciary with the broad issues of
what type of forum is involved, whether Milford violated the Free Speech
rules associated with that forum, and whether Milford would violate the
Establishment Clause by admitting The Club to its forum. Both the fed-
eral district court and U.S. Court of Appeals entered summary judgment
for Milford based exclusively on deciding the Free Speech issues by re-
solving the pivotal issue of whether the genre of The Club's speech was
the same as the genre of various other clubs allowed to meet at the Mil-
ford Central school.5 0 3
The Supreme Court resolved the Free Speech issues primarily by
accepting without question the parties' agreement that the forum was a
limited public forum, 5°4 and Milford's admission that its forum admitted
"any group that 'promote[s] the moral and character development of
children'... 505 From this perspective, it summarized the Free Speech
issues into "the question [of] whether speech can be excluded from a lim-
ited public forum on the basis of the religious nature of the speech."
50 6
The Court resolved this question in favor of The Club by holding that
Milford violated the Free Speech Clause by denying The Club access to
its limited public forum because of its religious viewpoint.50° As a conse-
quence, the Establishment Clause issues became relevant. Although the
Establishment Clause issues were not resolved by the lower federal
courts, the Court resolved it in favor of The Club rather than remanding





503. Id. at 154-60; The Good News Club v. Milford C. Sch., 202 F.3d 502, 509-11 (2d Cir.
2000) [hereinafter Milford Circuit].
504. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2100.
505. Id. at 2100-01.
506. Id. at 2099.
507. Id. at 2100-02.
508. Id. at 2103-07.
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Only the Second Circuit ruled on the reasonableness issue.5 19 Evi-
dently, Milford had justified the religious purposes exclusion on grounds
that it "'ensur[ed] that students in its charge are not left with the im-
pression that [Milford] endorses religious instruction in its school, or
that it advances the beliefs of a particular religion or group thereof.'-
5 20
The Club argued that this justification was unreasonable because "there
is little risk that children would confuse [its] ... use of [the] school facili-
ties with the school's endorsement of the religious teachings." 52 1 How-
ever, the Second Circuit declared that its earlier holding in The Bronx
Household of Faith v. Community School District No. 10,522 foreclosed this
argument
52
Bronx Household involved a school district refusing to rent its audi-
torium to a church that wished to use it as a place of worship.5 24 The
school district permitted religious groups to use its facilities for "pur-
poses of discussing religious material or material which contains a reli-
gious viewpoint[,]525 but it refused to permit anyone to "conduct religious
services or religious instruction on [its premises] after school."5 26 With
little supportive policy argument, the Second Circuit held that "it is rea-
sonable for state legislators and school authorities to avoid the identifi-
cation of a middle school with a particular church ... [and] it is reason-
able for... [school] authorities to consider the effect upon the minds of
middle school children of designating their school as a church."5 27 The
court also held that "it is a proper state function to decide the extent to
which church and school should be separated in the context of the use of
school premises for regular church services."5 28
The Club is not a church. Nevertheless, in Milford Circuit the Sec-
ond Circuit found this distinction to be immaterial because:
[tihe activities of [The Club clearly and intentionally communicate Chris-
tian beliefs by teaching and by prayer, and we think it eminently reason-
able that the Milford school would not want to communicate to students of
other faiths that they were less welcome than students who adhere to
21 F. Supp.2d at 154.
519. The District Court simply accepted The Club's acquiescence to the proposition that it
was reasonable for Milford to prohibit the use of its facilities for religious purposes. Milford
District 21 F. Supp. 2d at 154. And, the Supreme Court refused to rule on the reason-
ableness issue because it decided the case on the basis that Milford had engaged in un-
constitutional viewpoint discrimination. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2100.
520. Milford Circuit, 202 F.3d at 509.
521. Id.
522. 127 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 1997).
523. Milford Circuit, 202 F.3d at 509.
524. Bronx Household, 127 F.3d at 209.
525. Id. at 210.
526. Id.
527. Id. at 214. The only supportive argument the Court offered to support these conclu-
sions was its observation that "[elducation... is a particularly important state function,
and the use of school premises is properly a matter of particular state concern." Id.
528. Id. (emphasis added).
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[The Club's teachings[,] ... especially... [since] those who attend the
school are young and impressionable. 29
In essence, the court justified the exclusion of The Club from Milford's
forum on grounds that The Club's presence at the school could be dis-
ruptive of the schools educational mission.
The court failed to cite any evidence that the disruption-children
who did not adhere to The Club's teachings feeling less welcome at the
school-had occurred or was likely to occur. However, as previously
discussed, in cases involving non-religious speakers the Supreme Court
has readily accepted government assertions, backed by little or no evi-
dence, that admitting a specific speaker to a nonpublic forum could dis-
rupt the business of the forum. 3 ° So, it would have been most interest-
ing if the Supreme Court in Good News had reviewed the Second
Circuit's reasonableness holding in Milford Circuit. For speculative pur-
poses, it is useful to recall that in Lamb's Chapel the Supreme Court
commented that if it had undertaken the reasonableness issue "it might
[have] held that [a] rule [prohibiting public school property from being
used for religious purposes] could in no circumstances be applied to re-
ligious speech or religious communicative conduct."
5 3 1
Both the Second Circuit and the District Court found that The Club
had not been the victim of viewpoint discrimination. First, they both de-
termined from their analyses of The Club's purpose, activities and mes-
sages that it was primarily engaged in religious activities-religious in-
struction or religious worship-that Milford excluded from its public
schools.5 32 The keys to this determination were the courts' findings that
The Club's meetings were:
* conducted in a manner nearly identical in format to religious
worship services or religious instruction, 3 3 and
529. Milford Circuit, 202 F.3d at 509.
530. See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 732-33 (plurality) (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.,
and White and Scalia, JJ.); id. at 753, 758 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun and
Stevens, JJ.); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 807, 809-11 (O'Connor, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and
White and Rehnquist, JJ.); iAL at 830-31 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, J.); Perry, 460
U.S. at 52 and n. 12, 53 and n. 13.
531. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393 and n. 6.
532. Milford Circuit, 202 F.3d at 510; Milford District, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 153-58.
533. The Second Circuit determined that The Club's meetings were conducted in a format
nearly identical to that of worship services after comparing their format with the following
description of a worship service given by a religious organization in another case.
'We would come in and have what's called a group prayer, congregational prayer.
Then we would go into praise and worship, sing different praise and worship
songs accompanied by music. From there, [the Reverend] would get up and de-
liver the message, the service for that evening.' Following [the Reverend's] ser-
mon, the Reverends... engage in an 'altar call,' where they would 'invite some-
one to receive the Lord as their Savior.' The service would then conclude with a
closing prayer.
Milford Circuit, 202 F.3d at 510. Thus, the Second Circuit concluded that
It is difficult to see how [T]he Club's activities differ materially from [this descrip-
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* devoted primarily to encouraging children to accept Jesus Christ
as their Savior and believe that they need a relationship with Je-
sus Christ in order to live a moral life.
534
Given these findings, it is not surprising that the Court of Appeals con-
cluded that "[uinder even the most restrictive and archaic definitions of
religion, [The Club's] subject matter is quintessentially religious[, "35
and that the District Court held that "[Milford's] prohibition was based
on the general subject matter... [of] religious instruction and
"536
prayer ....
Second, both the Second Circuit and the District Court rejected The
Club's argument that its exclusion from Milford's public schools consti-
tuted viewpoint discrimination because its purpose and activities were
so similar other organizations -the Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts and 4-H
Club-that had been allowed to meet in the Milford public schools.537
The Club contended that the purpose of these organizations is "teaching
children moral values[ ] .... "53" Further, The Club argued that it also
pursues this purpose, but does so "from a different viewpoint-the
Christian perspective."539 But, both courts found that "the main purpose
of the [Boy Scouts] ... is personal growth and development of leadership
tion of] 'religious worship'...: each has prayers and devotional songs; each has a
central sermon or story with a message; each has a portion in which attendees
are called upon to be 'saved.' Applying a different label to the same activities does
not change their nature or import.
Id.
Similarly, the District Court noted that "[tihe emphasis on prayer, memorization, and reci-
tation of Biblical verses and scripture, and singing of religious songs... are characteristic
of worship activities that inculcate Christian religion and values in the children." Milford
District, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 157. The District Court also found that "The Club's activities
are characteristic of formal religious instruction," because they are "structured in a class-
room setting[,]" involve "... teaching materials and lessons.., oriented toward instilling
Christian beliefs in the children[,]" and engage the children in "pray[ing], read[ing] the Bi-
ble, memoriz[ing] Biblical verses, and singling] songs that have religious references." Id.
534. In light of The Club's argument that its viewpoint is that a relationship with God is
necessary to make moral values meaningful[,]" the Second Circuit concluded that "The
Club is focused on teaching children how to cultivate their relationship with God through
Jesus Christ." Milford Circuit, 202 F.3d at 510. The District Court was greatly affected by
Its analysis of a lesson contained in a booklet entitled Marantha, which among other things
instructed children that
Someday, if the Lord Jesus does not come ... you will die .... Our bodies will
be placed in graves. When the Lord Jesus gives the signal, all the believers who
have died will be raised, alive again. They will have new bodies .... Those who
are still living will also be given new bodies like the body of the Lord Jesus so that
we may travel with Him .... Our new bodies will be just like Jesus' resurrection
body .... The best thing about Heaven is that we will be with Lord Jesus for-
ever.
Milford District, 21 F. Supp.2d at 155-56.
535. Milford Circuit, 202 F.3d at 510.
536. Milford District, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 160.
537. Milford Circuit, 202 F.3d at 510-11; Milford District, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 158-60.
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skills[;]"54 0 "[the purpose of the Girl Scouts 'is to inspire girls with the
highest ideals of character, conduct, patriotism, and service [so] they
may become happy and resourceful citizens[;]'"5 41 and "the 4-H Club
strives to develop leadership and volunteer skills in the children and
values cultural diversity in its members[.]" 542 As a consequence, they
concluded that "[ejach of these organizations focuses on the development
of youth in various ways[, but] the record includes nothing to indicate
that any of the[irl ... activities remotely approach the type of religious
instruction and prayer provided by [Tihe Club."
543
The Second Circuit opinion was not unanimous, for Judge Jacobs
believed Milford had discriminated against The Club on the basis of
viewpoint. 544 He premised this belief on his determination that Milford
had created a forum for developing school children's morals and charac-
ter,545 and his view that "it is quixotic to attempt a distinction between
religious viewpoints and religious subject matters[ I when the subject
matter is morals and character[.]" 546 Further, he opined that "[tihe dis-
tinction is especially slippery where the viewpoint in question is reli-
gious .... because the sectarian religious perspective will tend to look to
the deity for answers to moral questions."547 Indeed, to Judge Jacobs
"[tihe idea that moral values take their shape and force from God
seems... to be a viewpoint for consideration of moral questions."548 Af-
ter noting that "religious answers to questions about morals and charac-
ter tend to be couched in overfly religious terms and to implicate reli-
gious devotions,"549 he proclaimed that "[n]o one should be surprised if a
religious viewpoint on morality looks very like religion itself."550 Thus, he
contended that "[tihe subject matter [of morals and character] does not
change when it is informed by viewpoints that are sectarian. "551 As a
consequence, Judge Jacobs found that The Club was the victim of view-
point discrimination because "[its] ... message is in fact the 'teaching of
morals from a religious perspective[.1"
552
The Supreme Court rejected entirely the lower federal courts' Free
Speech holdings, for Justice Thomas, writing for himself and five other
Justices, held that The Club was the victim of viewpoint discrimina-
540. Milford Circuit, 202 F.3d at 511. See Milford District, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 159.
541. Milford Distric 21 F. Supp. 2d at 159. See Milford Circuit, 202 F.3d at 511.
542. Milford District, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 159. See Milford Circuit, 202 F.3d at 511.
543. Milford Circuit, 202 F.3d at 511. See Milford Distric 21 F. Supp. 2d at 159-60.
544. Milford Circuit, 202 F.3d at 512-15 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
545. Id. at 512, 514.
546. Id. at 512.
547. Id. at 514.
548. Id.
549. Id.
550. Milford Circuit, 202 F.3d at 515 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
551. Id. at 514.
552. Id at 515.
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tion.553 The majority's holding was based on its findings that "teaching
morals and character development to children is a permissible purpose
under Milford's policy, [and] ... [Tihe Club teaches morals and charac-
ter development to children[, ... even though it does so in a nonsecular
way."554 From this finding, the majority concluded that The Club was
simply engaged in discussing a secular topic from a religious perspec-
tive.555 In support of this conclusion, the Court equated The Club's cir-
cumstances with those of the Church in Lamb's Chapel,556 which wanted
to meet in a public school to show a movie presenting a Christian per-
spective of child rearing and family values, 557 and the students in Rosen-
berger,58 who wanted the university to pay the printing costs of a news-
paper dedicated to encouraging students "to consider what a personal
relationship with Jesus Christ means."
559
If The Club had approached secular subjects as directly as did the
film in Lamb's ChapeL and the student newspaper in Rosenberger, Good
News would not have provided any new news. But, The Club's meetings
were overtly designed to enable a professional ministry to proselytize
young children through evangelizing lessons and materials presented in
a format that was nearly identical to a stereotypical worship service.
Yet, these distinctions made no difference to the majority, for they "dis-
agree[d] that something that is 'quintessentially religious' or 'decidedly
religious in nature' cannot also be characterized properly as the teaching
of morals and character development from a particular viewpoint."
5 60
Format made no difference, because the majority believed that the mode
of speech used by The Club presented a religious viewpoint.' 61 The overt
553. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2100-02 (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and




557. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 387-89.
558. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2101-02.
559. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 825-26.
560. 121 S. Ct. at 2102 (citing Milford Circuit, 202 F.3d at 512 (Jacobs, J., dissenting)).
The Court also cited with approval Judge Jacobs' view that "it is quixotic to attempt a dis-
tinction between religious viewpoints and religious subject matters [especially] [w]hen the
subject matter is morals and character[.]" Id.
561. Id. at 2101. In dissent, Justice Souter strongly disagreed with the majority's holding
that a worship service format should make no difference to the outcome of the case by
stating that
It is beyond question that Good News intends to use the public school premises
not for the mere discussion of a subject from a particular, Christian point of view,
but for an evangelical service of worship calling children to commit themselves in
an act of Christian conversion. The majority avoids this reality only by resorting
to the bland and general characterization of Good News's activity as 'teaching of
morals and character, from a religious standpoint.' If the majority's statement ig-
nores reality, as it surely does, then today's holding may be understood only in
equally generic terms. Otherwise, indeed, this case would stand for the remark-
able proposition that any public school opened for civic meetings must be opened
for use as a church, synagogue, or mosque.
20011
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proselytizing made no difference, for the majority "s[awl no reason to
treat [T]he Club's use of religion as something other than a viewpoint
merely because of any evangelical message it conveys."5 62 In fact, in a
concurring opinion, Justice Scalia extolled The Club's proselytizing as
the necessary means of defending the premise upon which its viewpoint
was based-"God exists and His assistance is necessary to morality."59
C. The Establishment Clause Extensions
Having found that Milford had violated The Club's Free Speech
rights, the Court proceeded to determine whether Establishment Clause
justifications for excluding The Club from Milford's limited public forum
were available.564 The majority held that Milford "ha[d] no valid Estab-
lishment Clause interest."5 65 It based its holding on two main findings:
(1) there was "'no realistic danger that the community would think that
[Milford] . . . endors[ed] religion or any particular creed[,]'" by letting The
Club meet on public school premises;5 66 and (2) Milford's arguments that
"[school]children will perceive that the school is endorsing [The Club
and will feel coercive pressure to participate[ I [in] [Tihe Club's activi-
ties... [were] unpersuasive.
567
With respect to the general public's perception, the Court noted
that "[The Club's meetings were held after school hours, not sponsored
by the school, and open to any student who obtained parental consent,
not just to Club members."568 It also found that "Milford made its [prem-
ises] available to other organizations." 569  Moreover, during its Free
Speech analysis, the majority had determined that "IThe Club's activi-
ties [were] materially indistinguishable from those [of the victim groups]
in Lamb's Chapel and Widmar."5 70 Thus, the Court concluded that the
general public would not perceive Milford's inclusion of The Club in its
forum as an endorsement of The Club's religious viewpoint.
57 1
Id. at 2117 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.) (citation omitted).
562. Id. at 2102 n. 4. In dissent, Justice Stevens believed there was a very important rea-
son for permitting public schools to exclude proselytizing religious speech-it could "intro-
duce divisiveness and tend to separate young children into cliques that undermine the
school's educational mission." Id. at 2113 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
563. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2109 (Scalia, J., concurring). Thus, Justice Scalia com-
plained that the Court of Appeals' holding would let "The Club... discuss morals and
character... [but not] give its reasons why they should be fostered-because God wants
and expects it, because it will make [Tihe Club members 'saintly' people, and because it
emulates Jesus Christ." Id. (emphasis in original).
564. Id. at 2103-07 (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor, Scalia, and
Kennedy, JJ.).
565. Id. at 2103 (quoting Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395).
566. Id.
567. Id.
568. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2103.
569. Id.
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The majority's rejection of Milford's concerns for school children
who do not belong to The Club was much more complicated. First, it
found that including The Club in Milford's forum would uphold a con-
cept of neutrality that extols the government offering benefits "'to a
broad range of groups... without regard to their religion.'"5 72 This find-
ing was based on its view that "The... Club s[ought] nothing more than
to be ... given access to speak about the same topics as other
groups..573
Second, the majority held that Milford school children could not be
coerced into participating in The Club's activities "[blecause [they] can-
not attend [T]he... Club meetings[ I without their parents' permis-
sion."5 74 Under these circumstances, said the Court, only the parents
could be coerced or made to feel that Milford was endorsing religion, and
it did not "believe... such an argument could be reasonably ad-
vanced.
575
Third, the majority rejected the impressionability of elementary
school children as a relevant Establishment Clause factor in cases where
private religious conduct is allowed to take place in their presence on
school premises after school hours.57 6 It did so by noting that the im-
pressionability issue has been important only in cases where the reli-
gious activity took place during school hours or during school sponsored
activities, for in such cases student exposure to the religious activity has
deemed to be coerced. 577 In contrast to these cases, Good News in-
volved an after-school program neither sponsored by the school nor op-
erated by school personnel in which students could participate only with
the voluntary consent of their parents.57 The majority also found Mer-
gens to be irrelevant, even though it involved religious conduct on school
premises after school hours, because a finding that "high school stu-
dents.., are capable of distinguishing between government and private
endorsement of religion ... ma[kes] no statement about how capable of
discerning endorsement elementary school children would have been
[under the same circumstances] .57
572. Id. at 2104 (citation omitted).
573. Id.
574. Good News, 121 S. Ct. 2104.
575. Id.
576. Id. at 2104-05.
577. Id. at 2104-05 (distinguishing Good News from Sante Fe Independent Sch. Dist. v.
Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (prayer at public high school football games); Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577 (1992) (prayer at public high school graduation ceremonies); Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (the teaching of evolution or creationism in public schools);
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (reading of Bible verses at the start of
each schoolday); I11. ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Ed. of Sch. Dist. No. 71, 333 U.S. 203 (1948)
(releasing children during regular school hours to attend classes taught by sectarian reli-
gious teachers)).
578. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2104, 2105 andn. 7.
579. Id. at 2105 n. 7.
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Fourth, the Court found that the facts of Good News failed to sup-
port Milford's assertion that elementary school students could perceive
the admission of The Club to its forum as Milford's endorsement of relig-
ion. Key factors supporting this finding were a lack of "evidence that
young children are permitted to loiter outside classrooms after the
schoolday has ended[,] ... the meetings [are] held in a combined high
school resource room and middle school special education room [rather
than] ... in an elementary school classroom[,] [t]he instructors are not
schoolteachers[, a]nd the children in the group are not all the same age
as in the normal classroom setting ... [since] their ages range from 6 to
12.58
0
Fifth, the Court found that the exclusion of The Club from Milford's
forum could cause as much harmful public perceptions of constitutional
significance as would its inclusion. It did so after hypothesizing that the
school building could be occupied by upperclassmen and "members of
the public writ large" who "could conceivably be aware of the school's
use policy and its exclusion of [The Club] ... and [as a consequence]
could suffer as much from viewpoint discrimination as elementary
school children could suffer from perceived endorsement."5 8 1 In other
words, the Court speculated that persons who knew of The Club's exclu-
sion would perceive it as an act of government hostility toward religion.
In short, the Court refused find that the existence of some possibil-
ity that "small children would perceive [the inclusion of The Club in Mil-
ford's forum as government] endorsement [of religion]" constitutes a vio-
lation of the Establishment Clause. To do so, declared the Court, would
sanction the use of "a modified heckler's veto, in which a group's reli-
gious activity can be proscribed on the basis of what the youngest mem-
bers of the audience might misperceive.
"58 2
The majority's decision even to consider, much less rule on, the Es-
tablishment Clause issues was controversial, because the lower courts,
having held that Milford had not violated The Club's Free Speech rights,
had not needed to decide the Establishment Clause issues. Moreover,
Good News was an appeal from a summary judgment in favor of Mil-
ford.58 3 A reversal of a summary judgment in favor of Milford based on
Free Speech issues does not justify entering what amounts to be a
summary judgment in favor of The Club based on Establishment Clause
issues unless there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and...
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."5 4
A bare majority felt there was enough information on the record to
580. Id. at 2106.
581. Id.
582. Id.
583. I& at 161.
584. Fed. R Civ. P. 56(c) (2000).
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warrant it deciding the Establishment Clause issues,5 5 but four justices
strongly believed issues of material fact still remained so that Milford
should have been given a chance on remand to contest them.5 8 6 In a
partial concurring opinion, Justice Breyer complained that the critical
factual issue of whether "[Tihe Club 'so dominate[s]' the 'forum' that, in
the children's minds, 'a formal policy of equal access is transformed into
a demonstration of approval[ I'" was not developed on the record because
critical items of relevant evidence were not developed or properly con-
tested.587 As examples, he pointed out that to support its no endorse-
ment effect holding the Court had
" relied on facts not in evidence ("There is no evidence that young
children are permitted to loiter outside classrooms after the
schoolday has ended[; tihere may be as many, if not more, up-
perclassmen than elementary school children who occupy the
school after hours.")58 and
" made assumptions about other facts ("Surely even young chil-
dren are aware of events for which their parents must sign per-
mission forms[; a]ny bystander could conceivably be aware of the
school's use policy and its exclusion of [T]he... Club, and could
suffer as much from viewpoint discrimination as elementary
school children could suffer from perceived endorsement."). 589
Similarly, in dissent Justice Souter proclaimed that
If I were a trial judge .... I would balk at deciding on summary judgment
whether an Establishment Clause violation would occur here without hav-
ing statements of undisputed facts or uncontradicted affidavits showing,
for example, whether Good News conducts its instruction at the same time
as school-sponsored extracurricular and athletic activities conducted by
school staff and volunteers .... whether any other community groups use
school facilities immediately after classes end and how many students
participate in those groups; and the extent to which Good News, with 28
students in its membership, may 'dominate the forum' in a way that
heightens the perception of official endorsement .... 590
Having basically held that the perceptions of Milford's schoolchil-
dren about the nature of the relationship between The Club and Milford
were irrelevant to the resolution of the Establishment Clause issues,59 1
585. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2107 n. 9 (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
O'Connor. Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ.).
586. Id. at 2114-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2117-20 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined
by Ginsburg, J.); id. at 2111-12 (Breyer, J., concurring in part).
587. Id. at 2111-12 (Breyer, J., concurring in part).
588. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2112 (Breyer, J., concurring in part) (quoting id. at 2106
(Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist. C.J., and O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ.).
589. Id.
590. Id. at 2118 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.) (quoting Rosenberger, 515
U.S. at 851 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
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the majority summarily stated that "none of [the] facts [about which Jus-
tices Souter and Breyer were concerned] is relevant to the Establishment
Clause inquiry. " 59 2 More importantly, the majority appears to have ex-
cised from Establishment Clause jurisprudence the issue of whether re-
ligious groups dominate government created fora, for it forcefully de-
clared that "[w]hen a limited public forum is available for use by groups
presenting any viewpoint, ... we would not find an Establishment
Clause violation simply because only groups presenting a religious view-
point have opted to take advantage of the forum at a particular time."5 93
D. Significance of the Good News Extensions For Religious Speakers
Given its finding that Milford engaged in viewpoint discrimination,
the Supreme Court's attenuated forum analysis is of little significance
other than to note that in Good News the Court renewed its Lamb's
Chapel inclination to classify the forum in question as a traditional or
designated public forum. 94 Both Milford and the school district in
Lamb's Chapel made public school facilities available for "'social, civic,
and recreational meetings and entertainment events, and other uses per-
taining to the welfare of the community .... , This is a very broad fo-
rum definition that arguably opens the forum for expressive activities in-
volving any subject.5 95  Viewed this way, it would have been most
reasonable to have classified Milford's forum as a designated public fo-
597
rum.
Under the designated forum classification, the mere fact that The
Club was excluded from Milford's forum because of the religious content
of its meetings would have subjected the exclusion to strict scrutiny
analysis. 98 Its adoption would have also rendered futile all arguments
for excluding The Club based on characterizing its meetings as religious
worship or religious instruction, for in Widmar the Court held that gov-
ernment entities may not exclude such expressive activities from an
open public forum unless they met strict scrutiny standards.5 99 The fact
that the Court chose not to take this easier path to invoking strict scru-
tiny indicates that it had a strong desire to address the viewpoint dis-
crimination issue in order to strengthen the claims of religious speakers
for inclusion in limited public fora and nonpublic fora.
The Court's viewpoint discrimination holding has stunning breadth
even though it arose from a discussion of what is included in a forum
592. Id. at 2107 n. 9.
593. Id.
594. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2100; Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 391.
595. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2098 (citation omitted): Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 391.
596. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 391.
597. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
598. See id.
599. 454 U.S. at 269, 270 and nn. 6, 7.
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dedicated to discussions about morals and character development, 600 a
subject that in a certain sense is a major component of any religion's
mission.6°" This breadth is the product of the Court fashioning a defini-
tion of religious perspective that could apply to any issue associated with
how a person interacts with the world around her.
Religious doctrines can be quite abstract, so the best way they can
be made meaningful to lay audiences is to apply them to issues that
arise from everyday life.6° 2 Logic dictates that the subject of vernacular
stories used to teach religious doctrine or to induce members of the au-
dience to join a religious movement is religion, even if the content of
those stories implicates other subjects that are included in a limited
603public forum. But, the Court declared that it saw "no reason to treat
[Tihe Club's use of religion as something other than a viewpoint merely
because of any evangelical message it conveys."60 4 It also concluded that
"[Tihe Club's activities do no constitute mere religious worship, divorced
from any teaching about moral values."60 5 As a consequence, the Court
created a definition of religious perspective that fails to identify the sub-
ject of expression by the purposes it serves and to separate the subject
from the means used to discuss it. By this definition, religion can never
be a distinct subject matter because it is always expresses a viewpoint
about any life issue a religious teacher or religious proselytizer uses to
600. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2102 and n. 4.
601. See Milford Circuit; 202 F.3d at 512-15 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
602. See Nathan 0. Hatch, The Dernocratization of American Christianity 125-61 (Yale U.
Press 1989) for a discussion of how certain American religious movements achieved more
rapid growth than others from about 1780 to 1830 because they were led by persons
uniquely adept in translating religious doctrine into vernacular language and forms of ex-
pression. For example, this material began with the following epigram:
Lorenzo [Dow] ... understood common life, and especially vulgar life-its tastes,
prejudices, and weaknesses; and he possessed a cunning knack of adapting his
discourses to such audiences. He told stories with considerable art, and his
memory being stored with them, he could always point a moral or clinch a propo-
sition by an anecdote. He knew that with simple people an illustration is better
than logic, and when he ran short of Scripture, or argument failed, he usually re-
sorted to some pertinent story or adapted allegory ....
Id. at 125 (quoting Samuel G. Goodrich, Recollections of a Lifetime (New York, 1856)).
Hatch illustrated Dow's genius for translating abstract religious doctrine into vernacular
language with the story of how Dow answered the question of whether he knew what Cal-
vinism was with the following poem:
You can and you can't
You will and you won't
You'll be damned if you do
And you'll be damned if you don't.
Id. at 130 (quoting Samuel G. Goodrich, Recollections ofaLifetime (New York, 1856)).
603. See Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2112-14 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2115-17
(Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.).
604. Id. at 2102 n. 4. (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor, Scalia, Ken-
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teach ar advance it..606
In Rosenberger the Court observed that "[it] is... something of an
understatement to speak of religious thought and discussion as just a
viewpoint, as distinct from a comprehensive body of thought."60 7 The
Court's viewpoint discrimination holding in Good News elevated to
precedent what was just an understatement in Rosenberger. As a result,
Good News stands for the proposition that "speech can[not] be excluded
from a limited public forum on the basis of the religious nature of the
speech." This opens up the possibility that Justice Souter was justi-
fied in being concerned that "this case [clould stand for the remarkable
proposition that any public school opened for civic meetings must be
opened for use as a church, synagogue, or mosque." 609 In other words,
Good News seems to give religious speakers automatic entry into any
limited public forum open to any secular subject that could possibly
provide a minister with illustrative tools for teaching religious doctrine,
preaching salvation or evangelizing.
Good News may also provide religious speakers with automatic en-
try into nonpublic fora, especially where public schools are concerned.
For example, a school district would create a nonpublic forum by au-
thorizing each school to make its facilities available during non-school
day hours to organizations it selects on a case-by-case basis to provide
its students with learning opportunities that enhance their understand-
ing of subjects covered by its curriculum. 6 ' ° Arguably, if a public school
admitted to such nonpublic forum an organization dedicated to provid-
ing students with learning opportunities in life sciences, it would be re-
quired by the viewpoint discrimination holding of Good News to also ad-
mit an organization operated by an evangelical Christian church that
wished to teach "creation science." It would have to do so because crea-
tion science presents a view of the Universe's creation that supports the
Biblical accounts of creation and directly refutes evolutionary theory.6 '
606. See Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2112-14 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2115-17
(Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.).
607. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831.
608. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2099, where the Court stated that it granted certiorari in
this case to resolve "a conflict among the Courts of Appeals on the question whether
speech can be excluded from a limited public forum on the basis of the religious nature of
the speech."
609. Id. at2117.
610. Such a forum would qualify as a nonpublic forum because it would be limited to
speakers who facilitate the business of the public school, see Perry, 460 U.S. at 53 ("gov-
ernment may-without further justification-restrict use to those who participate in the
forum's official business."), and it would involve the selective process that is the key char-
acteristic of nonpublic fora. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804-05. It would also not be gov-
erned by the Equal Access Act, since any group admitted would be curriculum related.
See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 237-40.
611. A working definition of creation science was embodied in a 1981 Arkansas law,
which provides:
(1) Creation-science includes the scientific evidences and related inferences that
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This outcome would be absurd, for the Court has previously ruled
that it violates the Establishment Clause for public schools to offer crea-
tion science as a part of its regular curriculum.6 12 It could be avoided if
the Court would hold that it violates the Establishment Clause for a
public school to include creation science in a nonpublic forum created
exclusively to further its educational mission. Such a holding seems
compatible with the selective nature of nonpublic fora6 1 3 and the Court's
holding in Allegheny County that government favors religion if it gives a
private religious organization access to government facilities that are not
open to all on an equal basis.6 14 But, in Good News, the Court cast
doubt as to its willingness to find an Establishment Clause justification
for such an exclusion, for at the outset of its Establishment Clause
analysis the Court declared that "it is not clear whether a State's interest
in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation would justify viewpoint
discrimination. 61 5
In Good News, the Court closed the door on the possibility that the
Establishment Clause provides any justification for the government to
exclude religious speakers from public fora, traditional, designated or
limited. Contrary to the intimations of Widmar and Mergens, the Court
held that the perceptions young students of impressionable age form
from witnessing private religious activity taking place in public schools
during non-school hours are simply irrelevant constitutionally.6 16 And,
contrary to the intimations of Rosenberger, Lamb's Chapel, Mergens, and
indicate sudden creation of the universe, energy, and life from nothing; (2) The in-
sufficiency of mutation and natural selection in bringing about development of all
living kinds from a single organism; (3) Changes only within fixed limits of origi-
nally created kinds of plants and animals; (4) Separate ancestry for man and
apes; (5) Explanation of the earth's geology by catastrophism, including the oc-
currence of a worldwide flood; and (6) A relatively recent inception of the earth
and living kinds.
Ronald L. Numbers, The Creationists: The Evolution of Scientific Creationism 245 (U. of Cal.
Press 1992) (quoting Ark. Code Ann. § 4(a) (LEXIS Supp. 1981)). Creation science is espe-
cially supported by persons who believe in a supernatural creator and the Biblical creation
story found in the Bible. Id; see Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 590, 591 and nn. 11-
13, 592 (1987).
612. Edwards., 482 U.S. at 596-97.
613. Cornelius, 473 at 804-05 (selective nature of nonpublic fora).
614. 492 U.S. at 599-600 (admission of religious symbol to a public facility not equally
available to all constitutes unconstitutional favoring of religion). See Pinette, 515 U.S. 753,
763-66 (1995)(plurality)(Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy and Thomas,
JJ.).
615. GoodNews, 121 S. Ct. at2103.
616. Compare Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2106 ("We decline to employ Establishment
Clause jurisprudence using a modified heckler's veto, in which a group's religious activity
can be proscribed on the basis of what the youngest members of the audience might mis-
perceive.") with Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274 n. 14 ("University students are.., young adults[,
so tihey are less impressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate
that the University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion."); Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250
(plurality) (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Blackmun, JJ.) ("We
think that secondary students are mature enough and are likely to understand that a
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Widmar, the Court made a brief footnote statement that appears to
eliminate the robustness of the forum, as indicated by a large number of
participants with diverse views, as a relevant Establishment Clause con-
cern.
6 17
The Court's impressionability holding reinforces the principle, most
clearly expressed in Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette,
618
that the perception of government endorsement of religion obtained by a
person from witnessing religious speech being expressed in a legitimate
public forum in a manner that makes the perception reasonable-such
as observing an unattended large cross erected by a private organization
in a public forum directly in front of a state Capitol building-is irrele-
vant to Establishment Clause purposes. 19 It is irrelevant, said the
Court in Pinette, because such a perception is erroneous since religion is
endorsed by the private religious speaker, not government, when private
religious expression occurs within a legitimate public forum. 620 As a
consequence, the Court judges the endorsement effects of private reli-
gious expression in a legitimate public forum through the eyes of a hypo-
thetical community consisting of reasonable people who are presumed to
know that the public forum is legitimate and the religious expression is
that of a private speaker.62' Under the Pinette principle, a young child's
perception of government endorsement of religion obtained by her obser-
vations of private religious speech activity in a legitimate public forum
established in a public school is erroneous. So, Good News reinforced
the Pinette principle by applying it to get rid of any lingering notion that
the misperceptions of any actual young child with respect to government
617. Compare Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2107 n. 9 ("When a limited public forum is avail-
able for use by groups presenting any viewpoint .... we would not find an Establishment
Clause violation simply because only groups presenting a religious viewpoint have opted to
take advantage of the forum at a particular time.") with Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 840, 842
("The category of support here is for 'student news, information, opinion, entertainment, or
academic communications media groups,' of which Wide Awake was 1 of 15 in the 1990
school year." "It does not violate the Establishment Clause for a public university to grant
access to its facilities on a religion-neutral basis to a wide spectrum of student groups [.J")
(emphasis added); Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395 ("The District property had repeatedly
been used by a wide variety of private organizations."); Mergens, 496 U.S. at 252 ("[Ihe
broad spectrum of officially recognized student clubs at westside, and the fact that
Westside students are free to initiate and organize additional student clubs... counteract
any possible message of official endorsement of or preference for religion or a particular
religious belief.") (plurality) (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White and
Blackmun, JJ.); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274 ("[T]he forum is available to a broad class of non-
religious as well as religious speakers; there are over 100 recognized student groups at
UMKC.").
618. 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
619. Id. at 763-65 (plurality) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy and Tho-
mas, JJ.); id. at 773, 778-82 (O'Connor, J., joined by Souter and Breyer, JJ.).
620. Id. at 763-65 (plurality) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy and Tho-
mas, JJ.); id. at 773, 778-82 (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by Souter and Breyer, JJ.).
621. Id. at 763-65 (plurality) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy and Tho-
mas, JJ.); id. at 773, 778-82 (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by Souter and Breyer, JJ.).
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endorsement of private religious speech, communicated in a legitimate
public forum, can be the basis of an Establishment Clause violation.
622
Thus, the Court declared that:
We cannot operate, as Milford would have us do, under the assumption
that any risk that small children would perceive endorsement should
counsel in favor of excluding the Club's religious activity. We decline to
employ Establishment Clause jurisprudence using a modified heckler's
veto, in which a group's religious activity can be proscribed on the basis of
what the youngest members of the audience might misperceive.
623
The Court's footnote indication in Good News that it is willing to
approve a limited public forum in which only religious speakers partici-
pate is a very significant development. Prior to Good News, the fact that
a forum had a large number of speakers representing a broad spectrum
of views was considered by the Court to be an important determinant of
its legitimacy, because such a forum was deemed to be incapable of pro-
ducing impermissible endorsement effects. 62 4 Moreover, in Pinette, five
Justices rejected the plurality's assertion that a public forum can be
deemed to have produced impermissible endorsement effects only if they
were the product of deliberate government action to promote or favor re-
ligious expression. 629 By doing so, they held open the possibility that a
public forum dominated by religious speakers for reasons other than
government manipulation is illegitimate and may generate, in the rele-
vant community, a reasonable perception that the government endorses
626the religious expression occurring therein. In announcing its willing-
622. Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2106 (citing Pinette, 515 U.S. at 779-80) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
623. Id.
624. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 840, 842 ("The category of support here is for 'student
news, information, opinion, entertainment, or academic communications media groups,' of
which Wide Awake was lof 15 in the 1990 school year." "It does not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause for a public university to grant access to its facilities on a religious-neutral
basis to a wide spectrum of student groups [.]") (emphasis added); Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S.
at 395 ("The District property had repeatedly been used by a wide variety of private organi-
zations."); Mergens, 496 U.S. at 252 ("[T]he broad spectrum of officially recognized student
clubs at Westside, and the fact that Westside students are free to initiate and organize ad-
ditional student clubs... counteract any possible message of official endorsement of or
preference for religion or a particular religious belief.") (plurality) (O'Connor, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Blackmun, JJ.); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274 ("Itlhe provision
of benefits to so broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secular effect.").
625. Compare Pinette, 515 U.S. at 763-70 (Plurality opinion of J. Scalia, joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy and Thomas, JJ.) with id. at 774-78 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring, joined by Souter and Breyer, JJ.); id. at 786-92 (Souter, J., concurring, joined by
O'Connor and Breyer, JJ.); fd. at 807-12 (Stevens, J., dissenting); ki. at 817-18 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
626. For example, in her concurring opinion Justice O'Connor noted the importance of
the Court's finding in Widmar that the forum was comprised of a large number of student
groups and the university's handbook contained a disclaimer of association with the view
of those groups. Id. at 776 (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by Souter and Breyer, JJ.).
And, in dissent, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg found that an unattended cross, located in
a public forum, in front of a state capitol building, without a highly visible sign demon-
strating that it did not belong to the government, impermissibly gave the impression that
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ness to accept the legitimacy of a limited public forum in which only reli-
gious speakers participate, the Good News majority essentially adopted
the Pinette plurality's view that endorsement analysis should not apply
whenever "[rieligious expression ... is purely private and ... occurs in a
traditional or designated public forum, publicly announced and open to
all on equal terms,"6 27 and then extended it to religious expression in a
limited public forum. 628 It also aligned religious expression cases with
the Court's prior holding, in the important government benefit case of
Mueller v. Allen, 629 that the constitutionality of laws which distribute
government benefits in a facially neutral manner should not turn on how
much of the benefits go to persons who use their benefits in ways that
benefit religious organizations.6 3 °
It is difficult to determine what motivated the Good News majority
to adopt the Pinette plurality's approach to endorsement, for it did so
without supporting analysis in a single sentence at the end of a footnote
that was itself at the very end of the majority's Establishment Clause
analysis.6 3 ' Perhaps the majority felt it had to take this approach, be-
cause Milford's limited public forum had only included four outside or-
ganizations,6 3 2 thereby making it distinguishable factually and constitu-
tionally from the broad-based and diverse fora the Court had approved
in the cases the Good News majority most relied on, Widmar and Lamb's
Chapel.633 However, the majority obviously lacked empathy for children
who might reasonably believe that the inclusion of The Club in Milford's
limited public forum would signify Milford's endorsement of religion, so
one is led to suspect that it adopted the Pinette plurality's endorsement
approach so it could ignore any real-world problems Milford's forum
might impose on children who did not share The Club's religious
views.
6 34
In his Mergens concurrence, Justice Marshall warned that very real
problems could be imposed on non-religious students and students of
minority faiths if a public school establishes a public forum in which the
the government endorsed Christianity. Id. at 807-12 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 817-
18 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
627. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 770 (plurality) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Ken-
nedy and Thomas, JJ.).
628. See Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2107-08 (Scalia, J., concurring)(quoting Pinette, 515
U.S. at 770).
629. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
630. Id. at 401.
631. GoodNews, 121 U.S. at 2107 n. 9.
632. Id. at 2120 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.).
633. See id. at 2119-20.
634. See id. at 2104, 2106, where the majority found that these children could not be co-
erced, their discomforts would be outweighed by those who could suffer from the percep-
tion that government is hostile to religion if they knew that The Club was not included in
Milford's forum, and to help them would be tantamount to using a heckler's veto.
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only ideological participant is a religious group." 5 Such students could
reasonably believe that the school endorsed religion by operating such a
forum, since
Students would be alerted to the meetings of the religion club over the
public address system[,] ... see religion club material posted on the offi-
cial school bulletin board and club notices in the school newspaper[,] ...
[and] be recruited to join the religion club at the school-sponsored Club
Fair.6
36
As noted previously, Justice Marshall also feared that in such a non-
robust forum a popular religious club could fan intolerance against stu-
dents who do not share the club's perspectives sufficient to create enor-
mous peer pressure on the "dissenting" students to join the club or ad-
here to its beliefs. 637 Similarly, in his Good News dissent Justice Stevens
expressed concern that the admission to a public school-created forum
of a religious club dedicated to proselytizing could "introduce divisive-
ness and tend to separate young children into cliques that undermine
the school's educational mission."m8 And, in Milford Circuit, the Second
Circuit expressed support for Milford's concern that admitting The Club
to its limited public forum could make students who did not share The
Club's religious views feel less welcome.63 9
These are not idie concerns. It has been reported to the author that
at prominent suburban high schools in the Tulsa area, where students
of evangelical faiths predominate, a popular annual event involving stu-
dents congregating around the schools' flag poles, before classes start, to
engage in a communal prayer service, has been used by many attending
students as a means of identifying non-Christian students for future re-
cruitment efforts. In fact, the superintendent of one such school district
has stated that the evangelical efforts of some Christian students are so
intense as to create impermissible discord within the district's schools.
And, a veteran ACLU attorney in the Tulsa area has told the author that
the evangelical environment in these schools has risen to the level of
constitutional concern but that the parents of non-Christian students
have chosen to send their children to other schools rather than endure
the hostility that would be directed toward them by the community if
they filed a lawsuit.
The Good News majority turned a blind eye to these real world
problems faced by flesh-and-blood children. After all, such children are
real persons experiencing the effects of real religious activity, yet accord-
ing to the Good News majority their very tangible perceptions of feeling
635. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 266 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Bren-
nan, J.)
636. Id. at 268.
637. Id. at 268-69.
638. GoodNews, 121 S. Ct. at 2113 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
639. Milford Circuit, 202 F.3d at 509.
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unwelcome and besieged by fanatical evangelicalism are undeserving of
consideration constitutionally if they emanate from purely private reli-
gious expression occurring within their schools' public fora. 640 Instead,
the Good News majority held that only its portrayal of the perception of a
hypothetical community of hypothetical observers, well-schooled in the
vagaries of the Court's public forum jurisprudence, should be consid-
ered. 641 (Query: Could it be that the constitutionally relevant community
can only be the Justices comprising the Good News majority?) In fact,
the Good News majority found that children in these circumstances were
so much less deserving than those who would participate in religious or-
ganizations operating in public fora established by public schools that it
equated them with hecklers.642 Thus, Good News signifies a sad and
precipitous decline in the real world value of an endorsement test that
once was heralded as a device for preventing the government from
"send[ing] a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community, and an accompanying message to
adherents that they are insiders[.]" 64 3
E. Significance of Good News to an Emerging Church-State
In Bowen v. Kendrick,644 a 1988 case, a bare majority of the Su-
preme Court held that it does not facially violate the Establishment
Clause for the government to contract with religious organizations to
provide social services if
" competition for the funding is open to all qualified providers on a
religiously neutral basis,645
* "a fairly wide spectrum of organizations is eligible to apply for
and receive funding[,]" 64 6
" it is unlikely that direct aid will flow to "pervasively sectarian"
organizations, 6 4 7 and
" "there is... no intimation in the statute that at some point...
religious uses are permitted."64"8
Accordingly, the Bowen majority held that it would be unconstitutional
for the government to contract with pervasively sectarian organiza-
tions, 649 or for religious contractees to use government aid to support re-
ligious activities, disseminate materials that have explicitly religious con-
640. See Good News, 121 S. Ct. at 2106.
641. Id.
642. Id.
643. Lynch. 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
644. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
645. Id. at 606-09 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White, O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy, JJ.).
646. Id. at 608.
647. Id. at 610-12, 616-17.
648. Id. at 614-15.
649. Id. at621.
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tent, or "inculcate the views of a particular religious faith."650 In other
words, Bowen permits the government to contract with religious service
providers in a manner which will "carry[ ] out their functions... in a
lawful, secular, manner."
651
Even prior to Bowen, in 1986, the Court had held, in Witters v.
Washington Dept of Services for the Blind,65 2 that it was permissible for a
person to receive government aid, even though he used it to benefit a re-
ligious organization's religious mission, if he received the aid pursuant to
religiously neutral eligibility criteria and his decision to use it in a man-
ner that benefited a religious organization was his own pure private
choice.653 Seven years later, the Court reaffirmed Witters in Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills School Dis_
65 4
Given that Bowen appeared to provide the government with broad
authority to contract with religiously oriented service providers, and that
Witters and Zobrest appeared to permit persons receiving government
vouchers under religiously neutral selection criteria to use them to re-
ceive services from religious providers engaged in religious missions, it
was somewhat surprising that on August 22, 1996, Congress and Presi-
dent Clinton felt compelled to embark on a new faith-based initiative (fbi)
as a part of the landmark welfare reforms of 1996.655 However, the pur-
pose of the fbi is to
allow States [administering certain social services programs funded by the
federal government] to contract with religious organizations, or to allow re-
ligious organizations to accept certificates, vouchers or other forms of dis-
bursement under any [relevant] program.... on the same basis as any
other nongovernmental provider without impairing the religious character of
such organizations, and without diminishing the religious freedom [of
these programs'] beneficiaries .... 656
So, it is obvious that the fbi is intended to permit religious organizations
to receive government contracts and implement them in ways that are
less secular than Bowen appeared to require. Indeed, the fbi expressly
provides that religious organizations contracting with the government
may retain their "independence ... over the definition, development,
practice, and expression of [their] religious beliefs."65 7 Moreover, such
650. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 621-22.
651. Id. at 612 (emphasis added).
652. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
653. Id. at 482-84, 487-89 (recipient used an education grant to attend a Bible college).
654. 509 U.S. 1, 3, 8-10, 13 (1993) (deaf student attending a private sectarian high school
was peritted to receive the services of a state-paid sign language interpreter who would
be with him at school during religious and non-religious activities).
655. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, § 104, 110 Stat. 2161 (1996) (now codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 604a (West Supp.
2001)).
656. 42 U.S.C.A. § 604a(b) (West Supp. 2001) (emphasis added).
657. 42 U.S.C.A. § 604a(d)(1) (West Supp. 2001).
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organizations may not be required to "alter [their] form of internal gov-
ernance, "6s8 or "remove religious art, icons, scripture, or other sym-
bols" 65 9 to be eligible to receive government contracts. 660 More generally,
the fbi:
" forbids government contractors from discriminating against reli-
gious applicants for contracts "on the basis that... [they] ha[ve]
a religious character, 
"661
" permits religious contractees to receive and implement govern-
ment contracts "so long as the programs are implemented consis-
tent with the Establishment Clause ... .662
" requires government to provide individual beneficiaries objecting
to receiving services from a provider displaying a religious char-
acter with secular alternatives of comparable accessibility and
value,663
" forbids the religious contractees, from discriminating against any
beneficiary "on the basis of religion, a religious belief, or refusal
to actively participate in a religious practice,"66 and
" forbids the use of government funds "for sectarian worship, in-
struction or proselytization."
6 65
Of particular relevance to this article is the requirement that reli-
gious providers implement government programs in a manner consistent
with the Establishment Clause, for the Supreme Court has considerably
liberalized the degree to which religious organizations can receive gov-
ernment benefits and participate in government fora since 1988. As dis-
cussed previously, in the 1995 Rosenberger case, the Court blurred the
line between government benefits cases and religious speech cases by
developing the concept of a metaphysical forum to justify applying its re-
ligious speech precedents to a case involving a public university paying
the printing costs of a religious student organization communicating its
666 667
religious views to the public. Two years later, in Agostini v. Felton, a
bare majority of the Court removed the barrier against the government
providing pervasively sectarian institutions direct aid as long as the re-
cipients are identified through religiously neutral selection criteria.66
Most importantly, in the 2000 case of Mitchell v. Helms,a6 9 which
658. 42 U.S.C.A. § 604a(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2001).
659. 42 U.S.C.A. § 604a(d)(2)(B) (West Supp. 2001).
660. 42 U.S.C.A. § 604a(d)(2) (West Supp. 2001).
661. 42 U.S.C.A. § 604a(c) (West Supp. 2001).
662. 42 U.S.C.A. § 604a(c) (West Supp. 2001).
663. 42 U.S.C.A. § 604a(e)(1) (West Supp. 2001).
664. 42 U.S.C.A. § 604a(g) (West Supp. 2001) (emphasis added).
665. 42 U.S.C.A. § 604a(j) (West Supp. 2001).
666. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830-32.
667. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
668. Id. at 228-31.
669. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
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concerned the constitutionality of a federal program for providing com-
puters and other instructional materials to public and private schools, °
six Justices agreed, for varying reasons, that pervasively sectarian insti-
tutions could receive direct aid capable of being diverted to religious
purposes.67' They also agreed that Mitchell was the death knell of Estab-
lishment Clause precedents requiring the government to treat perva-
sively sectarian institutions differently than secular institutions.7 2 Fi-
nally, the six Justices agreed that government aid could ultimately be
used in a manner that advanced the religious mission of a religious or-
ganization as long as the aid was distributed on the basis of religiously
neutral beneficiary selection criteria and reached the religious organiza-
tion through the purely private choices of the government's true benefi-
673ciaries.
The six Justices parted company, however, as to what type of dis-
tribution system satisfies the private choices requirement. A plurality of
four Justices asserted that the private choices requirement is met, even
though the aid flows directly from the government to religious organiza-
tions, as long as the true beneficiaries of the government aid are identi-
fied by religiously neutral criteria and government aid goes to religious
organizations based on the number of the true government beneficiaries
they serve. 67 4 Two concurring Justices refused to accept the per capita
distribution system endorsed by the plurality as an acceptable way of
meeting the private choices requirement, for they believed that giving the
aid directly to religious organizations not only reduces somewhat the
ability of the true government beneficiary to direct where the aid goes, 5
but also leads to the government impermissibly endorsing any religious
activity its aid furthers.
6 76
This disagreement is not trivial. The concurring Justices would not
permit religious organizations to divert to religious purposes any aid they
receive directly from the government.6 7 Instead, they would require reli-
gious organizations to establish safeguards that need not amount to a
pervasive monitoring system to guard against the diversion of any direct
670. Id. at 801-07 (plurality) (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia and Ken-
nedy, JJ.).
671. Id. at 820-25 (plurality) (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia and Ken-
nedy, JJ.); id. at 853-57, 861-67 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by
Breyer, J.).
672. Id. at 826-29 (plurality) (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia and Ken-
nedy, JJ.); id. at 857-60 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Breyer, J.).
673. Id. at 809-14, 820-23 (plurality) (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia
and Kennedy, JJ.); id. at 841-43 ( O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by
Breyer, J.).
674. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809-14, 816-20, 829-31 (plurality) (Thomas, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia and Kennedy, JJ.).
675. Id. at 842 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Breyer, J.).
676. Id. at 842-43.
677. Id. at 840-43.
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618government aid they receive to religious purposes.
The plurality's neutral selection, per capita distribution approach
makes it much easier for religious organizations to get direct government
aid and use it for religious purposes. To that end, the plurality summa-
rized its approach as follows:
In distinguishing between indoctrination that is attributable to the State
and indoctrination that is not, we have consistently turned to the principle
of neutrality, upholding aid that is offered to a broad range of groups or
persons without regard to their religion. If the religious, irreligious, and
areligious are all alike eligible for governmental aid, no one would con-
clude that any indoctrination that any particular recipient conducts has
been done at the behest of the government. For attribution of indoctrina-
tion is a relative question. If the government is offering assistance to re-
cipients who provide, so to speak, a broad range of indoctrination, the
government itself is not thought responsible for any particular indoctrina-
tion. To put the point differently, if the government, seeking to further
some legitimate secular purpose, offers aid on the same terms, without re-
gard to religion, to all who adequately further that purpose .... then it is
fair to say that any aid going to a religious recipient only has the effect of
679furthering that secular purpose.
This approach is a stunning expansion of the ability of the govern-
ment to provide direct aid to the religious missions of religious organiza-
tions, for it arguably would permit the government to contract with reli-
gious service providers to use religious methods to achieve secular goals.
For example, imagine that government funded a substance abuse grants
program, with the criteria being that service providers demonstrate the
effectiveness of their programs and serve persons who truly have sub-
stance abuse problems. Under the plurality's approach, government
could contract with a church that demonstrates that it successfully
leads substance abusers into recovery through a program of religious
conversion, prayer, and meditation. The government's program serves a
secular purpose (helping substance abusers get into and remain in re-
covery). The government's true beneficiaries are selected by religiously
neutral criteria (they are true substance abusers). Contracts are
awarded on a religiously neutral basis (to providers with a track record
of success). Contractees receive payments in accordance to the number
of true substance abusers that choose them for assistance, so private
choice dictates the level of government aid, if any, the church will re-
ceive. As a consequence, according to the Mitchell plurality the church's
religious indoctrination of substance abusers is solely its own and is not
to be attributed for endorsement test purposes to the government. More
importantly, since the church's religious methods are effective in helping
678. Id. at 861-64.
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substance abusers get into and remain in recovery, the aid received by
the church will be deemed to have produced only a secular result despite
it having financed the religious conversion of substance abusers.
Obviously, the substance abuse program described above would not
presently pass constitutional muster, since in Mitchell only four Justices
signed on to the neutral selection, per capita distribution approach. It is
also clear that it would not even meet the requirements of the fbi, be-
cause it forbids the use government funds to finance "sectarian worship,
instruction, and proselytization."68 0 And yet, the Free Speech and Estab-
lishment Clause extensions of Good News may have opened the door for
the MitchelL plurality's neutrality vision to become reality.
First, it is not inconceivable that the Court would regard the sub-
stance abuse program as a metaphysical limited government program.
The program certainly has a defined subject: how to lead substance
abusers into recovery and keep them there. Even though some service
providers will make use of medical treatments, all will undoubtedly in-
clude a counseling or training program that is expressive in nature. A
wide range of potential service providers using diverse substance abuse
treatment methods will compete for the grants. In short, all of the ele-
ments are in place to meet the Rosenberger metaphysical forum re-
quirements.6 8 1
Second, the fact that the church's substance abuse recovery pro-
gram uses quintessentially religious forms of expression, including wor-
ship, prayer and proselytizing, cannot be the basis of government ex-
cluding it from the grants program. Under Good News, religion is a
viewpoint and a subject, so that it does not matter that the church uses
religious formats and proselytizing to address substance abuse.6 2 Any
attempt to exclude the church for using its religious methods could be
deemed to be unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.
683
Third, and most importantly, under the Good News' Establishment
Clause holding, the government's admission of the church to its meta-
physical limited public forum could not be deemed an endorsement of
the church's religious views. The Good News majority grounded its Es-
tablishment Clause holding on a neutrality principle that is virtually
identical to that employed by the Mitchell plurality: "the 'guarantee of
neutrality is respected, not offended, when the government, following
neutral criteria and evenhanded policies, extends benefits to recipients
whose ideologies and viewpoints, including religious ones, are broad and
680. 42 U.S.CA. § 604ag) (West Supp. 2001). See Amy L. Sherman, The Charitable
Choice Handbook for Ministry Leaders 11-14 (Hudson Institute & Center for Public Justice
2001).
681. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-31, 835.
682. GoodNews, 121 S. Ct. at 2101-02, 2102 n. 4.
683. Id. at 2101-02.
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diverse.""'
Moreover, in invoking neutrality as a key Establishment Clause fac-
tor, the Good News majority quoted with approval the Mitchell plurality's
assertion that government does not indoctrinate by providing aid to an
indoctrinating religious recipient through a program offering aid to a
broad range of recipients on a religiously neutral basis.65 And, as dis-
cussed previously, the Good News majority virtually adopted the Pinette
plurality's view, that government endorsement of religion never occurs
when "[r]eligious expression. . . is purely private and ... occurs in a
traditional or designated public forum, publicly announced and open to
all on equal terms,"68 6 by the way it refused to consider the perceptions
of Milford students and intimated that it would approve a forum that
had only religious participants.6 87
The Pinette plurality view is essentially the Mitchell neutrality prin-
ciple adapted to a case where entry into a government-created public fo-
rum is the benefit conferred on the religious recipient. This is no acci-
dent, for the Pinette and Mitchell pluralities are comprised of the same
four Justices. What also may be no accident is that the two concurring
Justices who refused to sign on to the Mitchell neutrality principle joined
with the Mitchell plurality to form the Good News majority in support of
a neutrality principle virtually identical to those of Mitchell and Pinette.
As a consequence, Good News could be the stimulus for a majority of the
Court to adopt the Mitchell neutrality principle in its next big direct gov-
ernment aid to religion case. Alternatively, Good News could become au-
thority for the proposition that it will not violate the Establishment
Clause if the government admits to metaphysical limited public fora, de-
signed to provide social services to designated beneficiaries, religious or-
ganizations that will provide their services through distinctly religious
means and messages.
Of course, the foregoing forum analysis depends upon whether a
government grants program can be deemed to be a forum for expression
or just a means by which the government secures help for carrying out
its programs. If grants programs are considered to be a means of carry-
ing out government policy, then grantees may be regarded as persons
who speak for the government, since the programs will not be designed
to encourage private speech but rather will involve the government em-
ploying the services of private speakers to deliver its own messages. 688
Those government directed messages will violate the Establishment
Clause's endorsement test if they signify the government's approval of
684. Id. at 2104.
685. Id
686. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 770.
687. Good News, 121S. Ct. at 2106-07, 2107 n. 9.
688. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193-200 (1991).
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religion. 689 It surely will violate the Establishment Clause for the gov-
ernment to encourage substance abusers enrolled in its recovery pro-
grams to pursue religious conversion.
690
VI. CONCLUSION
Good News is a very significant case masked by the majority's mod-
estly written opinion. It establishes religion as a perpetual viewpoint so
that religious speakers must almost automatically be admitted to any
public forum, traditional, designated, or limited, where secular topics are
discussed that could supply the means of illustrating religious doctrine.
It also intimates that public fora are legitimate even though their only
participants are religious speakers. As a consequence, Good News vir-
tually establishes the principle that government does not endorse the re-
ligious speech of private speakers it admits to legitimate public fora on
an equal basis using religiously neutral admission criteria. This concept
of church-state neutrality could combine with the concept of a meta-
physical forum to enable religious organizations to receive government
grants to provide persons with social services using religious means. At
a minimum, it will permit public schools to become instruments of reli-
gious proselytizing by creating limited public fora covering topics of wide
scope, such as moral and character development.
Should these developments come to fruition, one should hope that
Madison's critique of religious establishments in his Remonstrance
Against Religious Assessments is no longer valid. Otherwise, our nation
will witness increasing "pride and indolence in the clergy; ignorance and
servility in the laity; in both, superstition, bigotry, and persecution."
691
We may also witness the destruction of "that moderation and harmony
which the forbearance of our laws to intermeddle with religion has pro-
duced amongst its several sects."
692
689. See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 765-66.
690. Id.
691. James Madison, Against Religious Assessments, in The Annals of America-1 784-
1796: Organizing the New Nation, vol. 3, 6, 18 (Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 1976).
692. Madison, supra n. 691, at 19.
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